All points
4892 words
- The negotiations were being driven by an urgent effort to save lives. Jared and Steve were working as early as 4:30 a.m., discussing Phase Two, humanitarian aid delivery and coordination problems in Gaza. The UN was trying to get food to civilians, while Turkey had offered to send a recovery and rescue team to help locate the remains of deceased hostages. They said misunderstandings between well-intentioned parties were delaying assistance and that a mechanism for rapid, authoritative decisions was needed. When President Trump asked their chances of success, one answered, “100%,” explaining that they could not afford to fail.
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- Their negotiating philosophy was based on pragmatic realism rather than diplomatic lectures. They described Trump's foreign policy as using strength to prevent wars, identifying shared interests with other countries and making practical deals. Disagreements over interests or values should be handled privately while countries work together toward an agreed objective. They cited the Abraham Accords, trade agreements and resolution of the Gulf Cooperation Council dispute as examples from Trump's first term.
- Trust and persistence mattered more than conventional diplomatic procedures. They said the Abraham Accords required repeated attempts, describing their success as reaching Plan C after working through multiple alternatives. The Gaza negotiations were considerably more complicated and required approximately seven or eight rounds of alternative approaches before progress became possible.
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- Trump gave Jared and Steve considerable negotiating authority. They said he understood the situation after receiving detailed briefings and allowed them to make decisions without constantly seeking approval, although they continued checking in regularly. That freedom allowed them to change negotiating strategies quickly when circumstances demanded it.
- Israel's bombing of the Hamas negotiating compound in Doha triggered a fundamental change in their strategy. Jared and Steve considered the strike strategically unwise and a serious violation of the trust they believed Israel owed them. They decided to combine their existing ceasefire proposal with their separate proposal for ending the war, then approach Qatar and the wider Arab world first. Trump approved the approach and instructed them to push hard for Arab alignment before working out how to bring Israel on board.
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- Their extensive Gulf business relationships became a significant conflict-of-interest question. The interviewer pointed out that both men had conducted billions of dollars in business with Gulf states, including during the negotiations, raising concerns about whether their diplomatic responsibilities overlapped with financial interests. They maintained that nobody had identified a policy decision they had pursued against American interests. They also promised that neither would participate in awarding Gaza reconstruction contracts or deciding which businesses would receive work.
- One negotiator said he had left business, divested his interests and received no government salary. He also said he paid his own expenses. The interviewer challenged this by pointing out that family business interests continued. The negotiators nevertheless rejected the suggestion that their commercial backgrounds constituted an ethical conflict, describing their relationships as experience and professional knowledge.
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- Their access to senior foreign leaders was central to the negotiations. They said they could contact Qatar's Sheikh Mohammed, Benjamin Netanyahu, Turkey's foreign minister, UAE President MBZ and Saudi Crown Prince MBS directly. Rather than relying on junior diplomats, they communicated with the people making final decisions. They credited these relationships with helping secure broad consensus among Arab leaders at a meeting with President Trump.
- They explicitly reframed conflict-of-interest criticism as a diplomatic advantage. Their argument was that previous business dealings gave them cultural understanding, trusted relationships and immediate access to decision-makers. They maintained that without those relationships, the hostage agreement would probably not have been achieved.
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- Their central belief was that the underlying issues were relatively simple, while the people involved made them complicated. Jared said that after consulting historians and people involved in Middle Eastern diplomacy over the previous 20 years, he concluded that ordinary people fundamentally wanted security, freedom, economic opportunity, a better future for their children and the freedom to practice their religion. The negotiators believed decades of distrust, historical grievances and miscommunication had obscured these shared interests.
- The Doha attack occurred while the negotiators believed they were close to an agreement. Steve hosted Jared and Israeli minister Ron Dermer at his home on the Monday before the strike. They were discussing several proposals, including a compromise known as “10 and 10,” under which 10 hostages would be released while another 10 remained for a subsequent negotiation. Jared was drafting documents and sending them to the Qataris in Doha, who were communicating with Hamas.
