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- Wendover Productions revisited nine earlier videos to examine how major global developments had changed by late 2023. The channel began in 2015, before Brexit, Donald Trump’s first presidency, the COVID-19 pandemic, and TikTok’s emergence. Its stated editorial focus was on gradual, consequential changes that daily news coverage often misses.
- Electric-vehicle charging infrastructure was identified as a greater obstacle to EV adoption than vehicle prices. In an earlier video, Wendover argued that governments would achieve more by financing charging stations than by subsidizing electric-car purchases.
- The United States committed $5 billion toward a network of 500,000 fast chargers by 2027. The video attributed the commitment to legislation passed in 2022, presenting it as a significant shift toward addressing the infrastructure problem directly.
- Another $2.5 billion was allocated to the Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Discretionary Grant Program. The program was designed to fund charging infrastructure through cities, tribal governments, and local authorities over five years, complementing federal investment.
- The number of American EV chargers had nearly doubled since 2019, but reliability remained a major weakness. More charging stations did not necessarily mean drivers could depend on finding working equipment.
- Fast-charging stations are considerably more complicated than conventional fuel pumps. They require substantial direct-current power, reliable connectors, functioning vehicle interfaces, payment systems, and electronic controls. Failure of any essential component can make a charger unusable.
- Two major non-Tesla charging networks originated partly from regulatory obligations rather than consumer demand. EVgo emerged through NRG Energy’s regulatory-compliance arrangements, while Electrify America arose from Volkswagen’s diesel-emissions settlement. Both faced criticism for malfunctioning chargers and poor customer experiences.
- The Biden administration allocated an additional $100 million in 2023 to repair existing EV charging infrastructure. The funding recognized that expanding a network without maintaining operational reliability could leave drivers stranded.
- The United States had developed two largely separate charging systems. Tesla operated its proprietary network, while most competing manufacturers used the Combined Charging System, or CCS. This division reduced the practical availability of chargers for both groups.
- Nearly all major North American EV manufacturers announced plans to adopt Tesla’s charging standard beginning in 2025. Renamed the North American Charging Standard, or NACS, it was expected to give millions of non-Tesla drivers access to Tesla’s established charging network.
- Tesla’s charging connector offered practical advantages over CCS. The connector was less than half the size, easier to insert, and capable of carrying alternating-current and direct-current electricity.
- Tesla was required to provide access to non-Tesla vehicles to qualify for certain federal charging subsidies. The company was also retrofitting some stations with compatible connectors, creating access for existing CCS-equipped vehicles without requiring every driver to purchase a new car.
- Russia’s initial failure to capture Kyiv was attributed partly to serious military logistics failures. Supply difficulties prevented Russian forces from sustaining their advance during the opening weeks of the February 2022 invasion.
- Ukraine subsequently made Russian logistics infrastructure a strategic target. Attacks on supply lines and supporting infrastructure aimed to exploit the same weaknesses that had disrupted Russia’s initial offensive.
- Russia abandoned its northern Ukrainian front after logistical problems became increasingly difficult to overcome. The withdrawal marked a major change from the original invasion strategy and reduced Russia’s operations around Kyiv.
- Ukraine divided significant forces between its eastern and southern fronts to search for weaknesses in Russian defenses. The strategy involved deploying soldiers and armored vehicles across both regions rather than committing everything to a single offensive direction.
- By the video's late-2023 assessment, Ukraine had recovered approximately half the territory Russia had captured since March 2022. Nevertheless, significant Russian-held areas remained difficult to retake.
- Russia struggled to transport sufficient supplies deep into Ukrainian territory. Its forces had reportedly resorted to civilian vehicles for some transportation requirements, illustrating weaknesses in military supply capacity.
- Russian shortages of precision-guided missiles contributed to greater reliance on unguided munitions. The video connected the shortage to Russia’s failure to achieve a rapid victory during the invasion’s opening phase.
- Russia constructed extensive defensive barriers across occupied eastern Ukrainian territory. Tens of thousands of mines, concrete fortifications, and vehicle traps slowed Ukrainian counteroffensives for months and made rapid advances exceptionally difficult.
- Russian defensive preparations forced Ukraine toward costly, conventional assaults. The fortified positions reduced opportunities for the faster, more flexible operations that had helped Ukraine regain territory elsewhere.
