All points
2055 words
- Iran's remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) is central to the conflict with the United States. Iran is believed to possess enough material to eventually produce approximately 10 atomic bombs. International inspectors have been unable to verify the stockpile since June, when the United States and Israel struck three Iranian nuclear sites.
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- Trump has repeatedly demanded that the United States take possession of Iran's remaining nuclear material. Over the seven weeks of war described in the report, he has presented two possibilities: sending American troops to seize it or negotiating an agreement allowing scientists to secure the material and transport it to the United States.
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- Project Sapphire in Kazakhstan provides a historical precedent for removing an entire stockpile of weapons-grade uranium through cooperation. In 1994, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan inherited the world's fourth-largest nuclear arsenal. Some Soviet nuclear material remained inside the country, including at an industrial factory.
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- American officials discovered an undisclosed cache of weapons-usable uranium inside a factory they already knew about. Andrew Weber, then a young American foreign service officer in Kazakhstan, said officials understood the factory's connection to the nuclear power sector but did not know it contained highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons.
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- Personal diplomacy helped uncover the uranium stockpile. Weber spent several months building trust with the factory director through traditional diplomacy and even a moose-hunting trip. Eventually, the director approached him with a note reportedly carrying a message from someone named Batali.
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- The handwritten note revealed 600 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90%. It read: "U-235, 90%, 600 kg." Weber immediately understood that the material could support dozens of nuclear weapons. Uranium enriched to 90% is essentially weapons-grade and can be used to manufacture a nuclear bomb.
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- The discovery reached President Bill Clinton and led to an agreement between the United States and Kazakhstan. Washington wanted to remove the stockpile to prevent countries such as Iran and North Korea from acquiring it. Officials warned that obtaining 90%-enriched uranium metal would allow a country to fabricate nuclear weapons very quickly.
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- Andrew Weber became the American point person for Project Sapphire. He personally photographed the canisters containing more than 1,300 pounds of bomb-grade uranium, documenting the stockpile and its storage conditions.
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- The uranium was surprisingly poorly protected before the American operation. Weber described its protection as a militia woman carrying a sidearm and an ordinary padlock resembling something from an antique shop. The material's vulnerability made securing it an urgent priority.
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- Project Sapphire required three enormous C-5 Galaxy cargo aircraft and 31 American specialists. Personnel from the Departments of Defense and Energy travelled to Kazakhstan with 450 specialized nuclear-transport drums, designed to protect their contents even in a plane crash.
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- The operation was concealed under the appearance of a humanitarian mission. More than 30 specialists spent approximately five or six weeks packaging the uranium. The operation remained completely secret, with no leaks and no public awareness that the Americans were there.
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- Moving the uranium from the factory to the aircraft was one of the most dangerous stages. After packaging, every gram was secured and loaded onto ageing Soviet-era trucks. The vehicles encountered black ice during the nighttime journey and began sliding on the roads.
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- Secrecy during transportation was essential to preventing an interception. American officials were particularly concerned that Iranian operatives or organized criminal groups might discover the movement and attempt to obtain the material. The team deliberately kept the timing and route secret.
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- Project Sapphire successfully transferred more than 1,300 pounds of weapons-grade uranium to the United States. The material was flown to a Department of Energy complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for safekeeping. The entire operation, from the aircraft's arrival to its departure, took approximately six weeks.
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- Weber subsequently became an assistant secretary of defense responsible for nuclear deterrence. His involvement in Project Sapphire gave him direct experience with the diplomatic and logistical challenges of securing dangerous nuclear material from another country.
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- Repeating Project Sapphire in Iran would be considerably more difficult. One assessment in the report is that American specialists could not enter Iran unilaterally without facing enormous risks. A successful extraction would require establishing a secure perimeter in the middle of the country, potentially involving thousands of American troops while nuclear experts excavated the material.
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- Much of Iran's remaining uranium is believed to be buried inside deep underground tunnels at Isfahan. International inspectors believe the material is stored in containers roughly the size of scuba-diving tanks, beneath a mountain. The tunnels may be so deep that even American bunker-busting bombs cannot reach the stockpile.
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- Iran has apparently taken defensive measures around the Isfahan facility. Satellite images from the weeks before the current war showed dirt blocking the tunnel entrances. Images from two weeks before the report also showed roadblocks. Nuclear analysts interpret these preparations as evidence that Iran is concerned about a possible American or Israeli raid.
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- American special forces have spent years preparing for operations involving underground facilities. The report notes that US forces have trained for missions involving deep underground installations for a long time, suggesting that such an operation is not entirely outside their capabilities.
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- Satellite imagery cannot establish what is happening inside Iran's underground nuclear facilities. Dr. Matthew Bunn, a former White House nuclear adviser and longtime nuclear-security specialist at Harvard's Belfer Center, explained that satellite images reveal surface activity but cannot show what is happening inside buildings or underground installations. This creates substantial uncertainty about Iran's actual remaining nuclear capabilities.
