Hegseth Was Right About Iran’s Military Threat. The War Still Has to Prove Its Point.
Pete Hegseth's March 6, 2026, interview with 60 Minutes deserves a stronger defense than either its admirers or critics have given it.
The strongest argument was straightforward: Iran had spent decades building missiles, drones, naval capabilities and nuclear infrastructure that threatened American forces and regional security. The United States and Israel possessed the military capability to dismantle much of that threat without repeating the occupation and nation-building disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The first-week battlefield results support an important part of Hegseth's argument. But military degradation is not the same as strategic victory, and several of his assurances have since encountered serious evidence to the contrary.
I defend the military logic where it survives scrutiny. I will not defend claims that the evidence cannot sustain.
1. The opening military results were real
One of the most important exchanges concerned whether the United States was actually gaining control of the battlefield.
Hegseth insisted that the campaign was progressing faster than Iran could adapt. This was not simply a presidential talking point.
On March 5, CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper reported that Iranian ballistic missile attacks had fallen 90% from the opening day of the operation. Drone attacks had declined 83%. American forces had struck nearly 200 targets in the preceding 72 hours, deployed 2,000-pound penetrator bombs against deeply buried missile launchers and destroyed more than 30 Iranian ships.
These were official military figures, not independently audited measurements, but they provide concrete support for Hegseth's description of the campaign's early progress.
Stars and Stripes, March 5, 2026.
There is an important distinction that critics sometimes overlook: reducing an enemy's ability to launch attacks is a meaningful military achievement even when the enemy retains weapons.
A 90% reduction in missile launches does not mean 90% of Iran's missiles have been destroyed. It means the immediate volume of incoming attacks has been dramatically reduced.
That matters because fewer launches mean fewer opportunities for Iranian forces to strike American bases, threaten regional allies and overwhelm defensive systems.
The campaign subsequently demonstrated that this initial suppression was substantial, although incomplete. A September Congressional Research Service assessment reported that Iran had suffered major military losses but retained considerable capabilities. May intelligence reporting indicated that Iran might still possess as much as 75% of its mobile missile launchers and 70% of its prewar missile stockpile. Iran had also restarted missile production in underground facilities by September.
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Conflict with Iran, September 18, 2026.
This is the correct interpretation: American and Israeli strikes substantially reduced Iran's immediate ability to project military power, but did not eliminate its capacity to rebuild and retaliate.
That is a meaningful achievement. It is not annihilation.
2. The distinction between military intervention and nation-building matters
Hegseth's strongest strategic argument was his rejection of the Iraq and Afghanistan model.
He recalled watching American forces attempt to transform Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy through imported institutions, security structures and an enormous military presence.
His criticism was not of the courage of American soldiers. It was of the political assumptions behind the missions.
He argued that America should not repeat a strategy involving hundreds of thousands of troops, indefinite occupation, unclear objectives and an attempt to remake another society.
There is a genuine distinction here.
The administration's initial military objectives included destroying Iranian missile capabilities, attacking missile production, degrading the navy and preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. These are identifiable military capabilities rather than an open-ended programme of administering a foreign country.
The Congressional Research Service documented these objectives and the substantial difference between the initial air campaign and the much larger American ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CRS, U.S. and Israeli Military Operations Against Iran: Issues for Congress, March 1, 2026.
However, Hegseth's assertion that this was not a regime-change war requires qualification.
Trump openly encouraged Iranians to overthrow their government. Ali Khamenei was killed during the opening strikes, and Iran subsequently installed his son Mojtaba as supreme leader. By September, the Islamic Republic remained in power.
The administration therefore cannot credibly claim that political change was irrelevant to its objectives.
Hegseth's distinction is defensible in a narrower sense: avoiding an American occupation and a programme of Western-style nation-building is different from weakening a regime in the hope that its population eventually replaces it.
That distinction deserves recognition.
3. Iran's nuclear programme was a legitimate security concern
One of the interview's most important exchanges concerned highly enriched uranium.
Hegseth was asked whether American objectives could be achieved without locating and extracting Iran's remaining uranium.
He refused to disclose operational options.
That refusal was appropriate. A defence secretary should not publish the intended methods of locating, securing or destroying strategically sensitive nuclear material while a military campaign is underway.