- Russia retained a substantial advantage in artillery production and ammunition availability. The video estimated Russian forces had fired between 10 million and 11 million artillery rounds during 2022, demonstrating the scale of their industrial and logistical support.
- Russia remained capable of acquiring weapons and vehicles despite deficiencies in its supply system. Its ability to continue equipping troops helped offset operational weaknesses and prolonged the conflict.
- Ukraine remained heavily dependent on Western military supplies. Russia’s comparatively larger artillery and manufacturing capacities meant continued external assistance was important to Ukraine’s ability to resist.
- Corruption posed an additional threat to Ukraine’s wartime logistics and institutional effectiveness. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy repeatedly replaced cabinet members, military officers, and the defense minister as part of efforts to address longstanding governance problems.
- St Helena’s airport had failed to deliver its most desired connection: regular direct commercial flights to London. Runway-design limitations complicated the service, which would have made family visits easier for residents and opened access to an important potential tourism market.
- COVID-19 temporarily eliminated St Helena’s normal commercial air service. Airlink could no longer economically sustain its Johannesburg flights after international restrictions reduced travel.
- The island introduced government-funded nonstop flights from London during the pandemic. These operated approximately once every three weeks and carried only passengers specifically authorized to enter, preserving limited access for people and essential requirements.
- St Helena was among just three jurisdictions reported to have recorded no COVID-19 cases during 2021. Its isolation and strict border controls helped protect a population of approximately 4,500.
- Visitors to St Helena faced unusually strict pandemic-entry requirements. These included a 14-day quarantine, negative PCR testing, and extensive masking rules.
- The same restrictions that protected residents severely damaged the island’s tourism ambitions. Its two hotels closed for more than a year, delaying efforts to develop a self-sustaining visitor economy.
- St Helena removed vaccination, masking, and quarantine requirements in September 2022. This marked a major reopening of the island after its prolonged pandemic isolation.
- A second weekly Johannesburg–St Helena flight was announced for Tuesdays. The planned additional service represented an important step toward rebuilding visitor access and tourism-related economic activity.
- St Helena had depended on a single satellite dish for internet connectivity since 1989. This limited the island’s connection speeds and made its communications infrastructure highly vulnerable to capacity constraints.
- The telecommunications provider Sure held a monopoly over internet and television services on St Helena. Residents faced comparatively high prices, including reported premiums of 600% for additional data usage.
- Basic email and web browsing were available, but video streaming and video calls remained impractical for many residents. The limitations restricted participation in internet-dependent activities increasingly taken for granted elsewhere.
- The European Union granted St Helena €21.5 million in 2018 for undersea fiber-optic connectivity. The funding supported construction and maintenance of infrastructure described as capable of transmitting up to 80 terabits per second.
- St Helena obtained a branch connection to Google’s Equiano submarine cable. The larger cable system runs along Africa’s coast, linking the remote island to international high-capacity telecommunications infrastructure.
- St Helena planned to develop a satellite ground-station industry to generate revenue from its new cable. Companies such as Starlink could potentially use the island’s Atlantic location to connect passing satellites to the wider internet.
- The island’s geographic isolation could become a commercial advantage in satellite communications. Ground-station services would allow St Helena to monetize telecommunications capacity beyond the requirements of its small population.
- The fiber-optic cable was operational and undergoing beta testing at the time of the video. Improved connectivity was expected to affect business opportunities, communications, culture, and the island’s relationship with the outside world.
- St Helena’s telecommunications project offered a possible model for other remote islands. The video identified Tristan da Cunha as another isolated territory that could potentially benefit from similar infrastructure and satellite-related business arrangements.
- The pandemic exposed the vulnerability of globally interconnected supply chains. Increased consumer demand, congested ports, rising costs, and labor shortages combined to delay goods and disrupt manufacturing internationally.
- Just-in-time manufacturing was identified as a central source of supply-chain fragility. Companies had reduced inventories to improve efficiency, leaving themselves with little protection when components or shipments failed to arrive on schedule.
- Traditional just-in-case manufacturing maintained inventory reserves throughout production. Common before the 1980s, this approach reduced the risk of production stoppages but tied up money and storage space in surplus materials.
- Toyota helped establish the modern just-in-time manufacturing model. Reducing unnecessary inventory freed working capital and warehouse capacity, improving profitability during normal operating conditions.
