The Missing Ledger: Wendover's Cargo-Flight Profitability Claim Doesn't Add Up
Wendover Productions tells an appealing story about aviation's response to COVID-19: passenger airlines grounded their customers, filled their aircraft with freight, and discovered an unexpected way to make money. The underlying emergency was real. The financial conclusion, however, is much less established. The video calculates what airlines could earn from cargo, then declares that flying passenger aircraft without passengers could be profitable. It never produces the flight-level accounts needed to demonstrate that conclusion.
The distinction matters. A flight generating substantial freight revenue is not necessarily a profitable flight. Revenue must first pay for fuel, crew, maintenance, airport charges, handling, insurance and the other costs of getting an aircraft safely from one airport to another.
The 44 percent is revenue arithmetic, not proof of profit
The video's most important calculation concerns an Airbus A330. Wendover estimates that the passenger version can carry 29% of the freight capacity of its dedicated freighter counterpart. It then applies a freight-rate increase of up to 50%, arriving at approximately 44% of the freighter's normal revenue per flight.
The arithmetic is understandable. The assumptions are doing considerably more work than the presentation admits.
The video itself gives two different rate increases: 27% from Hong Kong to North America and 50% from Shanghai to Europe. Applying the lower figure to the same 29% capacity ratio produces approximately 37%, not 44%. The 44% figure is therefore an optimistic illustration using the highest quoted rate increase, not a demonstrated industry-wide result.
More importantly, 44% of another aircraft's revenue is not 44% of its profit.
The calculation does not establish actual cargo loads, freight mix, route-specific prices, return-flight utilization or the operating expenses of the passenger aircraft. Nor does it calculate the additional costs of handling, insurance, landing charges, maintenance and aircraft operation.
There is also a fundamental accounting question Wendover never answers: what does it mean by profit?
If an airline has an otherwise idle aircraft and employees already on payroll, a cargo flight might generate positive additional cash after covering its incremental expenses. That is a legitimate commercial decision. But it is not necessarily profitable after allocating aircraft ownership, depreciation, financing, maintenance and other fixed costs.
Those are two different financial tests. Wendover moves between them without showing either.
The airlines' own accounts tell a more interesting story
The strongest independent evidence comes from airline financial statements.
United Airlines experienced a substantial increase in cargo revenue. Its 2020 annual report records cargo revenue of $1.648 billion, compared with $1.179 billion in 2019: an increase of $469 million, or 39.8%.
Crucially, United explicitly attributed that increase primarily to more cargo-only charter flights, which benefited from higher yields as demand for critical goods increased. This confirms that the emergency operations were commercially significant.
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Air Canada provides an even more revealing operational example. Its 2020 annual report records:
- CAD $920 million in cargo revenue, up 28% from 2019.
- More than 4,000 international cargo-only flights between March and December.
- Four Boeing 777s and three Airbus A330s converted for exclusive cargo use by removing passenger seats.
- A 105% increase in cargo yield, despite a 37% decline in cargo traffic.
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These figures establish that airlines successfully created a substantial emergency cargo business.
But neither company's published figures establish the profitability of individual cargo-only flights. United combines cargo revenue from scheduled passenger services and cargo-only operations. Air Canada's financial statements provide cargo revenue by geographical region, not the operating margin of its converted aircraft or individual charters.
This is precisely the missing information.
I will not claim these flights lost money. The evidence does not establish that. But the same evidence cannot support Wendover's confident declaration that they were profitable.
The passenger cabin was not a cargo hold
There is another significant omission.
Wendover explains that airlines began loading freight directly onto passenger seats and securing it in place. The video acknowledges that this increased loading complexity and time.
What it does not explain is that passenger cabins were not designed or certified to operate as conventional cargo compartments.
This was already documented before the episode appeared.
On April 24, 2020, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) explicitly stated that passenger cabins were not approved for general cargo transportation. Carrying cargo beyond approved storage areas required an exemption, with additional procedures to compensate for shortcomings in smoke detection and fire suppression.
