GameStop CEO Ryan Cohen’s $56B Plan to Take Over eBay

• Primary speakers: Ryan Cohen, chairman and chief executive of GameStop and co-founder of Chewy; interviewer David Friedberg of the All-In Podcast.
• Main context: A long-form interview covering Cohen’s creation and sale of Chewy, his operating methods, his investment in GameStop, GameStop’s turnaround, and his proposed acquisition of eBay.
• Source date: Not stated clearly inside the supplied transcript.
• Commercial segments: The transcript contains promotional messages for AppLovin and Nasdaq. They are separated from the editorial interview below.
• Transcript quality: The source contains extensive duplicated captions, repeated fragments, inconsistent speaker labels, transcription errors, and several garbled names and figures. These have been cleaned where the intended wording is clear. Uncertain material is marked or included in the verification list.
• Editorial status: All opinions, allegations, forecasts, transaction claims and financial interpretations below remain attributed to the speaker who made them. This record does not independently endorse them.

The transcript opens with a preview of Ryan Cohen’s later argument about GameStop’s proposed acquisition of eBay.

Cohen claims that:

• GameStop is widely disliked or dismissed.
• Much of the media appears to want GameStop and its acquisition attempt to fail.
• The same commentators appear to prefer eBay’s existing board and management.
• eBay directors receive hundreds of thousands of dollars annually while, according to Cohen, attending only a limited number of meetings.
• Cohen alleges that eBay directors do not buy company stock with their own money.
• He describes eBay’s management as “grossly overpaid” and as taking little or no personal financial risk.
• He contrasts this with his willingness to risk his own capital.
• He presents personal financial exposure as an expression of ownership, accountability and American entrepreneurship.

His central rhetorical question is why observers would prefer an entrenched management team with limited personal financial exposure over an owner-operator investing substantial personal capital.

A promotional segment makes the following claims about AppLovin, whose name is transcribed inconsistently:

• The company began with an $8 domain and no venture-capital funding.
• It grew into one of the world’s largest advertising platforms.
• It is applying its advertising technology to e-commerce through AppLovin Ads.
• Advertisements run inside mobile games and allegedly reach more than one billion people.
• The advertisements are described as full-screen and free from competing distractions.
• The platform is said to identify buyers and optimize campaigns for profit after an advertiser sets its target.
• The advertisement cites a cookware business that was doing approximately $4 million, reached a figure transcribed as “16 million,” became profitable and was allegedly on pace for $80 million during the year.
• Listeners are directed to an AppLovin web address connected to the All-In Podcast.

The cookware figures, the exact meaning of “hit 16 million,” the company name and the web address require verification.

Friedberg welcomes Cohen and says approximately a decade has passed since they last had dinner together in New York.

He frames the interview around Cohen’s attempt to acquire and operate eBay, describing it as a major development connected to the history of internet commerce. Before discussing eBay, Friedberg asks Cohen to explain the earlier business experiences that brought him to this point, beginning with Chewy.

Cohen says he originally intended to launch an online jewellery company.

The original jewellery effort included:

• Little or no prior knowledge of jewellery.
• Attendance at trade shows.
• The purchase of hundreds of thousands of dollars in inventory.
• Construction of a website.
• Preparation of distribution capabilities.

The idea changed while Cohen was shopping at a neighbourhood pet store for his poodle.

He concluded that pet products presented a stronger opportunity because:

• He understood the products personally as a pet owner.
• Food and similar pet products generate recurring purchases.
• The pet market remained fragmented.
• Independent neighbourhood pet stores still existed despite competition from Petco and PetSmart.
• Amazon had sold pet products since the 1990s but, in Cohen’s assessment, had not achieved dominant scale in the category.

His proposed model combined two different experiences:

1. The knowledge, service and passion of a neighbourhood pet store.
2. Amazon’s strengths in supply chains, selection, pricing and fast shipping.

Cohen says Chewy hired pet owners, making it easier for employees to understand and care about the products.

The strategic goal was market leadership in a low-margin category. In hindsight, Cohen says competing with Amazon by shipping products such as 30-pound bags of pet food was not necessarily an attractive business idea.

However, he says Chewy executed effectively, grew quickly and benefited from negative working capital. In practical terms, the business could receive money from customers before it had to pay some suppliers, allowing it to reach billions of dollars in revenue without consuming an equivalent amount of capital.

Cohen says he understood from the beginning that Chewy’s real competitor was Amazon.

Because Amazon was world-class in supply-chain management, Chewy had to compete through detailed operational discipline:

• It negotiated aggressively with suppliers for lower product costs.
• It moved from buying pallets of pet food to buying truckloads.
• It reduced reliance on distributors and increasingly purchased directly.
• Greater purchasing volume produced better prices.
• Warehouse labour had to be optimized.
• Warehouse management had to become more efficient.
• Chewy negotiated competitive terms with shipping carriers.
• Small improvements in individual costs accumulated into a viable economic model.

Cohen describes the economics as “a game of pennies.” In a low-margin business, a few pennies of loss per order could mean failure, while a few pennies of profit could create a successful company at scale.

The company therefore had to operate with extreme efficiency while growing quickly.