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- Bunn directly rejected Trump's claim that Iran's nuclear programme had been completely obliterated. He argued that a programme cannot reasonably be described as destroyed when the country still possesses enough nuclear material for multiple weapons.
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- The American and Israeli strikes have damaged Iran's nuclear capabilities without eliminating the underlying threat. Bunn acknowledged that the strikes in June of the previous year and the continuing war had seriously set back Iran's capabilities. However, he stressed that substantial capabilities remain and that bombing cannot eliminate the scientific knowledge Iran has already acquired.
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- International inspectors estimate that Iran has approximately 970 pounds of uranium enriched to 60%. This material is close to weapons-grade enrichment. Bunn explained that enriching it only a little further would provide enough material for approximately 10 to 11 nuclear bombs.
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- Pickaxe Mountain has emerged as another significant nuclear concern. Nuclear analysts have become increasingly interested in the site after satellite images from February showed what appears to be an entrance to a massive nuclear facility constructed deep beneath solid rock.
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- Military destruction alone is unlikely to provide a lasting solution to Iran's nuclear programme. Scott Roecker, a former senior official at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), argued that there is no durable solution through military means alone.
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- The NNSA would lead an American operation to take possession of Iran's uranium if a negotiated agreement were reached. Roecker explained that the agency, a roughly $24 billion organization within the Department of Energy, would be responsible for coordinating such an effort. He left the agency in 2021.
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- The United States has considerable experience removing nuclear material from other countries. Roecker said the NNSA had applied lessons from Project Sapphire to operations around the world, transporting nuclear material to the United States for safekeeping. The agency has removed more than 16,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium through these efforts.
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- International cooperation is a critical requirement for successful nuclear-material removal. Roecker emphasized that previous operations depended on agreements with the countries holding the material. A willing partner working alongside American specialists is essential. He said he had never seen such an operation successfully carried out without that cooperation.
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- An interviewee expressed immediate willingness to participate in an Isfahan extraction mission. Asked whether he would return if a former colleague called and requested that he join a team entering the facility to package and remove the uranium, he answered: "I would go in a heartbeat."
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- Trump and the Iranian government publicly contradicted each other over the stockpile's future. Trump said Iran had agreed to hand over its uranium as part of a deal to end the war, referring to the material as "nuclear dust." Within hours, Iranian officials insisted that the uranium was not going anywhere.
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- Trump maintained that the United States would obtain the uranium regardless of Iran's position. He said America would get the material either through an agreement with Iran or by taking it. This left military seizure as an explicit alternative to diplomatic cooperation in his public position.
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- Retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward supported the possibility of a military extraction, even if American lives were at risk. Harward is a former Navy SEAL and former deputy director of US Central Command who led elite special operations in the Middle East. Asked whether such an operation would be worth the risk, he answered yes.
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- Harward estimated that a military extraction could take many weeks and involve every branch of the American military. He described the operation as high-risk because American forces would have to occupy territory, confront resistance and force their way into the facility. Nevertheless, he believed the military could accomplish it.
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- Securing an Iranian nuclear facility could require a substantial military engineering operation. American forces might need to establish a complete security perimeter, deploy bulldozers to clear rubble and potentially construct their own landing strip to bring in aircraft and supplies.
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- Harward cited the American operation in Afghanistan as an example of the military's logistical capabilities. He recalled that American forces built a runway in the desert and brought in C-17 aircraft. His point was that the military could construct the infrastructure needed to support a difficult operation in hostile territory.
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- Iran's remaining drones and missiles represent a major threat to American troops during an extraction. Harward identified kinetic drones and whatever missiles remain in Iran's inventory as the most immediate battlefield dangers. These weapons could threaten troops throughout the time they remain on the ground.
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- American casualties would have to be anticipated in a military operation inside Iran. Harward acknowledged that casualties were possible and said the military would have to plan for them rather than assume the operation could be conducted without losses.
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- The ceasefire between the United States and Iran was described as fragile and due to expire on Wednesday. Its approaching expiration added urgency to the unresolved question of how Iran's remaining nuclear material would be secured.
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- Bunn argued that any future nuclear agreement must depend on verification rather than trust. He said Iran had spent more than 20 years claiming that its nuclear programme was entirely peaceful and that it was not pursuing nuclear weapons. In his assessment, those claims were false, and Iran continued lying after international inspectors entered the country and began discovering evidence.
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- Bunn identified two essential conditions for resolving the nuclear issue: no highly enriched uranium and extensive international monitoring. He considered both the removal or elimination of HEU and meaningful international verification essential to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
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- Distrust created by the war and Trump's repeated withdrawal from negotiations makes a new agreement harder to achieve. The report identifies Trump's repeated departures from talks to launch further strikes as part of the problem. Even if Iran and the United States eventually return to negotiations, rebuilding the confidence needed for international cooperation will be difficult.
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- Bunn is pessimistic about the long-term prospects for resolving Iran's nuclear programme. He believes the United States will have very few realistic tools available for dealing with the programme for a long time. The remaining uranium, uncertainty about underground facilities, lack of international verification and deteriorating diplomatic trust leave Washington with no straightforward solution.
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