- They had expected a response from Hamas within four and a half days. Steve had already arranged to travel to Paris on Friday to meet Sheikh Mohammed and other participants. The negotiators believed the discussions were productive and that a complete agreement was within reach. They discovered the following morning that Israel had bombed the compound where the Hamas negotiators were located. Neither Jared nor Steve had known the attack was coming.
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- The Doha bombing destroyed confidence in the negotiating process. Both men said they felt betrayed. They believed President Trump was furious and felt Israel had begun taking actions that were contrary to its own long-term interests. Qatar, which was the principal intermediary between the Americans and Hamas, lost confidence in the process. Hamas went underground, making communication considerably more difficult. Egypt and Turkey were also critical participants whose cooperation was now endangered.
- Netanyahu's apology to Qatar was the turning point in restoring negotiations. The interviewer suggested Trump had forced Netanyahu to apologize. The negotiators disputed the word “forced” but agreed that the apology was essential. They had spent considerable time discussing it with Ron Dermer and Netanyahu before Trump intervened directly and took a firm position. They said negotiations could not move forward without the apology.
- The apology produced a new formal mechanism between Israel and Qatar. The negotiators described it as the first formal trilateral arrangement between the countries, creating a channel for cooperation that had not previously existed. They suggested Israel and Qatar could eventually become important regional allies. Trump told Netanyahu that peace was now necessary, while assuring him that the United States would not require concessions that created long-term security threats for Israel.
- The negotiators concentrated on three immediate objectives: hostages, a genuine ceasefire and humanitarian assistance. They wanted both sides to respect the ceasefire and aid to reach Palestinian civilians. Qatar remained the direct intermediary with Hamas, while the Americans worked through Qatar, Egypt and Turkey.
- They attempted to convince Hamas that retaining the 20 living Israeli hostages had become a liability rather than an asset. Their argument was that Hamas had gained little from continuing to hold them after tens of thousands of Palestinians had been killed and more than half of Gaza had been destroyed. Trump and the Arab mediators were offering a commitment to help Palestinians achieve a better future, but that future could not begin while the hostages remained captive and the war continued.
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- Trump's 20-point peace plan was designed to change the international negotiating balance. The negotiators deliberately made its provisions sufficiently defined to prevent prolonged technical discussions from giving either side opportunities to stall. Israel agreed to the plan, and the Arab world endorsed it. Jared argued that this transformed the international situation: Israel had been globally isolated two weeks earlier, but Hamas became increasingly isolated once its Arab supporters endorsed the proposal.
- Qatar, Turkey and Egypt jointly increased pressure on Hamas to accept the plan. Their representatives met Hamas and encouraged it to negotiate, while offering to address the assurances necessary for an agreement. This collective pressure was intended to prevent Hamas from continuing to rely on its previous negotiating position.
- The plan contained concessions and protections intended to make acceptance possible for Hamas. These included an amnesty program, Israeli military redeployment and humanitarian aid. Hamas would not have to leave Gaza. The negotiators argued that a deal had to address the interests of both sides or it would eventually collapse.
- They argued that Hamas had already undergone a major leadership and military turnover. Jared told the Israelis that virtually everyone they had sought to target after October 7 had been killed and that Hamas had lost more than 20,000 fighters during the conflict. He argued that continued killing could not be the permanent answer and that an opportunity had to be created for something different to emerge.
- Netanyahu's five principles for ending the war were incorporated into the 20-point agreement. The negotiators said the plan combined those Israeli requirements with additional provisions that allowed Hamas to feel its concerns were being heard. They believed this combination made an agreement possible because Israel could pursue its security objectives while Hamas received sufficient assurances to accept the arrangement.
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- Jared and Steve trusted their direct diplomatic contacts more than the intelligence assessments predicting Hamas would reject the deal. They said they received daily intelligence reports and three CIA briefings a day. Those briefings suggested Hamas would say no, while direct communications through the leaders of Qatar, Turkey and Egypt indicated that Hamas was moving toward acceptance. The two negotiators independently concluded that the private signals were more encouraging, and Hamas subsequently accepted Trump's plan.