Cohen emphasizes that online pet retail was not a novel idea. Pets.com remained a cautionary example, and the category already contained substantial competition. That history also made capital difficult to raise.

In Cohen’s interpretation, investors did not underestimate the size of the pet market. They underestimated Chewy’s capacity to execute.

Cohen viewed recurring purchases as a central advantage over jewellery.

During Chewy’s early years, it concentrated on frequently consumed products:

• Pet food.
• Treats.
• Cat litter.
• Other items that customers needed repeatedly.

Cohen says customer cohorts showed strong retention. His thesis was that customers who were treated well would continue shopping with Chewy.

The customer-service strategy included:

• Handwritten holiday cards.
• Custom pet portraits.
• Customer service available 24 hours a day.
• Resolving customer problems generously when something went wrong.
• Hiring people who understood pets and pet products.

Cohen says satisfied pet owners recommended Chewy to friends and other pet owners. He considers word of mouth the strongest form of referral and says the recurring-purchase thesis ultimately worked.

When asked how he learned to manage and execute, Cohen emphasizes constant personal involvement.

He says he:

• Watched the company’s numbers continuously.
• Personally managed Google AdWords campaigns until four or five in the morning.
• Negotiated directly with major suppliers.
• Remained involved in important operating details rather than delegating them without oversight.

Cohen recounts a supplier negotiation after which the supplier expressed relief that he would not have to speak to Cohen again for another year. Cohen interpreted this as a compliment because it indicated that he had negotiated hard.

His view of supplier relationships is deliberately transactional:

• If suppliers send gifts, Cohen considers it a warning that the company may be overpaying.
• If suppliers say they never want to speak to him again, he considers that evidence that the company may have obtained the right price.
• He believes employees often prefer friendly relationships and the path of least resistance.
• That instinct can conflict with the need to make a loss-making business sustainable.

He does not argue that every relationship is meaningless. His point is that purchasing negotiations exist primarily to establish commercially sustainable terms, and personal friendliness should not obscure the company’s economic interests.

Cohen says he looks for determination and personal drive over formal skill or an ideal résumé. The precise phrase is transcribed as “will overkill” and is likely incomplete or inaccurate.

He gives the example of a woman who eventually ran customer service:

• She had worked in an elderly-care or retirement-home setting.
• She applied to Chewy repeatedly.
• The company initially dismissed her because she did not appear qualified on paper.
• She continued applying.
• Cohen interpreted her persistence as evidence of drive and motivation.
• She was hired and became an exceptional employee.

Cohen says he sought people willing to commit themselves completely to the business. He jokingly describes the Chewy team as people willing to be as “psychotic” as he was and calls them “a bunch of fellow psychopaths.”

Friedberg responds that “psychopaths attract psychopaths” and adds that top performers tolerate other top performers. Cohen agrees.

Friedberg states that Chewy was sold in 2017 for $3.35 billion and later went public at a valuation of approximately $20 billion.

When asked whether he regretted selling:

• Cohen jokes that the business seemed to take off as soon as he sold it.
• He recalls investment bankers describing the sale price as exceptional.
• The company later went public at a substantially higher value than many people had expected.
• He says nobody has a crystal ball.
• He describes Chewy as his baby and says he loved the company.
• He accepts that events work out for a reason.
• He notes that he would not be having this conversation about GameStop and eBay if he were still operating Chewy.

Friedberg jokes that the alternative interview might have been about Cohen building a $100 billion dog-food company.

After selling Chewy, Cohen says he became an activist investor for the first time.

His general investment framework was to seek:

• Established businesses.
• A strong historical record of making money.
• Companies that had fallen out of favour.
• Concentrated investments where the market appeared pessimistic.

The transcript distinguishes between passive investing and activist involvement, though the exact development of Cohen’s portfolio outside GameStop is not discussed in detail.

Cohen says GameStop began as a passive investment.

Initially:

• He owned less than 5% of the company.
• GameStop’s chief executive contacted him while the company was resisting another activist investor.
• Management invited him to join the board.
• Cohen believes they assumed he would become a friendly director and help defend the existing board from the activist.
• At the time, Cohen’s father had recently died.
• The offer involved one seat on what Cohen considered an excessively large board.
• He did not find one board seat attractive enough to justify the commitment.

The situation worsened during the COVID period:

• GameStop was classified as a non-essential retailer.
• Cohen says it appeared close to bankruptcy.
• Its share price fell significantly.
• He continued buying shares.
• His ownership crossed 5%.

Cohen explains that crossing 5% forced him to decide whether to file a Schedule 13G or Schedule 13D:

• He describes 13G as the passive filing.
• He describes 13D as the filing used when an investor intends to engage with management.
• He chose the 13D.
• GameStop’s chief executive called and asked whether he had filed a “D or a G.”
• Cohen’s answer made clear that he intended to engage.

The transcript’s explanation of the legal distinctions between the forms should be independently checked before publication.

Cohen says GameStop interested him because the market consensus had been negative for many years.

His reasoning included:

• GameStop had long been regarded as a company destined to fail.
• Its shares had been heavily shorted.
• Investors and media commentators regularly treated the company with contempt.
• Merely identifying as a GameStop investor attracted scepticism.
• Cohen liked its position as an underdog.
• He associates opportunity with situations dominated by pessimism and fear.
• He compares investing in such a company to “running into a burning house.”