- COVID-related labor shortages and delays in trans-Pacific shipping undermined just-in-time production. Manufacturers that depended on precisely timed deliveries found themselves unable to obtain essential components.
- Businesses began redesigning supply chains rather than simply returning to the older inventory model. By 2023, companies were combining inventory reserves, geographic diversification, alternative suppliers, and forecasting technologies according to their individual needs.
- The risk of future wars and climate-related disruptions influenced supply-chain decisions. Companies increasingly viewed resilience as worth paying for, even after the immediate pandemic-related crisis began to ease.
- Volkswagen experienced a 7% decline in vehicle deliveries in 2022. Global semiconductor shortages were identified as one contributing factor.
- Volkswagen diversified its semiconductor sourcing beyond South Korean manufacturers. It developed partnerships involving European semiconductor producer STMicroelectronics and Taiwan’s TSMC to reduce dependence on a limited supplier base.
- Volkswagen also established an internal system for identifying potential component shortages and alternatives. The cross-reference process was intended to identify vulnerable parts earlier and locate substitutes when specific semiconductor supplies were constrained.
- Electric vehicles made semiconductor supply-chain resilience increasingly important. Their heavy reliance on electronic components meant shortages could become more damaging as EVs gained market share.
- Nearshoring became a major response to global supply-chain disruption. Manufacturers moved some operations closer to their customers to shorten deliveries, improve quality control, and reduce exposure to distant transport networks.
- Mexico benefited from manufacturing relocation aimed at supplying the United States and Canada. Its lower-cost labor, geographic proximity, and overland transportation links made it an attractive alternative to production located across the Pacific.
- Companies increasingly used selective stockpiling and multiple sourcing for critical components. Rather than building large inventories of everything, manufacturers identified essential parts, such as semiconductor chips, and held reserves or secured alternative suppliers.
- Artificial intelligence was being adopted for supply-chain forecasting and inventory management. Systems could analyze production patterns, anticipate bottlenecks, monitor stock levels, and automatically initiate replenishment orders.
- The smaller-commercial-aircraft market became the subject of a major competitive struggle involving Bombardier, Embraer, Boeing, and Airbus. Bombardier and Embraer built aircraft suited to routes and airports that Boeing and Airbus had not fully served.
- The United States was a particularly valuable market for smaller commercial aircraft. Its numerous smaller airports created substantial demand, giving manufacturers strong incentives to secure American airline customers.
- Bombardier sold CSeries aircraft to Delta Air Lines at unusually low prices to enter the American market. Boeing accused the Canadian manufacturer of dumping aircraft below fair value and petitioned the US Department of Commerce.
- Bombardier faced the threat of approximately 300% import tariffs following Boeing’s complaint. The threatened duties made its American-market strategy significantly more difficult and created pressure to restructure the aircraft program.
- Airbus acquired a 50.1% controlling stake in Bombardier’s CSeries program. The transaction gave the aircraft access to Airbus’s manufacturing, purchasing, marketing, and international commercial capabilities.
- Airbus’s aircraft assembly operation in Mobile, Alabama, helped overcome the tariff threat. Aircraft assembled in the United States could qualify as domestically produced for relevant import-duty purposes.
- Airbus renamed the CSeries aircraft the A220. The rebranding positioned the aircraft within Airbus’s commercial portfolio and strengthened its ability to compete in the lower end of the narrow-body market.
- The first Alabama-built A220 flew in June 2020. This represented a milestone in integrating the former Canadian aircraft program into Airbus’s American manufacturing operations.
- Earlier market forecasts suggested the CSeries could capture as much as 60% of its target segment. Analysts estimated demand for approximately 3,000 aircraft over 20 years, equivalent to roughly 12.5 aircraft per month.
- Bombardier sold its remaining interest in the A220 program to Airbus by 2022. The company redirected its attention exclusively toward business aviation rather than competing in commercial airliners.
- Bombardier’s exit was presented as part of a major financial recovery. The narration described the company as having moved from near-bankruptcy to a reported $7.6 billion in profits in 2022, crediting its narrower business focus as an important factor.
- The A220 program became jointly owned by Airbus and the Canadian province of Quebec. Quebec retained a 25% stake, preserving Canadian public investment in a program that had originated with Bombardier.
