The Dollar Is Not Being Dethroned. But Wendover Is Asking the Wrong Question.
Wendover Productions makes a persuasive case that the US dollar is difficult to replace. Its mistake is treating the survival of dollar supremacy as though it settles the question of whether American financial influence is declining. These are two different things. The IMF's first-quarter 2026 figures put the dollar at 57.13% of disclosed foreign-exchange reserves, while its share has fallen substantially from its 2001 peak of approximately 71%. The dollar remains dominant, but dominance and immunity from gradual erosion are not the same thing.
data.imf.org+1
The reserve-currency relay race never existed
The episode builds its history around successive currencies taking over from their predecessors: the florin, Spanish real, Dutch guilder, pound and dollar. It then makes a consequential assertion: “There has never not been a definitive global reserve currency in modern times.” That is historically too neat.
The IMF's 2025 historical analysis describes a period of coexistence between sterling and the dollar. The dollar had already overtaken sterling in trade credit, but the pound remained significant, particularly among Commonwealth countries. During the interwar period, gold accounted for at least 80% of reserves, making the competition between the two currencies only part of the picture.
imf.org+1
An earlier IMF study also documents periods without a clearly dominant international currency, including periods when the pound, French franc and German mark all held significant reserve positions.
elibrary.imf.org
This matters because a dominant currency does not have to be replaced by another dominant currency for the international monetary system to change. Several currencies can share international functions, while gold and other reserve assets absorb part of the demand previously concentrated in dollars.
The dollar remains dominant. The yuan is not close to replacing it.
The strongest evidence in Wendover's favour comes from the Bank for International Settlements. Its 2025 survey found that the dollar was on one side of 89.2% of foreign-exchange trades, up from 88.4% in 2022. Global foreign-exchange trading reached $9.6 trillion per day. The renminbi accounted for 8.5% of currency turnover, but just 2.11% of official foreign-exchange reserves in the IMF's second-quarter 2026 data.
Bank for International Settlements+1
China has made genuine progress: the renminbi reached approximately 25% of China's goods-trade invoicing by mid-2024. But the IMF still found that the dollar was the most frequently used invoicing currency among Chinese firms, while renminbi use among third parties outside China remained limited by capital controls and the lack of a sufficiently deep, liquid domestic bond market.
International Monetary Fund+1
Wendover is therefore right about the absence of a credible immediate successor. That is not the same as proving that the dollar's international influence cannot gradually diminish.
Gradual diversification is already a documented phenomenon
The episode's treatment of declining dollar reserves as a normal fluctuation overlooks research available before its release. In March 2022, IMF researchers Serkan Arslanalp, Barry Eichengreen and Chima Simpson-Bell documented an active, long-term diversification by central banks since 2000. They found that roughly three-quarters of the shift away from dollars went into smaller currencies, not another major reserve currency.
International Monetary Fund
The latest figures provide another example. In the second quarter of 2026, the dollar's reserve share fell from 57.18% to 56.70%, while dollar claims remained largely unchanged. Euro-denominated claims increased by nearly $100 billion, mostly through active purchases. The IMF attributed the broader currency-share changes primarily to portfolio reallocations and other price changes, rather than exchange-rate movements.
IMF Data
One quarter does not establish a lasting decline. But it demonstrates the missing possibility in Wendover's framework: reserve managers can gradually redistribute their holdings without waiting for an American collapse, a worldwide political revolt, or a new currency to take over.
The IMF's 2025 External Sector Report identifies four developments worth watching: geopolitical fragmentation, greater renminbi use, a softening of America's role as the world's banker and insurer, and alternative payment systems. Its conclusion is notably more nuanced than either a dollar-collapse narrative or a declaration of permanent American supremacy: these developments do not currently displace the dollar, but could eventually produce a gradual reconfiguration of international currency use.
International Monetary Fund
The Amadea seizure was not an exercise of unlimited American jurisdiction
The episode's most consequential overstatement concerns American sanctions power. It says that using the dollar gives Washington “near-total jurisdiction over global finance” and presents the $300 million Russian superyacht Amadea as an example of the United States physically seizing foreign assets through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
The financial connection was real. US prosecutors alleged that payments for the yacht's maintenance passed through American financial institutions in violation of sanctions. But the physical seizure in Fiji required a separate legal process.
United States Department of Justice+1
Fiji's Supreme Court documented that process in its April 28, 2023 judgment:
- The United States obtained a seizure warrant from its District Court on April 13, 2022.
- The US Department of Justice requested Fiji's assistance under Articles 13 and 18 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
- Fiji's Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1997 provided the domestic legal framework.
- Fiji's Attorney-General authorized the Director of Public Prosecutions to seek registration of the American warrant.
- Fijian courts and authorities then enabled the vessel's detention and transfer.