His original intention was not to become chief executive. He began as an investor, joined the board and eventually became CEO because, in his view, nobody else was available to do what the company required.

Cohen’s first thesis was narrower than the later turnaround strategy.

He expected GameStop to survive until a new console cycle involving new PlayStation and Microsoft Xbox hardware.

He viewed the company as cyclical:

• GameStop historically performed well near the beginning of a console cycle.
• New consoles initially had restricted availability.
• Consumers visited GameStop to obtain new hardware and software.
• Surviving until the next console launch could therefore produce a temporary recovery.

Cohen says this was the original passive-investment thesis. It changed after he became involved in operating the company.

Friedberg says Cohen joined GameStop’s board in early 2021 with two former Chewy executives or colleagues. Cohen confirms this.

Friedberg describes the subsequent market event as follows:

• GameStop’s stock rose sharply.
• Hedge funds holding short positions were forced to cover.
• The stock price accelerated.
• GameStop later raised an amount transcribed as “billion7,” probably $1.7 billion, and eliminated its legacy debt.

The capital-raising figure is unclear in the transcript and requires verification.

Cohen says he initially made the mistake of assuming that lessons from Chewy could be transferred directly to GameStop.

He:

• Entered GameStop with a strong Chewy bias.
• Hired e-commerce executives from Chewy and Amazon.
• Hired another chief executive rather than taking the role himself.
• Lacked complete day-to-day visibility into the company.
• Attempted to make GameStop more like Chewy.

After slightly more than a year, he concluded that this was “really, really stupid.”

The two retailers had materially different economics:

• Customers repeatedly purchased consumable products.
• Customer cohorts were highly persistent.
• Revenue grew rapidly.
• Inventory moved quickly.
• Even if Chewy bought too much inventory, recurring demand meant it would probably sell eventually.

• Purchases were less predictably recurring.
• Certain inventory could become obsolete or unwanted.
• The company purchased products such as televisions that remained unsold in stores.
• Unsold goods required markdowns and generated losses.
• Physical retail required a different operating model.

When Cohen became chief executive, he says he reviewed the financial statements and changed direction quickly.

The revised strategy concentrated on:

• Aggressive cost reduction.
• Efficiency.
• Operating the physical stores effectively.
• GameStop’s established strength in pre-owned products.
• Expansion in collectibles.
• Reducing dependence on software, which had become a relatively small part of the business.

Cohen acknowledges that he had no physical-retail experience when he joined GameStop’s board or became CEO. He describes the experience as learning on the job.

Cohen says GameStop was already selling collectibles but had not gone deeply enough into the category.

The company tested several other consumer-electronics ideas, but those did not perform as well as collectibles.

Areas of growth included:

• Trading card games.
• Sports cards and sports collectibles.
• Professionally graded cards.

Cohen describes a trade-in system:

• Customers can bring qualifying PSA-graded cards, generally graded eight or higher, into GameStop.
• GameStop provides cash immediately.
• The card is purchased from the customer.
• GameStop can resell it in the store or send it to a warehouse for online sale.

Cohen views this as an extension of GameStop’s existing trade-in model for video-game hardware and software. The company already understood how to buy used products, price them and resell them.

When asked about management changes, Cohen emphasizes the value of experienced internal employees.

He says:

• The people who understand GameStop best are often those who have worked there for a long time.
• He identified capable internal employees and worked directly with them.
• Their institutional knowledge became important to the turnaround.
• GameStop also brought in some outside employees to complement the existing team.
• The main emphasis, however, was not replacing all long-serving employees with outsiders.

This position contrasts with his earlier attempt to import a large e-commerce playbook from Chewy and Amazon.

Friedberg compares Cohen with a business operator whose name and company are transcribed as “Charles Ko” and “KO Industries,” probably referring to Charles Koch and Koch Industries.

Friedberg asks whether Cohen has a repeatable framework that he applies across Chewy, GameStop and potentially eBay.

Cohen says:

• He probably has such a framework.
• He is not good at articulating it.
• He cannot always describe what is happening in his mind.
• When he attempts to explain a feeling or instinct, the description can come out incorrectly.
• Someone who has worked with him may be better positioned to describe his management style.

When Friedberg asks what such employees would say, Cohen replies that Friedberg would have to ask them. He jokes that he hopes they would not say good things, implying that he expects work under him to involve pressure.

A Nasdaq promotional segment makes the following claims:

• Trust becomes more valuable as the global economy becomes more connected.
• Nasdaq analyzes 1.8 billion transactions each week.
• When a fraud pattern appears at one institution, artificial intelligence strengthens detection across the wider network within hours.
• This is presented as an example of trust being built directly into economic infrastructure.
• Listeners are directed to Nasdaq’s website.

The transaction volume and technical description require verification if used editorially.

Friedberg presents several GameStop figures before asking why Cohen wants to pursue acquisitions.

