Every Papal Conclave Since 1958 and My Prediction for the Next Pope

The 2025 papal conclave was called following the death of Pope Francis. The College of Cardinals would elect his successor through successive rounds of secret voting, with a candidate needing at least two-thirds of the votes to become pope.

The six conclaves between 1958 and 2013 reveal recurring patterns in papal elections. Matt Baker examines how ideological divisions, candidates' ages, institutional experience, and the perceived need to balance the previous papacy have influenced the selection of popes.

Papal candidates do not belong to formal liberal or conservative parties. Baker uses these labels to describe differences in outlook among cardinals, while acknowledging that their political and theological positions are more complicated than a simple ideological spectrum.

Popes are often selected for strengths that contrast with those of their predecessors. Baker distinguishes diplomatic popes, who concentrate on international relationships and representing Catholicism externally, from pastoral popes, who focus more directly on the Church and its members.

The Catholic Church has historically shown reluctance to elect two consecutive long-serving popes. An older candidate can appeal to cardinals seeking a relatively short transitional papacy, particularly after a predecessor has occupied the position for decades.

The 1958 conclave followed the death of Pope Pius XII, whose papacy had lasted almost 20 years. Pius XII had spent much of his earlier career as a diplomat and had served as Vatican Secretary of State. His diplomatic background contributed to interest in choosing a more pastoral successor.

Cardinal Giacomo Lercaro was the leading liberal candidate in 1958. The 67-year-old Archbishop of Bologna was considered too liberal by many electors, limiting his ability to secure the necessary majority.

Cardinal Giuseppe Siri was the principal conservative candidate in 1958. The 52-year-old Archbishop of Genoa was regarded as too young, partly because electing him could produce another exceptionally long papacy immediately after Pius XII.

The failure of Lercaro and Siri to attract sufficient support shifted the 1958 election toward moderate candidates. Their difficulties illustrated how ideological opposition and concerns about age could prevent prominent frontrunners from winning.

Cardinal Grégoire-Pierre Agagianian represented an unusually radical possibility in 1958. As Armenian Catholic Patriarch of Cilicia, he belonged to an Eastern Catholic Church rather than the much larger Latin Church.

Electing Agagianian would have broken centuries of geographical precedent. At that point, more than 400 years had passed since the election of a non-Italian pope, and more than a thousand years had passed since a pope had come from outside Western Europe.

Cardinal Angelo Roncalli emerged as the alternative moderate candidate in 1958. As Patriarch of Venice, he had significant ecclesiastical experience, while his advanced age made a relatively short papacy likely.

Roncalli and Agagianian reportedly competed closely during the later ballots. Roncalli described their changing fortunes as resembling two chickpeas moving up and down in boiling water, indicating that neither initially commanded decisive support.

Roncalli eventually secured the required two-thirds majority and became Pope John XXIII. The 1958 conclave took 11 rounds of voting, illustrating how a candidate who was not initially the clear favorite could emerge from prolonged negotiations and shifting support.

John XXIII served for less than five years but initiated the Second Vatican Council. Vatican II sought to modernize important aspects of Catholic Church life and became one of the most consequential developments in modern Catholic history.

John XXIII is frequently characterized as a liberal pope because he initiated Vatican II. Baker cautions that this classification oversimplifies his actual religious outlook and the complexity of his papacy.

A conspiracy theory developed during the 1980s claiming that Cardinal Siri had actually won the 1958 election. Some traditionalist Catholics alleged that Siri secured enough votes but was pressured into refusing the papacy.

Supporters of the Siri conspiracy theory regard subsequent popes as illegitimate. Baker associates this belief with sedevacantism, a position whose name comes from the Latin expression meaning that the papal chair is empty. The alleged election and coercion remain unsubstantiated claims.

Confusing smoke signals during the 1958 conclave contributed to the conspiracy theories. Smoke from the Sistine Chapel chimney initially appeared white, suggesting that a pope had been elected, before turning black to indicate that voting would continue.

The official explanation attributed the confusing 1958 smoke to problems burning wet straw. Straw was traditionally used to produce black smoke. Modern conclaves employ special chemical mixtures to produce more clearly distinguishable signals.

The 1963 conclave occurred before Vatican II had been completed. The new pope would therefore determine whether John XXIII's reforms continued or whether the Church changed direction.

Several leading candidates from 1958 remained contenders in 1963. Lercaro was still considered too liberal, Siri too conservative, and Agagianian an unconventional choice because of his Armenian Catholic background.

Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini became the leading alternative in 1963. The Archbishop of Milan had already received some votes during the 1958 conclave, despite not yet having been made a cardinal at that time.

Montini won the 1963 conclave after five rounds of voting, compared with 11 in 1958. He became Pope Paul VI and continued the Second Vatican Council rather than reversing the direction established by John XXIII.

Paul VI completed Vatican II and served for just over 15 years. His longer papacy meant that the next election did not occur until 1978.

The August 1978 conclave again featured Cardinal Siri as a major conservative contender. Lercaro and Agagianian had died, removing two important figures from the earlier elections. Siri received the largest number of votes in the opening ballot.

Cardinal Sergio Pignedoli was regarded as the leading liberal candidate in August 1978. A close ally of Paul VI, he headed the Vatican office responsible for interreligious dialogue and possessed a strongly diplomatic background.

Pignedoli offered a possible shift away from the pastoral emphasis of the previous two popes. His international and interreligious experience made him attractive under the recurring logic of choosing someone with strengths different from those of his predecessor.

The August 1978 conclave became deadlocked between liberal and conservative preferences. Neither the liberal frontrunner nor the leading conservative could secure sufficient support, opening the way for another compromise candidate.

Cardinal Albino Luciani, Patriarch of Venice, emerged as the compromise winner in August 1978. He chose the name John Paul I to honor both John XXIII and Paul VI, symbolically linking his papacy to those of his immediate predecessors.

John Paul I died after only 33 days as pope. Baker describes his unexpected death during sleep as resulting from a heart attack. The exceptionally short papacy forced the Church to conduct a second conclave in October 1978.

John Paul I's sudden death generated allegations involving Vatican financial corruption. One conspiracy theory claimed that he was murdered because he intended to expose wrongdoing at the Vatican Bank. Financial scandals associated with the institution subsequently emerged during the early 1980s, but this does not establish the murder allegation.

A separate conspiracy theory claimed that John Paul I was killed to prevent the restoration of the traditional Latin Mass. The theory alleged that liberal opponents feared he would reverse the post-Vatican II transition toward celebrating Mass in local languages. Baker presents this as speculation rather than established history.

The October 1978 conclave again featured a contest between liberal and conservative candidates. Pignedoli remained a possibility, but Cardinal Giovanni Benelli, the Archbishop of Florence, became the principal candidate on the more liberal side.

Benelli was considered more moderate than Pignedoli. His candidacy offered electors a less strongly liberal alternative, while Siri remained the principal conservative contender.

October 1978 represented Cardinal Siri's fourth opportunity to become pope. Despite his continued prominence across several decades, opposition between competing factions again prevented him from securing the papacy.

Cardinal Karol Wojtyła of Poland emerged as the October 1978 compromise candidate. Although relatively young and conservative-leaning, he attracted sufficient support to break the deadlock between Benelli and Siri.

Wojtyła became Pope John Paul II and ended 455 years of Italian control of the papacy. His election marked a major geographical shift in the leadership of the Catholic Church.

John Paul II was elected at age 58 and lived until age 84. His papacy lasted approximately 26½ years, making it the second-longest in the historical ranking used by Baker, or third if the Apostle Peter is included.

The unusually long papacy of John Paul II shaped the selection process in 2005. Following his death, electors had an incentive to choose an older candidate who would provide a shorter transitional period.

Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger of Germany was the clear frontrunner in 2005. Unlike the compromise outcomes emphasized in the earlier conclaves, his election represented a case in which the leading candidate ultimately prevailed.

Ratzinger's experience as a theologian and senior Vatican administrator strengthened his candidacy. He was a prominent figure in the Roman Curia, the Vatican's central administrative structure, whereas neither John Paul I nor John Paul II had been a member of that institution.

Ratzinger offered a return to a more administratively experienced papacy. After two popes whose careers had developed largely outside the Curia, his institutional background suited the perceived need for stronger internal administration.

Ratzinger's age made him attractive as a transitional candidate. At 78, he was unlikely to serve for another 25 years, reducing the prospect of an exceptionally long papacy immediately after John Paul II.

Ratzinger had moved from an earlier liberal theological outlook toward conservatism. Baker argues that this intellectual history gave him an understanding of both sides of the Church's ideological divisions, even though he was generally considered conservative by 2005.

Ratzinger was Dean of the College of Cardinals when he was elected. He therefore held responsibility for important aspects of the conclave itself. His election was unusual because cardinals occupying this senior position rarely become pope.

Ratzinger became Pope Benedict XVI. He explained that part of his reason for choosing the name Benedict was to honor Benedict XV, who had led the Catholic Church during the First World War.

Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini might have been a stronger candidate if John Paul II's papacy had ended earlier. Martini represented a more liberal alternative, but by 2005 he was suffering from Parkinson's disease, which Baker suggests may have weakened his prospects.

Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina reportedly received the second-largest number of votes in 2005. Although he did not win, his strong showing established him as an important figure in papal succession and anticipated his eventual election in 2013.

The 2013 conclave was exceptional because it followed a papal resignation rather than a death. Benedict XVI stepped down because of declining health, breaking with the usual practice of popes remaining in office until death.

Benedict XVI became only the sixth pope definitively known to have resigned. Of the 265 popes before him, Baker identifies only five confirmed resignations. Benedict was also the first pope to resign in almost 600 years.

Benedict XVI did not participate in choosing his successor. Following his resignation, he withdrew from active leadership and adopted the title Pope Emeritus.

The 2013 conclave took place without the papal funeral that normally precedes an election. Benedict remained alive throughout the election and continued living in retirement until his death in 2022.

Cardinal Christoph Schönborn of Austria and Cardinal Peter Turkson of Ghana were among the widely discussed candidates in 2013. Turkson's election would have made him the first Black pope within the known historical record, according to Baker.

Three cardinals emerged as the principal vote-getters in 2013. They were Marc Ouellet of Canada, Angelo Scola of Italy, and Jorge Mario Bergoglio of Argentina.

Ouellet and Scola represented the more conservative side of the 2013 contest. Bergoglio was the more liberal-leaning candidate among the three, creating another election in which differences over the Church's direction mattered.

Bergoglio's victory broke the tendency for unsuccessful candidates from previous conclaves to remain unsuccessful. Having finished second in 2005, he was not widely expected to win in 2013, yet he secured the election and became Pope Francis.

Francis was the first pope to choose that papal name. His choice honored Saint Francis of Assisi, the founder of the Franciscan order, who was particularly associated with helping poor people.

Pope Francis was the first Jesuit elected to the papacy. The Jesuits are one of several religious orders within Catholicism, alongside groups such as the Benedictines, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Carmelites.

Catholic religious orders are not separate Christian denominations. They are organizations within the Catholic Church that follow particular religious traditions, missions, and forms of community life.

Francis was a Jesuit but deliberately chose a name associated with the Franciscans. His decision linked his papal identity to Saint Francis of Assisi rather than to the founder or traditions of his own religious order.

Francis served for approximately 12 years and was considered more progressive and pastoral than Benedict XVI. His leadership therefore continued the historical pattern of a new pope bringing a different emphasis from his predecessor.

The 2025 conclave presented another contest between candidates with different ideological and professional backgrounds. Baker identified five leading possibilities based on their age, nationality, religious outlook, and experience.

Cardinals Marc Ouellet and Angelo Scola remained technically eligible contenders in 2025 but were considered unlikely winners. Ouellet was 80 and Scola 83, making both substantially older than most of the other prominent candidates.

Cardinal Matteo Zuppi was the most liberal of Baker's five leading candidates. As Archbishop of Bologna, he represented a more progressive direction for the Church and occupied the liberal end of the commentator's informal ideological ranking.

Cardinal Luis Antonio Tagle of the Philippines was considered liberal-leaning and strongly pastoral. Formerly Archbishop of Manila, he had subsequently moved into the Roman Curia, giving him both pastoral and Vatican administrative experience.

Tagle was frequently compared with Pope Francis. His pastoral outlook and broadly similar religious priorities made him a potential continuation candidate rather than a clear departure from the previous papacy.

Cardinal Pietro Parolin was considered the most moderate of the three liberal-leaning frontrunners. His position as Vatican Secretary of State gave him extensive diplomatic and institutional experience.

The Vatican Secretary of State is frequently regarded as the institution's second-ranking official after the pope. Parolin's occupation of this position gave him a prominent administrative role and made him one of the most obvious candidates for the papacy.

Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa was the youngest of Baker's five leading candidates, at age 60. An Italian and the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, he was classified as conservative-leaning but also possessed considerable experience in international religious affairs.

Pizzaballa's title distinguishes his Catholic position from other patriarchates in Jerusalem. The city also has Greek Orthodox and Armenian patriarchs, neither of whom is in communion with the Catholic Church.

Cardinal Péter Erdő was the most conservative of the five principal candidates. As Archbishop of Budapest, Hungary, he represented the conservative end of Baker's proposed ideological spectrum.