But the underlying problem was real.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's September 2025 report documented that Iran had accumulated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity by June 13, 2025. That concentration is technically much closer to weapons-grade uranium, generally defined as approximately 90%, than ordinary civilian reactor fuel.
The IAEA had verified 432.9 kilograms of that material in uranium hexafluoride form.
IAEA, Report GOV/2025/50, September 3, 2025.
The American strikes in June 2025 damaged Iran's nuclear facilities. But the status of the enriched uranium remained unresolved because inspectors subsequently lost access to the affected facilities.
Here, an important development strengthens part of Hegseth's argument while limiting another.
On October 27, 2026, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told the United Nations Security Council that inspectors had found no evidence Iran had attempted to repair or reconstruct the nuclear facilities damaged in the 2025 and 2026 attacks.
However, the IAEA still could not verify the location or condition of the previously declared 440.9-kilogram stockpile.
Associated Press, October 27, 2026.
This distinction is essential.
The absence of reconstruction is encouraging evidence that the strikes damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure. It is not proof that the enriched uranium disappeared or that Iran permanently abandoned its nuclear ambitions.
Hegseth was justified in arguing that the nuclear threat remained unresolved. The administration was not justified in treating the word "obliterated" as a substitute for independent verification.
The next meaningful achievement must be verifiable nuclear disarmament, not another declaration of military success.
4. The Strait of Hormuz exposed the real strategic stakes
Hegseth's discussion of the Strait of Hormuz deserves particular attention.
This was never simply a question of whether the Iranian navy could defeat the American navy.
The Strait is a strategic chokepoint through which roughly 25% of global maritime crude oil and petroleum product trade and 19% of liquefied natural gas trade passed in 2025.
Iran's ability to threaten commercial shipping therefore gives it considerable economic leverage even when its conventional military forces are substantially weaker than America's.
Congressional Research Service, The Strait of Hormuz: Security Developments and Impacts on Oil, Gas, and Other Commodities, August 7, 2026.
Iran declared the strait closed on March 4 and threatened and attacked vessels attempting to transit it.
Hegseth said American firepower was destroying the Iranian navy and that further strikes would establish safe passage.
He was right that destroying naval assets was essential. But destroying a conventional navy does not automatically neutralize an asymmetric maritime threat.
Smaller vessels, mines, coastal missiles and drones can continue threatening shipping long after large warships have been destroyed.
By August, the United States had reinstated its naval blockade after renewed Iranian attacks on commercial shipping. The Congressional Research Service reported that Iran retained sufficient military capability to continue disrupting maritime traffic.
The economic consequences were substantial. Brent crude rose from approximately $72.48 per barrel on February 27 to $118.35 by March 31.
The subsequent ceasefire and diplomatic arrangements failed to establish lasting control over the waterway.
The important lesson is that military superiority and control of a strategic chokepoint are two different achievements.
Hegseth correctly identified the threat. The campaign had not yet demonstrated a durable solution.
5. His emphasis on defense production was justified. His confidence in unlimited ammunition was not.
Hegseth repeatedly argued that American ammunition supplies were sufficient and that the defence industrial base was expanding to support years of future requirements.
His emphasis on industrial production was justified.
Modern military superiority depends not only on the weapons already in service but also on the ability to replace them, manufacture new systems and sustain operations.
However, the subsequent numbers expose a weakness in his assurances.
On September 15, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that military operations against Iran had cost approximately $38 billion through August 1.
Of that amount, approximately $21.7 billion was required to replace expended munitions. Missile defence interceptors accounted for $13.1 billion.
The CBO also warned that the substantial expenditure of defensive interceptors would leave the United States with reduced inventories for several years.
Congressional Budget Office, Estimating the Cost of Combat Operations Against Iran, September 15, 2026.
More significantly, the October 5 Congressional Research Service assessment cited a Department of Defense Inspector General report identifying strategic inventory shortfalls and bottlenecks in the defence industrial base.
Some missile interceptors could take at least five years to replace at increased production rates.
CRS, U.S. Military Operations Against Iran: Munitions and Missile Defense, October 5, 2026.
This is not a minor accounting issue.
Every expensive interceptor fired against an Iranian missile is an interceptor unavailable for another conflict.