He states that:

• Collectibles account for approximately 42% of revenue.
• Collectibles generated approximately $350 million.
• First-quarter revenue was $835 million.
• Revenue grew approximately 14% year over year.
• SG&A declined from approximately $228 million to $202 million.
• GameStop had approximately $9.7 billion in cash or related liquid resources.
• It generated approximately $333 million in free cash flow.
• The board authorized a share-repurchase programme.

These were Friedberg’s claims in the interview and should be checked against the relevant financial statements. The period attached to the $350 million and $333 million figures is not completely clear from the transcript.

Cohen distinguishes between improving GameStop organically and doing something significantly larger.

He says:

• GameStop’s organic business could become “nice” or “okay.”
• He prefers to pursue large opportunities.
• Chewy could have remained a $100 million or $500 million business.
• Chewy could have become profitable sooner if it had spent less on marketing.
• Cohen instead pursued market leadership and scale.
• “Life is too short to do it small.”

This preference for scale is the foundation of his interest in eBay.

Cohen says his expansion into collectibles caused him to appreciate eBay differently.

He identifies several areas of overlap:

• Both companies operate in secondary markets.
• Both facilitate the resale of products.
• Both are strong in collectibles.
• Both create liquidity by helping owners convert goods into money.
• GameStop performs some of these functions through stores.
• eBay performs them online.
• Both deal with authentication of second-hand products.
• Refurbished technology is important to both companies.
• eBay provides global reach and substantial scale.

Cohen also considers eBay closer to his established area of competence:

• He understands e-commerce better than physical retail.
• He built Chewy online.
• He feels more comfortable operating an online marketplace than a store-based retailer.
• The transaction therefore makes sense to him personally as well as strategically for GameStop.

He says that selling pet food online was not an especially attractive idea because it was a low-margin business competing with Amazon. He compares it with airlines, where many customers choose primarily by price rather than loyalty.

He also says GameStop was not necessarily a good business idea when he entered it. By contrast, he calls the eBay proposal “actually a really good idea,” while acknowledging that it may not succeed.

When Friedberg asks whether Cohen remembers the moment he decided GameStop should pursue eBay, Cohen says he does.

Asked where he was, Cohen answers: “I was on the toilet.”

He then provides the more substantive background:

• He had followed eBay for a long time.
• He had come to appreciate eBay’s position in collectibles.
• He viewed that position as a competitive moat.
• He also saw overlap in refurbished technology and second-hand products.
• He considered other opportunities where he might add value.
• eBay was the one that made sense both for him and for GameStop.

Cohen credits eBay’s early success to:

• First-mover advantage.
• Becoming the default online marketplace.
• Establishing a marketplace before many competitors.
• Creating a network that was difficult to displace.
• Early founder-led execution.

He notes that eBay initially competed successfully even as Amazon emerged.

Cohen contrasts eBay’s marketplace model with Amazon’s development:

• Amazon combined third-party marketplace activity with first-party inventory.
• It took possession of products and built large logistics capabilities.
• Cohen loosely compares Amazon’s model with Walmart conducted online and at scale.
• Amazon delivered a strong customer experience.
• Amazon also built powerful tools for sellers.

In Cohen’s opinion, eBay’s marketplace foundation gave it staying power, but its later execution was weak.

Cohen claims eBay did not grow alongside the overall e-commerce market.

He identifies competitors that captured opportunities eBay might have pursued:

• Amazon.
• Shopify.
• Social-commerce platforms.
• Category-specific marketplaces.
• Live-shopping companies.

He says eBay maintained a significant revenue base and continued generating earnings. He also acknowledges that it remains the default or leading marketplace in some categories.

However, he argues that:

• The business should be much larger.
• It surrendered market share to more focused competitors.
• It stagnated until the most recent quarters.
• Operating expenses increased substantially.
• Its first-mover advantage was not converted into broader long-term dominance.

Cohen argues that eBay could once have developed into the company Amazon became.

He does not recommend trying to recreate Amazon today.

His distinction is:

• Historically, eBay possessed enough marketplace strength and first-mover advantage to become the dominant general e-commerce platform.
• Amazon executed better through customer experience, seller tools, first-party inventory and logistics.
• Today, directly competing with Amazon across ordinary first-party retail would be unattractive.
• eBay should preserve the marketplace model rather than attempt to take possession of large amounts of new inventory.

Cohen says Amazon’s Seller Central is powerful and allows merchants to handle most of their work within one system. Sellers may dislike Amazon’s margins, but they tolerate the economics because Amazon moves large amounts of inventory.

Cohen says eBay has retained strength where Amazon is less dominant.

His examples include:

• A unique baseball card.
• A rare or difficult-to-find pen.
• A used auto part.
• Other unusual, used or collectible goods.

By contrast, Amazon is a more obvious destination for standardized new products such as phone chargers.

Cohen is uncertain whether eBay deliberately chose these categories or simply “defaulted” into them because Amazon concentrated elsewhere.

Friedberg suggests sellers are hungry for an alternative to Amazon because of its fees and margins. Cohen agrees that Amazon charges sellers substantial amounts but reiterates that sellers remain because the platform generates sales.

Asked whether eBay should acquire and hold inventory to compete with Amazon, Cohen rejects the idea.