EASA
On May 4, one day before Wendover published its video, the International Air Transport Association issued its third edition of its guidance for transporting cargo in passenger aircraft.
It required operators to consider:
- Formal authorization from the relevant national aviation authority.
- Comprehensive safety risk assessments.
- Approved cargo restraints and weight-and-balance procedures.
- Trained personnel to supervise loading and unloading.
- Cabin monitoring and fire-watch arrangements.
- Appropriate firefighting equipment.
- Restrictions on dangerous goods and other unsuitable cargo.
These were operational requirements, not optional administrative details.
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The American regulatory response makes the distinction even clearer. On May 20, 2020, the FAA issued a specific exemption allowing American airlines to transport cargo on passenger seats without passengers aboard. Operators needed to submit a letter of intent, receive specific authorization and comply with conditions and limitations.
That happened 15 days after the video was published.
Federal Aviation Administration
This does not mean ordinary belly-hold cargo operations required the same special cabin arrangements. They did not. But the additional cabin capacity Wendover presents as a straightforward solution came with real regulatory, safety and operational constraints.
The difference matters when calculating how much freight could actually be carried and what it cost to carry it.
Cheap fuel and paid employees were not free resources
Wendover's second major economic argument is that fuel prices collapsed and airlines were already paying their employees.
Both observations have a factual basis. The problem is how they are used.
United's 2020 financial statements provide a useful comparison with the video's fuel-price illustration.
United Airlines 2019 2020 Average fuel price per gallon $2.09 $1.57 Fuel consumption 4.292 billion gallons 2.004 billion gallons Fuel expense $8.953 billion $3.153 billionThe airline's actual annual average fuel price declined approximately 25%, while fuel consumption fell 53.3%.
The extraordinary late-April spot-price collapse was real, but a temporary market quotation is not the same as the actual average fuel cost paid by an airline.
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Air Canada's accounts provide another useful breakdown. Its fuel expenses fell by CAD $3.025 billion in 2020. Of that reduction, CAD $2.666 billion came from consuming less fuel, while CAD $332 million came from lower jet-fuel prices.
That distinction is important. A substantial part of the apparent savings across an airline's operations came from flying fewer aircraft, not simply buying cheaper fuel.
Air Canada
The employee argument also needs context.
Wendover points to the American government's requirement that airlines receiving payroll assistance retain employees rather than involuntarily furlough them. That did reduce the marginal staffing burden of additional flights.
But this was government-supported payroll, not a permanent feature of airline economics.
United received approximately $5.1 billion through the CARES Act Payroll Support Program. Approximately $3.6 billion was a direct grant, while $1.5 billion was a loan. The money was specifically intended to pay employee wages, salaries and benefits.
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Air Canada also recorded a CAD $554 million net benefit from Canada's Emergency Wage Subsidy program in 2020.
Air Canada
These arrangements helped airlines retain workers during an extraordinary crisis. They also mean that the cost advantage Wendover describes partly depended on public financial intervention.
That does not make cargo-only flights unprofitable. It does mean their economics cannot be separated from the exceptional support that kept airline employees on payroll.
The distinction between a flight that covers its additional costs and a business that covers its complete costs is not academic. It is the difference between a temporary survival strategy and a sustainable commercial operation.
The long-term forecast was wrong
Perhaps the most revealing failure comes at the end of the episode.
Wendover argues that air cargo demand closely follows global economic health. It predicts a prolonged downturn and concludes that, once emergency medical demand subsides, the air cargo industry will almost certainly follow passenger aviation into a difficult period.
The narrator states:
"The air cargo world will almost certainly follow the fate of its passenger-carrying colleagues."
That prediction did not survive the following year.
The International Air Transport Association's December 2021 analysis recorded an 18.7% increase in global air cargo volumes compared with 2020. Volumes also exceeded the previous 2018 peak by 3.5%.
IATA
IATA's 2022 Annual Review provides an even clearer financial picture:
Year Global air cargo revenue 2019 $101 billion 2020 $129 billion 2021 $155 billionBy 2021, air cargo revenue had risen more than 50% above its 2019 level. Demand was 6.9% above the pre-pandemic level.