- Airbus and Quebec agreed to invest another $1.2 billion in the A220 program in 2022. The funding was intended largely to accelerate production at facilities in Mobile, Alabama, and Mirabel, Quebec.
- The A220 production target was approximately 14 aircraft per month. Achieving that level was important to serving projected demand and making the program commercially successful.
- A220 production expanded much more slowly than anticipated. Airbus delivered an average of only 4.5 A220 aircraft per month during 2022, with supply-chain disruptions contributing to the shortfall.
- The video reported that Airbus had manufactured nearly 100 A220 aircraft by late 2023. It presented continued production constraints as an important challenge despite the aircraft’s favorable market position.
- Boeing lacked a direct competitor to the A220. The absence effectively ceded an important smaller-aircraft category to Airbus, although Airbus’s own production difficulties prevented it from fully exploiting the opportunity.
- Rwanda’s development under President Paul Kagame had previously been compared with Singapore’s economic transformation. A 2019 Wendover video examined whether Rwanda could become an African center for commerce, stability, and investment.
- The comparison emphasized three characteristics associated with Singapore’s development: geographic centrality, political stability, and ease of doing business. Rwanda had shown improvements in these areas but remained substantially less developed.
- Rwanda’s earlier governance indicators had been relatively promising. Around the time of the 2019 video, its political-stability ranking approached the global 50th percentile, while its control-of-corruption ranking neared the 70th percentile.
- The pandemic temporarily disrupted Rwanda’s economic progress. Although economic growth subsequently recovered, some political and social indicators had stagnated or deteriorated by 2023.
- Kagame remained president without a clear succession plan. His continued dominance, already a concern in 2019, raised further questions about the country’s long-term political direction.
- Rwanda’s economic achievements were accompanied by serious allegations of government abuses. A 2021 US State Department report documented alleged violations including unlawful or arbitrary government killings and enforced disappearances.
- Poet and social critic Innocent Bahati was identified as a prominent unresolved disappearance case. He remained missing at the time of the retrospective, illustrating concerns about the treatment of government critics.
- Paul Rusesabagina, associated with saving lives during Rwanda’s genocide, became a high-profile target of the Kagame government. His humanitarian role was depicted in the film Hotel Rwanda, but he later became an outspoken political critic.
- Rusesabagina boarded a private flight in Dubai believing he was traveling to Burundi for a speaking engagement. According to the account presented, he was instead sedated and transported against his will to Kigali.
- Rusesabagina was detained, held in solitary confinement, convicted on terrorism-related charges, and sentenced to 25 years in prison. The case attracted substantial international attention because of the circumstances of his transfer and prosecution.
- Rusesabagina was released following a commutation in early 2023 after international political pressure. The episode was presented as evidence of the tension between Rwanda’s international reputation and its government’s treatment of dissent.
- Defenders of Kagame had historically argued that restrictions on civil liberties were necessary to restore stability after the genocide. Wendover questioned whether this justification remained credible as allegations of political repression became more serious.
- Several Rwandan social and governance indicators had worsened. The video reported a murder rate of four per 100,000 residents, a one-year decline in average life expectancy, and declines of at least one percentile point in corruption-control and political-stability rankings.
- Rwanda continued attracting international investors despite political concerns. Its economic-development strategy remained focused on creating a favorable environment for foreign businesses and infrastructure investment.
- Qatar Airways acquired a 49% minority stake in state-owned RwandAir, according to the video. The partnership was presented as a major step toward strengthening Rwanda’s international aviation connections.
- Rwanda and Qatar Airways supported development of Bugesera International Airport. The project was valued at approximately $1.3 billion and was scheduled in the video for completion in 2026.
- Bugesera Airport was intended to establish Rwanda as a regional aviation hub. The video cited proposed annual capacity of seven million passengers and 150 million tons of cargo, describing an ambitious effort to expand Rwanda’s transport role in sub-Saharan Africa.
- RwandAir planned to double its fleet from 13 aircraft to 26. The expansion was tied to the government’s ambition to support increased passenger traffic and regional connectivity.
- Volkswagen, Motorola Solutions, Andela, and Radisson were among the international companies establishing operations in Rwanda. Their presence demonstrated continuing foreign commercial interest despite governance concerns.
- Rwanda was regarded as relatively easy for entrepreneurs to enter but difficult for some businesses to profit in. A 2023 US State Department assessment made this distinction, showing that straightforward business registration did not necessarily translate into strong commercial returns.