He says:

• He is not interested in making eBay a first-party inventory business.
• He likes the marketplace model.
• GameStop and eBay already overlap in categories where both are strong.
• Direct general-retail competition with Amazon is unattractive.
• eBay’s value lies in connecting buyers and sellers, not copying Amazon’s full inventory system.

This position is important because GameStop itself purchases and resells inventory. Cohen is not proposing that eBay adopt GameStop’s complete retail model.

Friedberg cites eBay’s history of acquiring and later separating businesses.

He states that:

• eBay acquired PayPal and later spun it off.
• eBay bought Skype for approximately $2.6 billion in 2005.
• It sold approximately 70% of Skype for around $2 billion in 2009.
• Microsoft later acquired Skype in 2011.
• Friedberg alleges Microsoft overpaid and says eBay ultimately made an additional amount from its remaining interest.
• eBay also bought StubHub and later sold it to its founder or an associated company transcribed as “VGO” for approximately $4 billion.

Friedberg asks whether these were flawed strategies or good strategies that were poorly managed.

Cohen responds that he prefers focus:

• At Chewy, he concentrated on the core Chewy business rather than creating numerous separate businesses.
• He believes focusing on eBay’s main marketplace is sensible.
• That focus has not, in his view, produced enough growth in gross merchandise volume or earnings.
• He criticizes some recent eBay acquisitions without naming them.
• Because eBay is already global and participates in many categories, he sees substantial room to grow inside the existing brand.
• He believes it is difficult to operate many separate businesses exceptionally well.
• Expansion should therefore occur organically through eBay where possible.

Friedberg refers to the period after an executive whose name is transcribed unclearly as “Dono,” likely John Donahoe, and says the executive left around 2015.

Cohen claims that, over the relevant period:

• Gross merchandise volume declined.
• Active buyers declined by approximately 30 million.
• Operating earnings declined.
• Revenue was essentially flat or only slightly higher.
• Operating expenses increased significantly.
• Operating expenses exceeded half of revenue despite eBay not owning most of the inventory sold through its marketplace.
• Other parts of e-commerce grew while eBay underperformed.
• eBay made less money while spending more.
• Sellers became dissatisfied.

These claims require period-specific verification. Cohen’s description appears to compare eBay over a long historical period rather than only its most recent quarters.

Cohen’s central operational criticism is that eBay has not served its sellers well enough.

He claims:

• Sellers need third-party tools because eBay does not provide everything required to operate efficiently.
• Amazon’s Seller Central offers a more complete system.
• Working through eBay is unnecessarily painful.
• eBay once offered stronger concierge programmes to important sellers.
• It now takes some sellers for granted.
• Sellers remain because eBay still generates meaningful sales, not because they feel supported.

Cohen argues that sellers are the customer in a marketplace:

1. Better tools make sellers more effective.
2. Effective sellers bring more inventory to the marketplace.
3. More inventory attracts buyers.
4. More transactions increase marketplace revenue.

His proposed method is direct:

• Speak with top sellers.
• Ask them to identify pain points.
• Connect engineers directly with sellers.
• Solve problems one by one.
• Avoid relying primarily on outside consulting firms.

Cohen alleges, without presenting direct evidence in the interview, that eBay’s management probably uses multiple outside consultants. He contrasts this with an owner-operator who works directly on root causes.

He generalizes that businesses can lose direct contact and practical problem-solving when they move from founder-led operation to professional management.

Asked for a concrete operating plan, Cohen identifies three priorities.

The first is immediate cost reduction.

He says:

• eBay has an operating-expense base of approximately $5.5 billion.
• Approximately $2.4 billion was spent on sales and marketing.
• That spending produced essentially no user growth, in his characterization.
• GameStop could remove approximately $2 billion in annual costs.
• Lower spending would immediately increase earnings.

The separate acquisition materials cited within the discussion divide the proposed cuts among marketing, product development and corporate overhead, but the interview itself emphasizes the total amount and limited user growth.

This is a forecast from Cohen, not an established result. The feasibility and effect on growth would need separate evaluation.

The second priority is live commerce: selling products through real-time video broadcasts in which viewers can interact and purchase.

Cohen argues that:

• A large unnamed competitor is significantly outperforming eBay.
• eBay already has users, a recognized brand and an existing platform.
• The eBay Live product has major front-end and back-end problems.
• Few consumers know that eBay Live exists.
• The platform lacks enough content creators.
• Prospective live sellers must apply.
• Some sellers have told Cohen that they are still waiting for approval.
• This approval process prevents eBay from bringing creators onto the platform quickly.
• Individual broadcasts may attract only a few hundred viewers.
• eBay should be a category leader rather than a minor participant.

Cohen estimates that live commerce represents an addressable market of approximately $400 billion.

He says:

• The category is growing quickly in the United States.
• It is already popular in Asia.
• eBay’s marketplace history and audience should give it an advantage.
• Poor execution has prevented that potential from being realized.

The market-size estimate, audience figures, competitor comparison and seller-delay claims require verification.

Cohen proposes using approximately 1,600 GameStop stores as physical support for eBay Live and the broader marketplace.