Three of the five leading candidates in 2025 were Italian. Zuppi, Parolin, and Pizzaballa therefore offered different possibilities for returning the papacy to Italy after decades of non-Italian leadership.

No Italian had become pope since the election of John Paul I in 1978. The sequence of John Paul II, Benedict XVI, and Francis had established a modern pattern of selecting popes from outside Italy.

Modern papal elections had gradually expanded the geographical background of the Church's leadership. John Paul II and Benedict XVI came from European countries outside Italy, while Francis became the first Latin American pope, although he was of European ancestry.

Tagle's election would represent another major change in the geographical and racial background of the papacy. Baker presents him as a possible first non-white pope within the known historical record, though this characterization depends on how uncertain early papal histories are interpreted.

The changing geographical distribution of Catholicism could influence future papal elections. Baker notes that Catholicism has been declining in Europe while growing in regions such as Asia and Africa, making a future pope from one of those regions increasingly plausible.

The strongest pattern Baker identifies is that candidates at the ideological extremes rarely win. His review of the six previous conclaves suggests that prominent liberals and conservatives can attract committed supporters but struggle to secure the broad agreement required for election.

Baker therefore considered Zuppi and Erdő relatively unlikely to win the 2025 conclave. Their positions at opposite ends of his ideological spectrum made them vulnerable to the same objections that had repeatedly frustrated candidates such as Lercaro and Siri.

Tagle's similarity to Francis was identified as a possible electoral weakness. If cardinals wanted to balance the strongly pastoral direction of the previous papacy, choosing another pastoral leader might appear less attractive.

Parolin and Pizzaballa emerged as Baker's two preferred predictions because both had diplomatic backgrounds. He considered a diplomatic pope a plausible successor to Francis, following the historical tendency for new popes to bring different strengths.

Parolin appeared to be the more obvious choice because of his senior Vatican position and experience. However, Baker argued that being the apparent favorite could become a disadvantage if sufficient support failed to materialize during the early ballots.

The traditional warning that a candidate who enters a conclave as pope leaves as a cardinal reflects the risks facing frontrunners. Baker uses the saying to illustrate how early expectations can collapse when leading candidates fail to reach the two-thirds threshold.

A split vote involving Parolin could create an opening for Pizzaballa. If Parolin did not secure a decisive early victory, cardinals might seek a compromise candidate acceptable to competing groups.

Pizzaballa's experience in the Middle East was presented as his greatest practical advantage. His position in Jerusalem gave him experience in a region where religious relationships, political tensions, and international diplomacy are especially important.

Pizzaballa also offered the possibility of a relatively fresh leadership figure. Compared with senior Vatican administrators and longer-established candidates, his career in Jerusalem could make him attractive to electors seeking diplomatic ability without simply promoting the most obvious institutional frontrunner.

Pizzaballa's age was identified as his principal electoral disadvantage. At 60, he could potentially remain pope for another 30 years, requiring cardinals to accept the possibility of another exceptionally long papacy.

Baker's prediction ultimately depended on whether the 2025 conclave followed the compromise pattern or selected its leading establishment candidate. Parolin represented the more conventional diplomatic choice, while Pizzaballa represented the potential surprise winner if support for Parolin stalled.

Papal history can also be traced through episcopal succession rather than through the sequence of papal elections. Episcopal succession connects bishops according to who consecrated whom, creating a network resembling a family tree.

Every pope since 1700 can be traced through episcopal succession to Cardinal Scipione Rebiba. Rebiba was born in 1504 and occupies a central position in the recorded consecration lineage of modern Catholic bishops.

All five of Baker's leading 2025 candidates belonged to the episcopal lineage associated with Rebiba. Consequently, whichever candidate won, that particular pattern of succession would continue.

Parolin was consecrated as a bishop by the future Pope Benedict XVI. His episcopal succession therefore connects directly to a recent pope before continuing backward through the wider historical lineage.

Erdő was consecrated as a bishop by Pope John Paul II. Like Parolin, he has a direct episcopal connection to a modern pope, rather than requiring several intermediate bishops before reaching a papal figure in the lineage.

Zuppi, Tagle, and Pizzaballa connect to the same historical episcopal lineage through other bishops. Their paths involve intermediate consecrators rather than the direct papal consecrations highlighted for Parolin and Erdő.

The six historical conclaves demonstrate that papal succession is shaped by more than the public popularity of individual cardinals. Ideological acceptability, age, length of the previous papacy, pastoral versus diplomatic experience, administrative needs, and the ability to attract compromise votes repeatedly influenced the outcomes. Pasted text