The administration's proposed $1.5 trillion FY2027 defence budget was an important part of its industrial strategy, but it was a budget request, not money already appropriated and converted into weapons. The proposal depended on congressional approval of both regular and reconciliation funding.
CSIS, Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion FY 2027 Defense Budget Topline, April 10, 2026.
The distinction is straightforward: America had sufficient resources to prosecute the opening campaign, but that does not mean the cost of sustaining military superiority is unlimited.
Hegseth was right to prioritize production. He was too confident about the depth of the available reserves.
6. The Minab school strike cannot be dismissed
The most serious challenge to Hegseth's interview concerns the girls' school in Minab.
During the interview, Garrett asked whether American forces had been involved in a strike that killed children.
Hegseth said the incident was being investigated and refused to give a definitive answer.
That was the correct answer if the investigation was genuinely incomplete.
But subsequent evidence makes the issue considerably more serious.
On March 6, Reuters reported that two American officials said U.S. military investigators believed American forces were likely responsible for the strike, although the investigation had not reached a final conclusion.
In September, a United Nations-backed fact-finding mission concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe the United States had committed war crimes in two strikes in Iran, including the Minab school attack.
The mission found that the school was clearly identifiable as a civilian educational facility. It concluded that the attack constituted an indiscriminate strike resulting in civilian deaths and damage to civilian objects.
The mission's findings were not a criminal court judgment, but they were serious independent findings. The Pentagon had still not publicly released its own investigation when the UN findings appeared.
CBS News/AP, September 17, 2026.
There is an important distinction between deliberately targeting civilians and unlawfully attacking a civilian location because of outdated intelligence or inadequate target verification.
The absence of deliberate intent does not automatically establish that an attack was lawful.
Hegseth's refusal to prejudge the investigation deserves credit. The administration's failure to provide a publicly accountable conclusion does not.
A military can possess extraordinary precision weapons and still make catastrophic targeting decisions.
That is precisely why investigations and accountability matter.
7. Russian intelligence support was a genuine concern, not an imaginary complication
Garrett opened the interview with CBS reporting that Russia was providing Iran with intelligence about American military positions and movements.
This reporting was significant.
CBS cited three sources, including a senior American official with direct knowledge. The Associated Press separately reported that two officials familiar with U.S. intelligence believed Russia had provided information that could help Iran target American warships, aircraft and other military assets.
The AP also made an important qualification: American intelligence had not established that Russia was directing Iran on how to use the information.
Associated Press/PBS NewsHour, March 6, 2026.
Hegseth said American commanders were tracking these relationships and incorporating intelligence into operational planning.
There is a legitimate reason for a defence secretary not to disclose precisely how American intelligence agencies identify, assess and counter foreign intelligence assistance.
But saying that the United States is not concerned does not establish that the threat is harmless.
Russia and Iran already had substantial military cooperation, including Iranian-designed Shahed drones used extensively by Russia in Ukraine.
The important point is that the United States was facing more than an isolated Iranian military confrontation. Foreign intelligence assistance made the regional conflict strategically more complicated.
8. The interview did not settle the legal question
Hegseth was asked whether America was at war, particularly after House Speaker Mike Johnson had said the United States was not at war.
His answer was that lawyers would debate the terminology.
That avoided a definitive answer but did not resolve the underlying issue.
The administration subsequently published a State Department legal opinion arguing that Operation Epic Fury was part of an ongoing armed conflict and was justified through American self-defence and collective self-defence of Israel.
However, international-law specialists challenged that position, arguing that the administration had not established the actual or imminent armed attack necessary to justify the initial use of force under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The University of Reading's international-law expert Dr Saeed Bagheri explained that broad concerns about a country's long-term intentions are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish the legal right to launch military force.
University of Reading, February 28, 2026.
Just Security, April 24, 2026.
Congress also debated the President's authority under the War Powers Resolution.
These are separate questions from whether the military campaign successfully degraded Iranian capabilities.
A successful military operation does not automatically establish that the decision to initiate it was lawful.
The interview provided a strategic explanation, not a complete legal justification.
The verdict: Defend the military achievement, demand the strategic result
Hegseth deserves credit for several arguments that have survived independent scrutiny.