IATA
This was not simply a continuation of the original medical-equipment emergency.
IATA identified robust demand for consumer goods, inventory restocking and supply-chain disruption as important drivers. Delays and congestion in maritime shipping also made air freight relatively attractive despite its higher cost.
IATA
There is an important distinction here.
The temporary passenger-aircraft cargo experiment did fade, but the air cargo industry did not collapse.
IATA's retrospective figures show that passenger-freighters, commonly called preighters, accounted for 16% of international cargo traffic in 2021. Their share fell to 7% in 2022, as conventional passenger aircraft gradually restored belly-hold capacity.
Over the same period, passenger belly cargo's share rose from 20% to 30%.
IATA
Wendover was right that the improvised passenger-aircraft operation would eventually become less necessary. It was wrong to equate that temporary operational change with the fate of the wider air cargo industry.
The market found another source of demand. It was not waiting for the passenger business to recover.
The sponsor is not the problem
The episode openly discloses CuriosityStream and Nebula as sponsors and promotes their subscription bundle.
I found no evidence in the material reviewed of an aviation-industry financial relationship or sponsor interference. There is no defensible basis for suggesting otherwise.
The problem is the economic argument itself. It does not need a conspiracy to be challenged.
Verdict: A convincing logistics story without the financial proof
Wendover successfully describes an extraordinary moment in aviation history. Passenger airlines repurposed grounded aircraft, cargo rates increased, medical supplies needed transportation and airlines found new ways to keep aircraft operating.
But the video makes a stronger claim than its evidence permits.
Its 44% calculation measures potential gross revenue, not profit. Its fuel and staffing arguments depend on exceptional market conditions and government support. Its cabin-cargo explanation understates the regulatory and safety requirements. And its prediction that air cargo would follow passenger aviation into a prolonged downturn was contradicted by the record-breaking recovery of 2021.
The central failure is confusing an economically attractive opportunity with a demonstrated profitable operation.
A flight might have been worth operating. It might even have generated positive incremental returns. But without actual revenues, costs and operating margins, declaring it profitable is an assumption dressed up as an economic conclusion.
Wendover had the ingredients of an excellent investigation. What it never supplied was the ledger.
References
1. Air Cargo's Coronavirus Problem — Wendover Productions — Original episode, published May 5, 2020. Primary source for the creator's claims, calculations and forecasts.
2. Air Cargo Market Analysis — March 2020 — IATA, April 28, 2020. Establishes the actual March demand and capacity contraction, including the collapse in passenger belly-hold capacity.
3. FAQ 113210: Using the Passenger Cabin as a Cargo Compartment — European Union Aviation Safety Agency, April 24, 2020. Establishes the certification, exemption, fire-detection and fire-suppression limitations.
4. Guidance for the Transport of Cargo and Mail on Aircraft Configured for Passengers — IATA, May 4, 2020. Documents the actual safety assessments, personnel, equipment, approvals and loading restrictions.
5. Novel Coronavirus Regulatory Updates — Federal Aviation Administration, May 20, 2020. Documents the specific US exemption and authorization requirements for cargo carried on passenger seats.
6. United Airlines Holdings 2020 Form 10-K — United Airlines, 2021. Provides audited cargo revenue, fuel costs, payroll expenses and CARES Act support figures.
7. Air Canada 2020 Annual Report — Air Canada, 2021. Documents more than 4,000 cargo-only flights, aircraft conversions, cargo revenues and the actual breakdown of operating-cost reductions.
8. Air Cargo Market Analysis — December 2021 — IATA, January 25, 2022. Establishes the extraordinary 2021 recovery in global cargo traffic, capacity and freight rates.
9. Air Cargo Revenues Vital to Airlines — IATA Annual Review 2022 — IATA, 2022. Documents the increase in worldwide cargo revenue from $101 billion in 2019 to $155 billion in 2021.
10. Uneven Recovery Trends in Air Cargo Traffic and Capacity — IATA, March 10, 2023. Separates the temporary preighter boom from the recovery of conventional passenger belly-hold capacity.