The China Numbers Behind American Sports' Global Ambitions Don't Tell the Whole Story
The central weakness in Wendover Productions' 2019 analysis is not that its numbers are necessarily false. It is that the video repeatedly treats audience reach as evidence of commercial success without establishing how much money those audiences generate, how consistently they return, or how durable the underlying business really is.
The distinction matters. Millions of people watching a game, a valuable broadcasting contract, and a profitable sports business are three different things.
The NFL's 120,000 young players were a forecast, not a head count
Wendover states that “120,000 young Chinese have gone to private training camps for American football.” The contemporaneous evidence says something materially different.
In an interview published by the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business, Richard Young, then managing director of NFL China, reported more than 30,000 children under 12 regularly participating in organized training. He described 120,000 as a projection for 2020, not an achieved figure.
CKGSB Knowledge+1
A February 2019 Forbes report repeated the distinction: 30,000 existing participants across approximately 100 purpose-built facilities, with 120,000 projected before 2020. It also disclosed an average training fee of 27,600 yuan, approximately US$4,000 annually for a weekly program.
forbes.com
That last figure matters. This was an emerging commercial niche aimed partly at affluent families, not evidence that American football had become a mass-participation sport across China.
By October 2020, Breaking Asia, citing NFL figures, reported more than 50,000 children under 12 participating in organized programs. That was evidence of growth, but it did not independently establish that the earlier 120,000 projection had been achieved.
Breaking Asia
This is not a harmless rounding error. Wendover converted a forecast into an accomplished fact and presented it as evidence of the sport's existing reach.
Two million viewers per game is not two million viewers per week
The video says:
“Each week, Tencent’s streaming platforms broadcast a number of games, which each have an average viewership of more than two million people.”
A February 2019 Forbes report provides a crucial distinction. The three NFL primetime games averaged 2.2 million unique viewers per week, while all digital activity, including short-form video and broadcasts, generated more than 18 million views weekly.
forbes.com
Those are different measurements. Weekly unique viewers cannot be multiplied into a per-game audience, and video views cannot be treated as distinct people.
A January 2020 Forbes report subsequently put average weekly Chinese viewership of NFL live online broadcasts during the 2019 season at 3.1 million. That confirms meaningful growth, but still describes a weekly audience, not millions of viewers for every individual game.
tollbit.forbes.com
The distinction matters because the episode uses the audience figures to establish the commercial potential of NFL broadcasting in China. Its wording makes the audience appear considerably larger and more consistently engaged than the available measurements establish.
The audience itself was not invented. A June 2019 Forbes report documented 72% growth in live digital viewership over the preceding year and more than eight million viewers for Super Bowl LIII in mainland China. The NFL had genuine momentum; the problem is what Wendover makes that momentum prove.
forbes.com
The commercial distinction was acknowledged by people working inside the sport. In September 2019, Ryan Huzjak, the Pittsburgh Steelers' vice-president of sales and marketing, told Sports Business Journal:
“We're not trying to drive sales in China.”
He explained that the immediate objective was to expand the team's fanbase, with commercial benefits potentially coming later. That is a much more honest description of an emerging market than treating social engagement as an established business.
sportsbusinessjournal.com
The Patriots' success illustrates the same distinction. Tom Brady's China Show accumulated 15.8 million total views across Tencent-owned platforms, according to digital marketing firm Mailman; that was a successful content series, not 15.8 million independently verified customers or unique fans.
Sports Business Journal
Wendover correctly acknowledges that the NFL's Tencent broadcasting fee was not publicly known. But without that figure, subscription revenue, advertising income, operating costs or evidence of commercial conversion, its suggestion that the audience necessarily represented meaningful income remains speculation.
The NBA's $500 million was plausible, but not an audited figure
Here, the evidence requires a narrower criticism.
Wendover's claim that the NBA generated more than $500 million annually in China was not invented. A 2019 CBS News report quoted sports-law professor Steven Weisman describing $500 million as a conservative estimate, while explicitly acknowledging that the league's China-derived income could not be accurately calculated. The Guardian subsequently described approximately $500 million as the prevailing modest estimate.
CBS News+1
There was substantial commercial activity behind the estimate.