Iran's missile, drone and naval capabilities represented a genuine threat. The opening American and Israeli operations substantially reduced Iranian attack rates. Targeting launchers, production facilities, air defences and command infrastructure was a coherent military approach.
His distinction between degrading an adversary's military capabilities and occupying and rebuilding its country was also important.
But the subsequent record makes it impossible to declare the broader mission accomplished.
By September 2026, the Iranian government remained in power. Iran retained missile and drone capabilities. The Strait of Hormuz remained contested. The ceasefire and subsequent memorandum of understanding had collapsed, and limited military exchanges had resumed.
American military operations had cost approximately $38 billion, with 18 American service members killed and 824 wounded by September 15.
The nuclear question remained unresolved because the IAEA could not verify the status of Iran's enriched uranium.
These are not reasons to pretend the initial military achievements did not happen. They are reasons to distinguish military success from strategic success.
The most important lesson from this interview is that overwhelming military superiority can destroy an adversary's ability to operate at its previous level without necessarily producing surrender, political transformation or lasting peace.
I defend Hegseth's central operational argument because the evidence supports it.
I reject the idea that overwhelming firepower, by itself, settles the future.
The United States demonstrated that it could severely damage Iran's military capabilities. It still had to demonstrate that it could turn that damage into a safer, more stable and verifiably nuclear-free region.
That is the standard by which this campaign deserves to be judged.
References
- On U.S. strikes against Iran, Pete Hegseth says, "this is only just the beginning" — CBS News, March 8, 2026. The original published interview account and its central exchanges about military objectives, casualties, Iran's surrender and the campaign.
- Hegseth says US timeline is 'ours alone to control'; CENTCOM provides update on Iran strikes — Stars and Stripes, March 5, 2026. Admiral Cooper's early operational figures on missile launches, drones, naval losses and American strikes.
- U.S. Conflict with Iran — Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2026. The most useful consolidated account of military developments, remaining Iranian capabilities, regime survival, casualties, costs and the failed diplomatic arrangements.
- Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2025/50 — International Atomic Energy Agency, September 3, 2025. The documented pre-strike uranium inventory, including the 440.9-kilogram stockpile enriched to 60%.
- Iran hasn't tried to repair nuclear facilities damaged in US strikes, UN nuclear chief says — Associated Press, October 27, 2026. Grossi's latest assessment of reconstruction and the continuing inability to verify Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.
- The Strait of Hormuz: Security Developments and Impacts on Oil, Gas, and Other Commodities — Congressional Research Service, August 7, 2026. The strategic importance of the strait, shipping disruptions and the continuing Iranian maritime threat.
- Estimating the Cost of Combat Operations Against Iran — Congressional Budget Office, September 15, 2026. The $38 billion estimated cost and the financial and military consequences of expending high-value munitions.
- U.S. Military Operations Against Iran: Munitions and Missile Defense — Congressional Research Service, October 5, 2026. Strategic ammunition shortfalls, interceptor expenditure and defence industrial production bottlenecks.
- Unpacking the $1.5 Trillion FY 2027 Defense Budget Topline — Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 10, 2026. Explains the proposed budget structure and the congressional approvals required.
- US investigation points to likely US responsibility in Iran school strike — Reuters, March 6, 2026. The initial American military assessment of likely U.S. responsibility for the Minab school strike.
- U.N.-backed experts allege U.S. war crimes in Iran — CBS News/AP, September 17, 2026. Reports the findings of the UN-backed fact-finding mission concerning the Minab school and Lamerd strikes.
- Russia providing intelligence to Iran about U.S. positions, sources say — CBS News, March 6, 2026. The original reporting on Russian intelligence assistance to Iran.
- U.S. and Israeli Military Operations Against Iran: Issues for Congress — Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2026. Documents the initial political objectives, encouragement of regime change and congressional war-powers debate.
- Iran strikes: Expert explains UN rules on force — University of Reading, February 28, 2026. Explains the international-law requirements for self-defence and anticipatory military action.
- On the State Department Memorandum “Operation Epic Fury and International Law” — Just Security, April 24, 2026. Examines the administration's subsequent legal justification and the principal objections to it.
Tighten the middle sectionsClarify the campaign timeline