- Rwanda’s GDP grew by 8.2% in 2022 to approximately $13.31 billion. The growth suggested that economic expansion continued despite setbacks in governance and some social indicators.
- Kagame announced plans in 2023 to seek reelection in 2024. His candidacy was enabled by constitutional changes to presidential term limits made in 2015.
- Rwanda’s future investment prospects remained closely tied to Kagame’s political decisions. The video argued that economic development alone would not resolve concerns about institutional stability, political freedoms, and succession.
- China’s economic influence in Africa remained substantial five years after Wendover first examined it. Chinese financing helped establish strong economic and political relationships with numerous African countries.
- Chinese investment in Africa served China’s own economic interests. The video emphasized access to natural resources, labor, and goods, rather than portraying the relationship as purely development assistance.
- Large infrastructure projects remained a central mechanism of Chinese engagement in Africa. Railways, transport systems, and other major construction projects were used to deepen economic connections and support development.
- The Addis Ababa light-rail system was an important early example of Chinese-backed infrastructure development. Opened in 2015, it was described as sub-Saharan Africa’s first urban tram system.
- The Addis Ababa system developed serious operating problems after its initial opening. Electricity-supply difficulties had been identified by observers as early as 2018 and continued worsening.
- The number of operating trains fell from 41 to 17 by 2020. The system originally operated across two lines, but equipment and operating constraints substantially reduced available service.
- By 2023, Addis Ababa light-rail ridership had fallen to approximately half its peak. Waiting times on the Green Line had reportedly increased to around 19 minutes.
- Difficulty obtaining replacement parts weakened the light-rail system’s reliability. Ethiopian authorities also lacked sufficient technical experience with the Chinese-manufactured equipment to maintain and repair it independently.
- Operating costs increased as the system became less dependable. The combination of electricity problems, maintenance difficulties, and reduced service threatened the long-term value of the original infrastructure investment.
- The Ethiopian light-rail experience illustrated the importance of maintaining infrastructure after construction. Large projects could deliver impressive openings but become financially and operationally problematic without adequate technical support, spare parts, and maintenance planning.
- Some African governments became more cautious about accepting additional Chinese infrastructure projects. Experience with maintenance costs and operating problems weakened enthusiasm for investments that initially appeared highly attractive.
- China also began reconsidering the cost of financing major overseas infrastructure. The video described a slowdown in large projects associated with the Belt and Road Initiative as both Chinese funders and recipient countries became more selective.
- China’s broader economic relationships with Africa continued even as enthusiasm for new mega-projects weakened. The distinction was between sustained Chinese influence and growing doubts about the financial and operational sustainability of particular investments.
- Shenzhen remained a leading global center for electronics manufacturing and product development. Its strength came from the concentration of factories, engineering talent, research capabilities, and technology businesses.
- Wendover’s original Shenzhen video was the creator’s first production involving travel to a location. The trip occurred following an invitation from Anker, which was then a growing electronics company celebrating its expansion into Walmart stores.
- Anker developed from a relatively young manufacturer into a widely recognized consumer-electronics business. Its growth illustrated the entrepreneurial opportunities that had developed around Shenzhen’s manufacturing ecosystem.
- Several international manufacturers had reduced or ended production at Chinese facilities. Samsung closed its Shenzhen factory in 2018, while Canon subsequently closed its facility in Zhuhai.
- Microsoft, Sony, and Apple retained connections to Shenzhen, but some reduced their Chinese manufacturing exposure. The video stated that Sony had relocated its camera-manufacturing facilities to other countries and that Apple had also reduced its reliance on China.
- Chinese manufacturing output continued to grow in absolute terms between 2004 and 2023. The broad upward trend was interrupted by stagnation during the pandemic period.
- Manufacturing nevertheless declined as a proportion of China’s overall economy. Its contribution to GDP fell from the low-30% range in the early 2010s to the mid-to-high-20% range in the early 2020s.
- China’s economy was gradually shifting toward services as incomes increased. Rising living standards and wages reduced some of the cost advantages that originally attracted foreign manufacturers.
- Higher Chinese labor costs made alternative manufacturing locations more attractive. Companies increasingly weighed the benefits of Shenzhen’s established industrial ecosystem against savings available in other countries.