- Hamas used public statements to preserve political credibility while privately signalling willingness to proceed. The negotiators said public declarations in the Middle East often address domestic political audiences rather than accurately reflect private negotiating positions. According to their accounts, Hamas privately indicated that it wanted the hostages released and the war ended, with disagreements remaining over smaller details rather than the fundamental agreement.
- They tried to resolve difficult issues before travelling to Sharm el-Sheikh on October 8. Jared and Steve asked mediators to obtain advance agreement on as many provisions as possible. They wanted unresolved questions adjudicated before the meeting rather than allowing the negotiations to begin from scratch. If Hamas would not agree to essential points, they preferred not to make the trip. Their objective was to increase the probability of success and avoid wasting time.
- Trump authorized them to meet Hamas directly if they believed the meeting could produce an agreement. They presented the proposal to the president and his foreign policy staff, explaining that direct contact might be necessary to finish the deal. Trump's response, according to them, was that if they believed they could reach an agreement, he would naturally encourage them to enter the room and complete it. His negotiating mandate was to avoid making a bad deal.
- Direct American engagement with Hamas represented a significant departure from the diplomatic approach they had previously encountered. Jared said that during Trump's first term he had suggested meeting Hamas representatives and was ridiculed or shut down by those he consulted. The interviewer noted that conventional US diplomats were not supposed to meet organizations such as Hamas. Steve described Trump's willingness to authorize the meeting as courageous because securing the hostages' freedom and stopping the killing mattered more than established diplomatic conventions.
- Trump promised that the United States would enforce the agreement fairly. He told the parties that Washington would stand behind the deal and would not allow either side to violate its terms without consequence. This assurance was especially important because Hamas and Israel had virtually no trust in each other after the Doha bombing and the preceding war.
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- The October 8 meeting brought Jared and Steve face-to-face with Hamas's negotiating leadership for the first time. Qatar, Turkey and Egypt were present, alongside four Hamas representatives. The lead Hamas negotiator had survived the Israeli attack in Doha, but his son had been killed. Steve expressed condolences and explained that he too had lost a son.
- The personal exchange over the deaths of their sons changed the atmosphere of the negotiations. Jared described the Hamas representatives as hardened men who had endured two years of war and were responsible for horrific violence and hostage-taking. Nevertheless, witnessing Steve and the Hamas negotiator discuss the loss of their children made the encounter briefly feel like a conversation between two grieving parents rather than simply a negotiation with a terrorist organization.
- The agreement produced an unusual moment of public reconciliation among the mediators. Once the deal was reached, Israeli and Qatari representatives hugged. The Turks and Egyptians also embraced participants. Steve said he wished the world could have witnessed people from Israel and Qatar embracing, because it demonstrated the possibilities for regional cooperation.
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- The first-phase agreement covered the return of 48 Israeli hostages. The total comprised 20 living hostages and 28 deceased hostages, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners at a ratio accepted by the Israeli government.
- Israel agreed to a staged military withdrawal rather than immediately leaving Gaza entirely. The initial arrangement required Israeli forces to reposition to a negotiated yellow line, providing a middle ground between a complete withdrawal and maintaining their previous positions. Further withdrawals would depend on the establishment of an international stabilization force and a credible path toward Hamas disarmament and the destruction of its military capabilities.
- The eventual objective was a Gaza that no longer required an Israeli military presence. Israel would withdraw further as the security situation improved and the international mechanism demonstrated that Hamas could no longer threaten Israel. The negotiators acknowledged that the agreement contained numerous conditions and safeguards because neither side trusted the other.
- Hamas required an assurance that Israel would not resume the war after the hostages were released. Its concern was that it might surrender all the hostages and allow Israel to withdraw to the agreed line, only for Israel to restart military operations. Trump therefore promised to hold Israel to its commitments as long as Hamas fulfilled its own obligations.
- The negotiators deliberately accepted an incomplete first phase rather than trying to settle every outstanding issue immediately. Jared explained that business negotiations involve understanding what the other side is prepared to accept now and what it needs to resolve later. They believed Hamas wanted the agreement but needed to save face and work through finer details that could not be resolved at that moment.