Potential functions include:

• Livestream studios for creators.
• Product-photography support.
• Seller intake points.
• Authentication.
• Fulfilment.
• Logistics.
• Warehousing or transfer into a wider distribution system.
• Helping creators concentrate on presenting and selling products.

The concept joins eBay’s digital audience with GameStop’s physical network.

Cohen’s reasoning is that:

• eBay already has buyers and marketplace infrastructure.
• GameStop already has stores and employees experienced with used goods.
• Sellers and creators may be good at content but not photography, authentication, shipping or logistics.
• The combined system could supply those missing services.

The proposal does not include a detailed implementation budget, store-conversion schedule, staffing plan or financial forecast in the transcript.

Cohen introduces his third idea as something he had not previously discussed publicly.

He argues that eBay’s leadership in physical collectibles could extend into digital game assets.

Examples include:

• Skins.
• Weapons.
• Other items accumulated inside major “AAA” games.
• Digital collectibles with an actual function inside gameplay.

Cohen distinguishes these items from non-fungible tokens:

• He says NFTs were promoted as a basis for digital ownership but often had no practical utility.
• In-game items can have utility because players use them inside games.
• He characterizes physical art and trading cards partly as status or “ego” purchases.
• A trading card is physically “a piece of cardboard in a piece of plastic,” yet it can still command substantial value.
• An in-game item can provide both status and functional use.

Cohen says no marketplace currently provides broad liquidity for these assets. His intended meaning appears to be a large, cross-game marketplace capable of converting digital items into money, although the literal claim that no market exists requires verification.

He believes:

• eBay could provide this liquidity.
• The addressable market might eventually exceed eBay’s market for physical items.
• The product should already exist.
• The absence of such a marketplace represents a major opportunity.

The transcript does not explain:

• How game publishers would authorize transfers.
• Whether players legally own or merely license the assets.
• How eBay would integrate with separate games.
• How fraud, stolen accounts, reversals and disputes would be managed.
• Whether publishers would permit cash sales outside their own systems.
• How revenue would be shared with developers and publishers.

These are material unresolved elements of the proposal.

Friedberg says eBay’s board rejected GameStop’s acquisition proposal.

Cohen says the rejection letter described the offer using a word transcribed as “incredible.” This appears inconsistent with the later discussion and may be a transcription error for “not credible” or “neither credible nor attractive.”

Cohen’s interpretation is that:

• The rejection was expected.
• Existing directors and executives do not want to surrender control.
• They are highly compensated.
• Their financial incentives favour remaining in office.
• They raised uncertainty about GameStop’s financing.
• They did not engage meaningfully with GameStop.
• They directed GameStop toward expensive advisers.
• Those advisers allegedly did not arrange the requested meetings.

These are Cohen’s claims and interpretation. The transcript does not include a response from eBay beyond Friedberg’s description of its rejection.

Friedberg presses Cohen on how GameStop could finance a transaction of this size.

The proposed structure is described as:

• Approximately 50% cash.
• Approximately 50% GameStop stock.
• A premium over eBay’s earlier trading price.
• Continued ownership of the combined business for eBay shareholders who receive GameStop stock.

Cohen’s argument for using stock is that eBay shareholders would not fully exit the business. In the near and medium term, most combined-company earnings would still come from eBay. Shareholders would continue participating in those earnings under new leadership.

Friedberg asks why GameStop does not:

• Raise all the required cash.
• Sell additional GameStop shares to supportive investors.
• Assemble a larger financing syndicate.
• Make an all-cash offer that eBay’s board would find harder to reject.

Cohen responds that:

• An all-cash proposal is not what GameStop presented.
• Raising approximately $56 billion or $60 billion entirely in cash would be difficult.
• GameStop does not have that amount of cash available.
• The central shareholder question is who should operate the business and allocate its capital.

Cohen argues that acquisition financing would rely significantly on eBay’s balance sheet. He therefore suggests that if financing cannot be raised against eBay’s own economics, that would also say something about eBay’s financial capacity. This is Cohen’s reasoning, not an independently tested financing conclusion.

Friedberg discusses eBay’s shareholder rules:

• A proposal to reduce the threshold for calling a special shareholder meeting to 10% allegedly failed.
• The existing threshold was described as 20%.
• Friedberg says the vote was close.
• Cohen confirms the general description.

The exact proposal, vote result and governing threshold require verification.

Friedberg asks whether Cohen has spoken with eBay’s institutional shareholders.

Cohen says:

• He does not want to disclose individual conversations.
• The general consensus among the shareholders he spoke with was that they liked eBay’s business.
• They saw substantial opportunities.
• Some investors might prefer a larger stock component because they want to remain invested.
• The final consideration mix could therefore change.

Cohen frames the proposed transaction as a choice between two groups entrusted with shareholder capital.

He contrasts himself with eBay’s existing management by claiming:

• He is financially aligned with shareholders.
• He understands e-commerce.
• He operates businesses efficiently.
• He has invested heavily in GameStop.
• He has not withdrawn money from GameStop.
• He intended to contribute $500 million of his own money to the eBay transaction.
• At the time of the interview, that commitment had not yet been filed publicly.
• He accepts personal financial risk.

He alleges that eBay’s chief executive:

• Had not bought shares in the open market with personal money.
• Had sold tens of millions of dollars in stock.
• Would receive substantial compensation even if removed after a transaction.

