- Russia assembled approximately 175,000 troops around Ukraine over three and a half months, preparing for a full-scale invasion. The buildup included medical units, field hospitals and fuel reserves, while troops and equipment moved from Russia into staging areas in Belarus and near the Ukrainian border.
“the Russians were amassing the infrastructure for war.”
- Russia's railway network was both its greatest logistical advantage and a fundamental military vulnerability. The government owned approximately 20,000 of the country's 21,000 locomotives, while 30,000 Railway Troops supported military rail operations; trains enabled enormous domestic mobilization but exposed troop movements to satellite monitoring and social media.
“it was trains that moved the troops, tanks, and trucks to and from Yelnya”
- Russia's initial strategy depended on capturing Kyiv quickly and installing a puppet government. Hostomel Airport was intended to become an air bridge for reinforcements, but Ukraine's 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade retook it by 8 p.m. on February 24, and Russian forces failed to advance beyond Kyiv's suburbs during the second day.
- Russia lacked sufficient trucks to sustain an offensive far beyond its railway supply depots. Each combined-arms army's logistics brigade had approximately 408 transport vehicles carrying 1,870 tons, while retired US Lieutenant Colonel Alex Vershinin estimated that Russian forces could not adequately sustain combat more than 90 miles from their supply dumps.
“Russia doesn’t have enough trucks.”
- Russia's invasion plan assumed Ukraine would collapse before its logistical capacity ran out. Its forces were expected to operate largely independently for only three to five days, leaving them scrambling to regroup and resupply when the anticipated rapid victory failed to materialize.
“for about three to five days.”
- Russia's centrally controlled resupply system was less adaptable than Western military logistics. Its push-based approach required commanders to prioritize ammunition, fuel and other supplies centrally, whereas Western pull-based systems allowed frontline units to request what changing battlefield conditions actually demanded.
“western forces let strategy lead logistics, while Russian forces let logistics lead strategy.”
- Ukraine deliberately attacked Russia's supply infrastructure rather than relying exclusively on conventional battlefield engagements. Defenders targeted vulnerable fuel trucks, destroyed bridges and railway connections, removed road signs and disrupted unsecured Russian radio communications, undermining the invading force's ability to move and coordinate.
“if you stop the fuel trucks, you stop the tanks”
- Russia's logistical weakness was serious but not necessarily permanent, because time could allow it to build alternative supply networks. Pipeline battalions and Railway Troops could extend fuel supplies and rebuild railways, while the prolonged invasion brought increasingly destructive attacks, looting and civilian casualties.
“the single factor that can best address these issues, however, is time.”