In July 2019, the NBA and Tencent announced a five-year digital broadcasting partnership covering the 2020–21 through 2024–25 seasons. The NBA reported that 490 million fans in China had watched its programming on Tencent during the previous season, with 21 million watching the sixth game of the 2019 Finals.
NBA.com: NBA Communications
The contract's financial value was not officially disclosed by either party. However, Chinese financial publication Caixin reported that sources close to the companies valued the agreement at $1.5 billion over five years, equivalent to $300 million annually.
caixin.com
There is another important development. SportBusiness subsequently reported that the Tencent agreement was renegotiated before its commencement, reducing its annual value to approximately $270 million. A separate China Mobile agreement beginning in 2021–22 was understood to be worth $50 million in its first season, with subsequent annual value below $100 million.
VOLUME 25 ISSUE 21 www.media.sportbusiness.com
These figures make the $500 million estimate commercially plausible. But they do not establish an audited $500 million annual total.
The distinction is important: a broadcasting contract is one revenue stream. Sponsorships, merchandise, licensing and other commercial activities contribute separately. Without the NBA's underlying financial statements, the total remains an estimate.
Wendover should have identified it as such and explained the difference between reported rights payments and estimated total revenue. Presenting an estimate as a settled financial fact gives readers more certainty than the evidence allows.
The Morey controversy did not simply blow over
The video describes the NBA's response to Daryl Morey's Hong Kong tweet as essentially an apology. The actual sequence was more complicated.
On October 6, 2019, the NBA's English-language statement expressed regret that Morey's views had offended Chinese fans, but also affirmed the league's support for individuals sharing their views. Two days later, Commissioner Adam Silver explicitly stated that the NBA was not apologizing for Morey exercising his freedom of expression.
NBA.com: NBA Communications+1
There was also a significant translation dispute. The NBA's Chinese-language Weibo statement described the league as extremely disappointed in Morey's inappropriate remarks, language that did not appear in the official English statement. The Associated Press documented the discrepancy and the NBA's subsequent clarification that its English statement was authoritative.
KSL.com
This was not simply an apology. It was an attempt to manage incompatible political and commercial expectations, with different audiences receiving materially different messages.
More importantly, the subsequent history contradicts the suggestion that the crisis largely passed.
-
October 2019: CCTV suspended NBA broadcasts, while Tencent temporarily stopped streaming NBA preseason games.
-
October 2020: CCTV returned with one NBA Finals broadcast after approximately a year away. This was not a restoration of regular coverage.
NBA.com
- March 2022: CCTV resumed broadcasting NBA games after a largely two-year television blackout.
Axios
- October 2024: Tencent renewed its exclusive NBA China digital partnership through 2027.
新华网客户端
- October 2025: The NBA returned to China for preseason games for the first time since 2019, with the Brooklyn Nets and Phoenix Suns playing in Macau.
BBC Sport+1
The financial consequences were substantial. In February 2020, Adam Silver estimated that the dispute would cost the NBA hundreds of millions of dollars, probably less than $400 million. He specifically connected those losses to the television blackout and Chinese business partners withdrawing from relationships with the league.
The Guardian
There is an important qualification: Tencent continued carrying NBA games after the initial suspension, and the subsequent renewal demonstrates that the digital relationship survived. The NBA did not lose its entire Chinese audience.
But digital distribution is not the same as full commercial access. The NBA retained a streaming relationship while losing regular state television coverage and its ability to stage preseason games in China for six years.
That distinction is central to understanding the actual business risk.
A growing audience was not yet a proven business
The NFL's expansion was real, but much of its Chinese strategy was still audience development.
A June 2019 Forbes report documented 72% growth in digital live-game viewership, more than 300 flag-football teams across 14 cities, and over 3,000 adults playing in organized recreational tackle leagues. These are meaningful developments, but they describe an emerging market, not an established domestic professional-sports industry.
forbes.com
The distinction is particularly important when evaluating the Patriots' success. The team had built a Chinese social media following exceeding 500,000, while its Brady China Show accumulated 15.8 million total views. Those results demonstrate that localized content could attract attention, not that viewers were purchasing subscriptions, merchandise or tickets.