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- Netanyahu invited Jared and Steve to attend the Israeli cabinet meeting that ratified the agreement. They had been discussing the deal with Netanyahu in his office when he invited them upstairs to join the cabinet. They rejected the characterization that they were acting as babysitters to supervise Netanyahu, explaining that they were there to help secure cabinet approval and demonstrate that the United States would stand behind the agreement without compromising Israeli security.
- Ben Gavir, a right-wing member of Netanyahu's cabinet, confronted the American negotiators. Steve described the exchange as emotionally charged because Israeli families had suffered deaths, injuries and hostage-taking. He discussed his deceased son Andrew with Ben Gavir and explained that, despite personal loss, people eventually had to let go rather than remain permanently defined by victimhood.
- The Israeli cabinet ultimately ratified the agreement. Jared and Steve said they received a generally positive reception from cabinet members across political differences. They believed the ministers appreciated having two American representatives present on Trump's behalf to help complete the agreement.
- The proposed reconstruction of Gaza carries an estimated price tag of approximately $50 billion. Steve said the final figure could be somewhat lower or higher. He expected Middle Eastern governments to provide most of the financing, with European participation also likely. He considered fundraising relatively straightforward compared with designing and implementing the reconstruction.
- A Gaza reconstruction master plan was already being developed. Steve and Jared said a group of people and organizations had spent approximately two years working on postwar plans. They believed substantial preparation had already taken place and that the world would be impressed if it saw the progress achieved so far.
- A proposed Board of Peace would oversee the reconstruction contracting process. The negotiators said they wanted the best available talent and were already speaking with contractors from across the Middle East because those companies understood regional markets. They promised transparency and argued that a corrupt administration must not simply be replaced by another corrupt administration. However, when they referred to the Board of Peace as the future oversight body, the interviewer pointed out that no such board yet existed.
- They acknowledged that establishing a transparent and effective government would be difficult. They described it as an early-stage objective rather than an accomplished institutional arrangement. Their stated ambition was to create a system that could manage Gaza's recovery without reproducing the corruption and dysfunction of previous governance.
- Humanitarian access and security coordination remained immediate problems. Gazans were returning to their former homes, often finding only rubble and pitching tents on the land where their houses had stood. The negotiators also highlighted unexploded munitions scattered across the area, creating additional dangers for returning civilians.
- Deconfliction was necessary because shooting and misunderstandings could undermine the ceasefire. They described their work as communicating with both sides to prevent small incidents from escalating into larger confrontations. Their immediate priorities included humanitarian assistance, aid delivery and preventing renewed violence.
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- The negotiators announced the agreement before finalizing the prisoner-exchange list to start the 72-hour hostage-release clock. After the Israeli cabinet ratified the deal, both sides complained that the other was not fulfilling its obligations because the exchange list remained unresolved.
- The prisoner-exchange disagreement nearly destroyed the agreement overnight. At approximately 2 a.m., Jared and Steve learned there was a substantial gap between the Israeli and Qatari positions. They spent the night communicating between the two sides and finally reached a compromise at approximately 5:40 a.m. They described the experience as particularly unsettling because the outside world was celebrating while they believed the agreement could still collapse.
- Their visit to Gaza exposed the scale of civilian destruction. They described an environment that looked almost as though a nuclear bomb had struck. They saw displaced Palestinians returning to the plots where their houses had been destroyed, intending to pitch tents because they had nowhere else to go.
- Both negotiators rejected the description of the war as genocide. When asked directly after visiting Gaza, they answered no and characterized the destruction as the consequence of a war being fought.
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- The families at Hostage Square showed dramatically different attitudes toward Trump and Netanyahu. Trump received enthusiastic cheers when his name was mentioned, while Netanyahu's name prompted a markedly negative reaction. The negotiators nevertheless credited Netanyahu with steering Israel through difficult circumstances.
- They rejected the accusation that Netanyahu deliberately prolonged the hostages' captivity for political survival. Asked about that criticism, one of the negotiators said he did not believe it was true.
- Their next message to Israel was that regional integration depends on improving Palestinian lives. They argued that Israel cannot become fully integrated into the wider Middle East without helping Palestinians achieve a better future. They acknowledged that this work had only just begun.