He also alleges that:

• eBay’s board members receive hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.
• They attend a limited number of meetings.
• They do not buy stock with their own money.
• Management receives excessive compensation while accepting little personal risk.

All claims about individual stock purchases, sales, compensation and incentives require verification from filings.

Cohen asks why media coverage appears hostile to GameStop.

His argument is:

• GameStop is stronger than it was previously.
• He has invested personal money over a long period.
• He has not removed money from the company.
• The proposed eBay transaction is unusually large and ambitious.
• Existing eBay leaders have less personal capital at risk.
• Despite that distinction, commentators appear to support eBay’s existing leadership.
• Risking personal capital is, in Cohen’s words, deeply American.
• He does not understand why this has not generated more support.

Friedberg asks for Cohen’s theory. Cohen says he does not know.

Friedberg asks whether Cohen has met eBay’s chief executive.

Cohen says:

• He would like to meet.
• The CEO has not taken the meeting.
• Cohen would fly to California immediately to meet him.

Friedberg observes that Cohen would probably remove the eBay CEO after completing the acquisition but that the executive would receive a large payout.

Cohen states that the CEO’s parachute is worth more than $100 million.

Cohen also says:

• He has not met eBay’s directors.
• They have not taken meetings.
• He has reached out.

The meeting history and value of the change-in-control compensation require independent confirmation.

Friedberg offers his own theory of the hostile coverage.

He uses the market analogy that:

• In the short term, the market is a voting machine.
• In the long term, it is a weighing machine.
• Sustained operating performance will ultimately matter more than commentary.

Friedberg argues that:

• GameStop should no longer be viewed only as a meme stock.
• Cohen’s operating results force commentators to reconsider earlier dismissals.
• Acknowledging Cohen’s competence would require some commentators to admit that they misunderstood GameStop.
• Media institutions may resist admitting error because it would damage their credibility.
• To preserve their earlier narrative, they may continue portraying Cohen as less credible.
• Friedberg compares this reluctance with unwillingness to admit mistakes about COVID, though he provides no specific COVID claim or evidence.

Cohen responds briefly in agreement.

This theory belongs to Friedberg. The transcript does not independently establish coordinated media hostility or motive.

Friedberg asks whether Cohen will:

• Take the offer directly to shareholders.
• Launch a tender offer.
• Pursue a hostile strategy.
• Use another escalation path.

Cohen says he will do whatever is necessary to succeed and confirms that he remains committed.

Friedberg notes that eBay’s advisers would normally seek competing bids to maximize shareholder value. If no other bidders emerge, they may have limited leverage against GameStop.

Cohen responds that:

• The offer is large.
• It contains a significant premium.
• The business is particularly valuable to him because of what he believes he can build.
• He sees short-term earnings gains through cost reduction.
• He sees long-term growth through live commerce.
• He sees another long-term opportunity in a digital marketplace for gaming assets.
• Existing management could not build that marketplace, in his opinion.
• Some larger possible acquirers could face antitrust obstacles.
• He does not understand why eBay will not speak with him.
• He is not going to stop or go away.

Friedberg suggests eBay’s shareholder base could change:

• Investors who do not want GameStop stock could sell.
• New investors who favour Cohen’s proposal could buy eBay shares.
• Those investors could later vote in favour of the transaction.

Cohen says GameStop has several escalation paths available but does not specify them.

He confirms that GameStop is working with bankers and jokes that it is also using “high-priced advisers,” echoing his earlier criticism of consultant-led management.

Friedberg closes by thanking Cohen for explaining:

• His history.
• His operating experience.
• His work at GameStop.
• His vision for combining GameStop and eBay.