Sports Business Journal
The NFL's three-year Tencent broadcasting partnership covered the 2017–2019 seasons and included selected preseason games, regular-season fixtures, playoffs and the Super Bowl. The league did not publicly disclose the broadcasting fee.
NFL
Wendover recognizes that limitation but offers no financial evidence to establish how valuable the arrangement actually was.
That is the missing business question: how much of this growing audience could the NFL convert into recurring revenue?
The NBA's $500 million was plausible, but not an audited figure
Here, the evidence requires a narrower criticism.
Wendover's claim that the NBA generated more than $500 million annually in China was not invented. A 2019 CBS News report quoted sports-law professor Steven Weisman describing $500 million as a conservative estimate, while explicitly acknowledging that the league's China-derived income could not be accurately calculated. The Guardian subsequently described approximately $500 million as the prevailing modest estimate.
CBS News+1
There was substantial commercial activity behind the estimate.
In July 2019, the NBA and Tencent announced a five-year digital broadcasting partnership covering the 2020–21 through 2024–25 seasons. The NBA reported that 490 million fans in China had watched its programming on Tencent during the previous season, with 21 million watching the sixth game of the 2019 Finals.
NBA.com: NBA Communications
The contract's financial value was not officially disclosed by either party. However, Chinese financial publication Caixin reported that sources close to the companies valued the agreement at $1.5 billion over five years, equivalent to $300 million annually.
caixin.com
There is another important development. SportBusiness subsequently reported that the Tencent agreement was renegotiated before its commencement, reducing its annual value to approximately $270 million. A separate China Mobile agreement beginning in 2021–22 was understood to be worth $50 million in its first season, with subsequent annual value below $100 million.
VOLUME 25 ISSUE 21 www.media.sportbusiness.com
These figures make the $500 million estimate commercially plausible. But they do not establish an audited $500 million annual total.
The distinction is important: a broadcasting contract is one revenue stream. Sponsorships, merchandise, licensing and other commercial activities contribute separately. Without the NBA's underlying financial statements, the total remains an estimate.
Wendover should have identified it as such and explained the difference between reported rights payments and estimated total revenue. Presenting an estimate as a settled financial fact gives readers more certainty than the evidence allows.
The Morey controversy did not simply blow over
The video describes the NBA's response to Daryl Morey's Hong Kong tweet as essentially an apology. The actual sequence was more complicated.
On October 6, 2019, the NBA's English-language statement expressed regret that Morey's views had offended Chinese fans, but also affirmed the league's support for individuals sharing their views. Two days later, Commissioner Adam Silver explicitly stated that the NBA was not apologizing for Morey exercising his freedom of expression.
NBA.com: NBA Communications+1
There was also a significant translation dispute. The NBA's Chinese-language Weibo statement described the league as extremely disappointed in Morey's inappropriate remarks, language that did not appear in the official English statement. The Associated Press documented the discrepancy and the NBA's subsequent clarification that its English statement was authoritative.
KSL.com
This was not simply an apology. It was an attempt to manage incompatible political and commercial expectations, with different audiences receiving materially different messages.
More importantly, the subsequent history contradicts the suggestion that the crisis largely passed.
-
October 2019: CCTV suspended NBA broadcasts, while Tencent temporarily stopped streaming NBA preseason games.
-
October 2020: CCTV returned with one NBA Finals broadcast after approximately a year away. This was not a restoration of regular coverage.
NBA.com
- March 2022: CCTV resumed broadcasting NBA games after a largely two-year television blackout.
Axios
- October 2024: Tencent renewed its exclusive NBA China digital partnership through 2027.
新华网客户端
- October 2025: The NBA returned to China for preseason games for the first time since 2019, with the Brooklyn Nets and Phoenix Suns playing in Macau.
BBC Sport+1
The financial consequences were substantial. In February 2020, Adam Silver estimated that the dispute would cost the NBA hundreds of millions of dollars, probably less than $400 million. He specifically connected those losses to the television blackout and Chinese business partners withdrawing from relationships with the league.