- They considered the agreement extremely fragile. Although the first phase had succeeded, they said the situation could deteriorate at any moment. They believed constant engagement with all parties would be necessary to preserve the ceasefire and achieve the best possible outcome.
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- Hamas disarmament was the central unresolved issue in Phase Two. The negotiators said an international stabilization force had to be established first, after which it would help create a local Palestinian government and security structure. They described this as a difficult undertaking requiring substantial planning and continuous work.
- Hamas was attempting to reassert control over Gaza during the postwar power vacuum. The interviewer described reports of Hamas using weapons to execute people it considered enemies and re-establish itself as the governing authority. The negotiators agreed that Hamas was trying to rebuild its positions and that this was what they expected from a terrorist organization.
- The success of Phase Two depends on creating a viable alternative to Hamas. Jared argued that if Israel and the international mechanism could establish a functioning alternative government and security structure, Hamas would lose its ability to govern and Gaza would cease to be a future security threat to Israel.
- American ground troops were described as highly unlikely. Asked whether US soldiers might enter Gaza to disarm Hamas, the negotiators said that was not the intention and that such an intervention was highly unlikely. Their stated plan was to establish an international stabilization force that would help build a local Palestinian police force and secure governance.
- They proposed a weapons buyback program connected to amnesty and renunciation of violence. The negotiators said disarmament would need to be linked to an arrangement that allowed people to abandon armed activity and participate in a new system. They also indicated that the question of Hamas members remaining in Gaza was being considered.
- Reconstruction investment would be conditional on security. They said reconstruction money would not enter until what the transcript calls “tariff-free zones” were established, arguing that investors would not commit funds to infrastructure that might simply be destroyed again by terrorism.
- Phase Two could prove harder than the first hostage agreement. The negotiators acknowledged that a Palestinian government and police force had to be created in circumstances where the necessary institutions did not yet exist. They had begun contacting potential participants and working out responsibilities, tasks and an approval mechanism.
- The international stabilization force had not yet been established. The negotiators said they were putting out feelers and organizing the framework. They described the proposed Board of Peace as the eventual reporting authority, although the interviewer challenged the reference by pointing out that the board did not yet exist.
- Several countries had expressed interest in training or supporting Palestinian security forces. Egypt and Jordan were already training Palestinians to become police officers. Turkey and Indonesia had indicated that they wanted to participate in the stabilization effort.
- The negotiators defended the speed of their progress. They said the agreement had been completed only three days earlier and estimated that they had accomplished approximately three weeks' worth of work in that period. They credited prior planning by the US government and other organizations and said a capable group had been assembled.
- Both men committed to continuing the next phase. One said he intended to help establish the new arrangements and then return to normal life. The immediate objective was to put the necessary institutions and international participation in place.
- Israeli military withdrawal was planned in three stages. At the time of the interview, Israeli soldiers remained in approximately half of Gaza. The negotiators said further redeployment depended on Gaza demonstrating that it could become peaceful and cease to threaten Israel. They argued that Israel would prefer not to maintain a heavy military presence if those conditions were achieved, while acknowledging that a refusal to withdraw remained possible.
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- The recovery of the 28 deceased Israeli hostages remained an outstanding obligation. A joint coordination center involving Israel and the mediators was passing Israeli information about the possible locations of the bodies to Qatar and Hamas to facilitate their recovery.
- The negotiators were trying to prevent the remains issue from becoming another breakdown in the agreement. They said they were encouraging both sides to share information, understand their obligations and actively seek solutions rather than accuse each other of bad faith.
- They said Hamas appeared to be searching for the deceased hostages in good faith, based on information from the mediators. They qualified this assessment by saying it could change at any moment, but that the information they had received so far indicated Hamas was attempting to honour the agreement.
- There were approximately ten top-priority tasks being pursued simultaneously. Rather than identifying one single next step, the negotiators said they were working on all the major requirements in parallel, including security, government formation, disarmament and the wider stabilization framework.
- The future political structure of Gaza remained undecided. Asked whether the eventual government would be democratic or authoritarian, the negotiators said it was too early to determine. Their immediate priority was creating a functional administration; the precise political model could be addressed later.