He wishes Cohen success. Cohen thanks Friedberg and addresses him as Dave.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “The market underestimated not the size of the addressable market, but our execution.”
• Context: Cohen explains why Chewy succeeded despite heavy competition and the failure of earlier online pet retailers.
• Topic: Execution, contrarian investing, Chewy.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “It was a game of pennies.”
• Context: Cohen describes how tiny changes in product, warehouse and shipping costs determined whether Chewy succeeded.
• Topic: Operating efficiency.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Pennies in the red is failure and pennies in the black is success.”
• Context: Cohen explains the sensitivity of a low-margin online pet retailer.
• Topic: Unit economics.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “If our suppliers are sending us gifts in the mail, that’s a really bad sign. It means we’re overpaying.”
• Context: Cohen argues that friendliness from suppliers can indicate weak purchasing discipline.
• Topic: Negotiation and supplier management.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “If our suppliers are telling us they never want to speak to us again, it means we’re getting the right price.”
• Context: Cohen describes his aggressive approach to supplier pricing.
• Topic: Cost control.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “It was just a bunch of fellow psychopaths.”
• Context: Cohen jokingly describes Chewy’s highly committed early team.
• Topic: Hiring and founder culture.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Staying on top of everything. It’s 24/7 watching all of the numbers.”
• Context: Cohen explains how he managed Chewy without extensive prior operating experience.
• Topic: Founder management.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “If we treat our customers well, they’re going to continue shopping with us.”
• Context: Cohen explains Chewy’s recurring-purchase and customer-service thesis.
• Topic: Customer loyalty.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I like the idea of going into a situation where you’re basically running into a burning house.”
• Context: Cohen explains why fear and pessimism around GameStop attracted him.
• Topic: Contrarian investing.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “There was no one else to do the job, so someone needs to do it, and here we are today.”
• Context: Cohen explains how a passive investment eventually led him to become CEO.
• Topic: GameStop leadership.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “The strategy was to make GameStop more like Chewy. And that was the wrong strategy.”
• Context: Cohen explains why the e-commerce playbook did not transfer directly to physical retail.
• Topic: Strategic adaptation.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “When I became CEO, I had zero physical retail experience.”
• Context: Cohen distinguishes his e-commerce background from the practical demands of GameStop.
• Topic: Management limitations and learning.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Life is too short to do it small.”
• Context: Cohen explains why improving GameStop organically is not enough for him.
• Topic: Ambition and acquisitions.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Selling pet food online. Not a great idea. And, you know, GameStop, I don’t think was such a good idea either. This is actually a really good idea whether it ends up working out or not.”
• Context: Cohen argues that acquiring eBay is more naturally suited to his experience than Chewy or GameStop initially appeared to be.
• Topic: eBay acquisition thesis.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I was on the toilet.”
• Context: Cohen answers where he was when the idea of pursuing eBay crystallized.
• Topic: Acquisition anecdote.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “eBay could have been Amazon.”
• Context: Cohen argues that eBay’s first-mover advantage could have supported a much larger company.
• Topic: E-commerce history.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “The sellers in a marketplace model like eBay, the sellers are the customer.”
• Context: Cohen explains why seller tools and direct seller contact are central to marketplace growth.
• Topic: Marketplace operations.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “You talk to the top sellers, you ask them what are the pain points, and you get the engineering team on the phone with the sellers.”
• Context: Cohen contrasts direct problem-solving with consultant-led management.
• Topic: Product development and seller service.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “You lose the one-on-one and the just rolling up your sleeves, really getting into solving the root cause of problems.”
• Context: Cohen describes what he believes is lost when a founder-operated company shifts to professional management.
• Topic: Corporate management.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “There are three areas. Number one is immediately improving earnings through cutting costs and pulling $2 billion of costs out of the business.”
• Context: Cohen begins his three-part eBay operating plan.
• Topic: eBay cost reduction.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Nobody even really knows eBay Live exists.”
• Context: Cohen argues that eBay has failed to market or scale its live-commerce product.
• Topic: Live commerce.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “There’s 1,600 essentially nodes that can be used as studios for creators.”
• Context: Cohen proposes using GameStop stores to support eBay livestream sellers.
• Topic: Physical and digital integration.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “This is something that I have not spoken about before publicly.”
• Context: Cohen introduces his plan for a marketplace for in-game digital items.
• Topic: Digital assets.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “In-game items actually have real utility.”
• Context: Cohen contrasts game assets with many NFTs and physical collectibles.
• Topic: Digital ownership.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “If you look at trading cards, I mean, it’s a piece of cardboard in a piece of plastic.”
• Context: Cohen argues that practical utility is not necessary for an asset to develop collectible value.
• Topic: Collectibles and digital assets.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “This should already exist, and it’s kind of like, it’s crazy that it doesn’t exist.”
• Context: Cohen argues for a broad marketplace providing liquidity for in-game assets.
• Topic: Gaming marketplace.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Ultimately, the decision is who do you want to run the business?”
• Context: Cohen reframes the financing debate as a vote on leadership and capital allocation.
• Topic: Acquisition governance.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I’m putting 500 million of my own money into this transaction.”
• Context: Cohen contrasts his personal exposure with the incentives of eBay’s board and management.
• Topic: Shareholder alignment.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I haven’t pulled a penny out of GameStop.”
• Context: Cohen argues that he has remained financially committed to the company.
• Topic: Owner-operator alignment.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “There’s nothing more American than basically risking your own capital.”
• Context: Cohen questions why observers favour executives who, in his view, have less money at risk.
• Topic: Ownership and incentives.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “Everyone hates GameStop, and it seems like everyone in the media basically wants us to fail.”
• Context: Cohen describes the public response to GameStop and its eBay proposal.
• Topic: Media narrative.

• Speaker: David Friedberg
• Exact quote: “It’s a voting machine, but on the long term, it’s a weighing machine.”
• Context: Friedberg argues that operating performance will ultimately outweigh short-term commentary.
• Topic: Markets and reputation.

• Speaker: David Friedberg
• Exact quote: “To maintain their credibility, they have to continue to make you seem less credible.”
• Context: Friedberg theorizes that commentators resist revising their earlier GameStop narrative.
• Topic: Media incentives.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I’m going to do whatever we need to do, whatever I need to do in order to succeed.”
• Context: Cohen is asked whether he will pursue a hostile offer or tender process.
• Topic: Acquisition strategy.

• Speaker: Ryan Cohen
• Exact quote: “I’m not going to stop. I’m not going to go away.”
• Context: Cohen says eBay’s refusal to meet will not end his pursuit.
• Topic: eBay acquisition.