The Guardian
There is an important qualification: Tencent continued carrying NBA games after the initial suspension, and the subsequent renewal demonstrates that the digital relationship survived. The NBA did not lose its entire Chinese audience.
But digital distribution is not the same as full commercial access. The NBA retained a streaming relationship while losing regular state television coverage and its ability to stage preseason games in China for six years.
That distinction is central to understanding the actual business risk.
What the episode ultimately gets wrong
The broad argument survives scrutiny: China became a valuable market for American sports, digital distribution created genuine opportunities, and political disagreements could threaten decades of commercial investment.
But Wendover makes that story look more commercially mature than its own evidence establishes.
A projected 120,000 young participants become 120,000 actual participants. A weekly audience becomes an audience supposedly exceeding two million for each game. An estimated NBA revenue figure is presented without its uncertainty. A temporary improvement in relations becomes a suggestion that the Morey controversy largely passed.
These are not minor editorial imperfections. They change how readers understand the scale, maturity and financial security of the Chinese sports market.
The disclosed Brilliant sponsorship deserves no insinuation: I found no evidence connecting the sponsor to the leagues, broadcasters or Chinese sports investments discussed here.
My verdict is narrower and more serious: Wendover tells a compelling story about market opportunity but does not consistently distinguish audience growth from commercial achievement. China was a real opportunity. It was never a guaranteed business, and the NBA's six-year absence from in-country preseason games demonstrates just how expensive that distinction could become.
References
1. American Sports' Battle for China — Wendover Productions, January 15, 2020. Original episode and primary material under review.
2. China Touchdown: An Interview with NFL's Richard Young, CKGSB Knowledge. The NFL China managing director distinguishes actual youth participation from the 120,000 projection.
3. The NFL Is A Sleeping Giant In China, Forbes, February 1, 2019. Documents the 30,000 participants, 120,000 forecast, training costs and weekly audience figures.
4. Millions In China Will Watch Super Bowl LIV Via Mobile Devices, Forbes, January 31, 2020. Reports 3.1 million average weekly NFL live-stream viewers during the 2019 season.
5. China Could Be The Next Frontier For American Football, Forbes, June 23, 2019. Provides evidence of actual digital audience growth, Super Bowl viewership and grassroots participation.
6. NFL Teams Go Deep With Chinese Marketing Efforts, Sports Business Journal, September 22, 2019. Documents the Steelers' stated intention to build an audience before pursuing sales.
7. Digital Content Propels Patriots to Become China's Most Popular NFL Team, Sports Business Journal, February 20, 2019. Provides the original Mailman figures behind the Patriots' Chinese social media and video performance.
8. NBA-China Rift Could Hit Players Where It Hurts: Their Wallets, CBS News, October 15, 2019. Attributes the $500 million China revenue estimate to a sports-law professor who acknowledges its uncertainty.
9. NBA and Tencent Announce Five-Year Partnership Expansion, NBA Communications, July 28, 2019. Officially confirms the partnership and audience figures, without disclosing the contract price.
10. Tencent's $1.5 Billion NBA Rights Renewal, Caixin, July 29, 2019. Reports the estimated contract value and explains that the parties did not disclose the price.
11. NBA Weathers Storm to Increase Digital Rights Revenue in China, SportBusiness, December 3, 2021. Reports the renegotiated Tencent fee and the additional China Mobile agreement.
12. The Losses Are Substantial: The NBA's Trouble With China, Four Months On, The Guardian, February 24, 2020. Documents Silver's financial-loss estimate and the continuing television blackout.
13. NBA's Reaction to Morey Tweet Differs in English, Chinese, Associated Press via KSL, October 7, 2019. Establishes the discrepancy between the NBA's English statement and its Chinese-language social media communication.
14. China Resumes Airing NBA Basketball After 2-Year Blackout, Axios, March 31, 2022. Establishes the prolonged interruption and subsequent return of state television coverage.
15. Why Is NBA Returning to China After Six Years?, BBC Sport, October 9, 2025. Documents the six-year absence and the Macau return.
16. NBA China and Alibaba Cloud Announce Multiyear Collaboration, Alibaba Group, October 9, 2025. Confirms the renewed commercial and technology partnership accompanying the NBA's return to Macau.