- They were attempting to prevent further violence against Palestinians inside Gaza. They said a strong statement had been issued by “SenCom,” messages had been sent to Hamas through mediators, and they were trying to prevent Israel from becoming involved in the internal violence.
- A proposed safe zone beyond the yellow line was intended to protect Palestinians threatened by Hamas. The negotiators said mediators had reported that Hamas did not control every armed faction in Gaza and that disorder was occurring partly because Hamas had become weak and desperate. They were working to create safe areas and alternatives for civilians facing threats.
- The 20-point plan offered a possible pathway toward Palestinian statehood, but the negotiators avoided committing to a specific political definition. Jared said the word “state” meant different things to different people. The immediate objective was joint security and economic opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians, allowing them to live peacefully alongside each other over the long term.
- They left the eventual definition of Palestinian statehood to the Palestinians themselves. Their position was that Gaza first needed to become functional and secure. The political terminology and final arrangement could be determined over time.
- Unifying Gaza and the West Bank was not an immediate priority. Jared said Arab interlocutors had described significant cultural differences and a long period of separation between the populations. He argued that both places needed effective leadership and functioning institutions before their people could decide whether to reunite politically.
- The negotiators believed Israel could eventually recover its international reputation. They argued that Israel should concentrate on its ingenuity, innovation, compassion and achievements rather than continually explaining itself to the world. One predicted that Israel could move from being controversial to highly popular internationally within a couple of years.
- They condemned rising antisemitism, including in the United States. They described it as unacceptable and said this was also President Trump's position. At the same time, they acknowledged that images of Gaza's destruction had a powerful emotional effect on people watching events around the world.
- Jared argued that Israel should demonstrate the benefits of partnership and the consequences of hostility. He cited Hezbollah's substantial destruction, Iran's weakened position and Gaza's devastation as evidence of Israel's military strength following October 7. He argued that Israel viewed its survival as an existential issue.
- He claimed that Hamas had diverted international assistance into building an extensive military infrastructure. Jared said tens of billions of dollars in aid had gone into Gaza and that Hamas used the resources to construct more than 450 miles of underground terror tunnels. He described this as a major misappropriation of assistance intended for the Palestinian population.
- Jared rejected the suggestion that Trump's MAGA base was abandoning Israel. He described political parties as collections of different groups and argued that a strong majority of Trump's supporters remained pro-Israel. He acknowledged that many Americans opposed war and disliked the destruction of the preceding two years, but maintained that a strong US-Israel relationship benefited both countries.
- The negotiators were also working on Ukraine. Jared said he remained actively available to Steve as needed. They reported that foreign leaders were approaching the White House asking how to advance a peace agreement in Ukraine.
- They said Iranian diplomatic contacts had begun. Asked about calls from Iran, they confirmed that they were speaking with Iranian representatives and hoped to achieve a long-term diplomatic solution. They did not disclose the substance or progress of those discussions.
- Their team was working on a potential Algeria-Morocco peace agreement. One negotiator predicted that a deal could be reached within approximately 60 days. This was presented as his forecast, not an already completed agreement.
- They described a call with Vladimir Putin that day as very productive. The negotiators said they intended to keep pursuing diplomatic opportunities rather than stopping after completing the Gaza agreement.
- Steve described the release of the living hostages as an overwhelming personal moment. He imagined receiving a call from Cedar Sinai Hospital about his deceased son Andrew, except that the message was reversed: instead of being told his son had died, he imagined being told that his son had been revived. He said the returning hostages' families were receiving the kind of life-changing call he could only imagine.
- The suffering of the hostages and their families had become their central motivation. Steve said he tried not to dwell on the conditions or possible abuse the captives were experiencing, but the knowledge that they remained imprisoned prevented him and Jared from stopping, regardless of other responsibilities or personal sacrifices.
- They regarded the hostage release as one of the greatest honours of their lives. Steve described the result as an enormous relief, not only for the freed hostages but also for families who had endured uncertainty, anguish and doubt. He said the sacrifices required to pursue an agreement were never in question because the objective was considered too important to abandon.
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