- Geopolitical tensions accelerated efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese factories. Businesses became more concerned that trade disputes, regional conflicts, or government restrictions could interrupt production and exports.
- The China+1 strategy allowed companies to maintain Chinese operations while adding production elsewhere. Vietnam was given as an example of a second manufacturing location capable of providing continuity if Chinese supply chains were disrupted.
- The pandemic reinforced the value of geographic diversification. Companies that depended on a single Chinese production base risked losing access to goods when restrictions or transportation interruptions affected that location.
- Both American and Chinese manufacturers increasingly established operations in Mexico. Producing closer to the United States offered competitive labor costs, shorter shipping routes, and reduced exposure to trans-Pacific supply problems.
- China remained a dominant manufacturing power, but its competitive advantage had narrowed. The video did not predict the collapse of Chinese manufacturing; it argued that more countries were becoming viable alternatives for selected products and production stages.
- Australia’s dependence on China had created an economic and diplomatic vulnerability. The original video emphasized the tension between Australia’s reliance on Chinese commerce and its disagreements with Beijing over political, security, and social issues.
- Higher education was one of Australia’s important economic links with China. Chinese international students formed a significant market for Australian universities, exposing institutions to changes in Chinese student demand and diplomatic relations.
- Chinese student enrollment declined sharply during the pandemic and remained below earlier levels afterward. The video attributed the continued weakness partly to deteriorating relations between Australia and China, beyond the initial impact of travel restrictions.
- Mineral and commodity exports formed another major source of Australian dependence on China. China’s demand for Australian raw materials had made the trading relationship economically important despite political disagreements.
- China imposed substantial trade restrictions on Australian products after diplomatic relations deteriorated from 2020 onward. The video identified wine, wheat, coal, and cotton among goods affected by Chinese tariffs or restrictions.
- Australia’s positions on COVID-19 and regional security contributed to the confrontation. Canberra called for an investigation into the pandemic’s origins and raised concerns about Chinese behavior in the Pacific.
- Australia strengthened its alignment with the United States and other Western partners. This geopolitical direction increased differences with Beijing even while China remained an important economic partner.
- Chinese trade retaliation failed to cause the collapse in Australian exports that might have been expected. By late 2023, Australia’s overall export sector had recovered from pandemic disruptions and Chinese trade measures and was performing strongly.
- Australia demonstrated that it could redirect some exports to alternative markets. Coal previously sold to China could instead find buyers in countries such as India, Japan, and South Korea.
- Alternative customers weakened China’s ability to use trade restrictions as economic leverage against Australia. When Chinese purchases declined, other regional importers could benefit from redirected Australian supplies.
- Australian-Chinese diplomatic tensions began easing during 2023. The improvement occurred after Australia had already demonstrated that its economy could withstand significant pressure on selected exports.
- Australia entered the period of diplomatic improvement with greater negotiating leverage than before. The video argued that export diversification had reduced the cost of resisting Chinese pressure, allowing Australia more freedom in its foreign-policy decisions.
- The nine updates collectively showed that solutions to one structural problem frequently exposed another. American EV charging expansion raised reliability questions; St Helena’s improved connectivity created new commercial possibilities; aviation acquisitions solved market-access problems but left production constraints; and China-funded infrastructure faced maintenance challenges after construction.
- The pandemic accelerated several structural changes rather than creating all of them. It intensified supply-chain diversification, the movement of manufacturing toward Mexico, changes in international student flows, and the vulnerability of geographically isolated economies.
- Economic interdependence did not always translate into political control. Australia’s experience suggested that dependence on a major trading partner could be reduced through alternative markets, while Rwanda’s experience showed that foreign investment could continue alongside serious concerns about political rights.
- The ability to maintain and operate infrastructure emerged as a recurring determinant of success. EV charging networks, Ethiopian light rail, St Helena’s telecommunications, aircraft manufacturing, and wartime supply lines all demonstrated that building or acquiring assets was insufficient without reliable ongoing support.
- The retrospective’s central finding was that the underlying trends identified in earlier videos largely continued, but their consequences had become clearer. China remained a manufacturing leader, Russia retained military advantages despite logistical problems, Rwanda continued growing economically, and EV adoption benefited from greater charging investment. In each case, developments through 2023 revealed important limitations that were less visible when the original videos were produced.