Most importantly, the Fiji Supreme Court explained that registration placed the yacht under the control and management of Fiji's Attorney-General, who retained authority to decide what happened to it. Washington did not acquire automatic control of property sitting in Fiji.
judiciary.gov.fj+1
The subsequent American forfeiture proceedings also took years. Eduard Khudainatov and Millemarin Investments disputed the government's claim that Suleiman Kerimov beneficially owned the yacht. Following a four-day evidentiary hearing, the US District Court found that they were merely straw owners who had relinquished meaningful ownership and control. The Second Circuit affirmed that finding on June 1, 2026.
ww3.ca2.uscourts.gov
There was a substantial financial cost to enforcement. The Washington Post reported in December 2024, using records obtained through litigation, that the US government had spent approximately $30 million maintaining the yacht; the Department of Justice confirmed the figure. Its FY2025 financial audit subsequently recorded a sale for $187 million on October 10, 2025, while the legal appeal was still pending.
Washington Post+1
This was a successful exercise of American financial and legal influence. It was not proof of unilateral global jurisdiction. The distinction matters: the dollar gave Washington leverage over the payments; international cooperation and domestic legal authority gave it access to the yacht.
New payment networks can strengthen the dollar
There is another complication the episode misses: an alternative payment network does not necessarily mean an alternative currency.
The IMF's 2025 report found that the market capitalization of stablecoins had grown almost tenfold since early 2021, with US-dollar-backed products accounting for the largest share. These digital instruments can function as a means of payment, a store of value and a unit of account.
International Monetary Fund
The two largest issuers, Circle and Tether, collectively held US Treasury investments comparable to those of major national holders, ranking as the world's 17th largest holder. The IMF explicitly warned that wider adoption of dollar-backed stablecoins could reinforce the dollar's international position.
International Monetary Fund
That is a particularly important distinction. Financial infrastructure can move away from traditional American banking channels while continuing to use American money. The dollar's future is therefore not simply a contest between the US banking system and Chinese payment infrastructure.
The dollar's safety premium can weaken before the dollar falls
The episode identifies an American economic collapse as the traditional route to losing reserve-currency supremacy. But there is a meaningful difference between an economy collapsing and its financial advantages gradually becoming less attractive.
The IMF's 2025 report identifies several signs of weakening in America's role as the world's banker and insurer:
- The US net international investment position has deteriorated substantially over the preceding decade.
- The return advantage on American foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has declined.
- The convenience premium on US Treasury securities has fallen and turned negative across several maturities.
- American government debt has reached historically high levels and is projected to increase further.
The IMF attributes these developments to several possible factors, including debt issuance and structural changes in financial markets.
International Monetary Fund
April 2025 offered a particularly interesting test. Following American tariff announcements, the dollar depreciated and Treasury yields rose, suggesting weaker demand for American safe assets during a period of global uncertainty. This was unusual because investors traditionally move towards dollars and Treasuries during financial stress.
The IMF cautioned that the episode could prove temporary and noted that Treasury yields remained relatively low by historical standards. It is not evidence that the dollar has lost its safe-haven status. It is evidence that the foundations of that status deserve closer examination.
International Monetary Fund
The measures of dollar dominance should not be confused
There is a fundamental analytical weakness running through the episode: it moves between three different kinds of power as though they were interchangeable.
- Reserve dominance: How much foreign-currency wealth central banks hold in dollars.
- Trading dominance: How frequently the dollar appears in foreign-exchange transactions.
- Financial jurisdiction: How much influence American institutions and laws have over international payments.
These measures are related, but they are not identical. The dollar can lose reserve share while becoming more deeply embedded in foreign-exchange trading. Payment infrastructure can also change while the underlying currency remains the dollar.
Even the IMF's reserve data needs careful interpretation. COFER measures foreign-currency reserves, not all official reserve assets; it excludes monetary gold and special drawing rights. The IMF reported that gold surpassed US Treasuries by market value in 2025, but attributed almost all of that change to gold-price valuation rather than a corresponding mass withdrawal from dollar holdings.
IMF Data+1
The IMF also revised its COFER methodology in late 2025, imputing previously unallocated reserves. Its July 2026 release initially reported a 57.13% dollar share for the first quarter; the September release revised that quarter to 57.18%. The broad historical trends remained unchanged.
IMF Data+2
A serious assessment of dollar supremacy must examine these different measures separately. Otherwise, a change in one can be mistaken for a transformation of the entire financial system.
Verdict: The dollar can remain first without remaining unchallenged
Wendover's central conclusion that the dollar has no credible immediate replacement remains defensible. The evidence does not establish an impending dollar collapse, a successful BRICS currency, or a global rejection of American financial institutions.
But its two-scenario framework is unnecessarily restrictive.
History demonstrates that currencies can share international functions. Central banks have actively diversified reserves into smaller currencies. The euro can gain reserve share without replacing the dollar. Gold can absorb some reserve demand without becoming a transaction currency. Digital payment systems can expand dollar usage rather than diminish it.
And America's financial power, while extraordinary, depends on foreign institutions, legal cooperation and continued confidence in American assets.
The most important threat to dollar supremacy may therefore be neither a spectacular collapse nor a coordinated international revolt. It may be the gradual loss of exclusive dependence: more countries building alternatives, more transactions taking different routes, and more reserve managers keeping their options open.
Wendover mistakes the absence of a successor for the absence of a transition. The dollar does not have to lose first place for America to lose some of the extraordinary influence that comes with holding it.
References
1. The Growing Revolt Against the US Dollar — Wendover Productions, original video. The primary source for the episode's historical narrative, sanctions argument and predictions.
2. Reserve Currencies in an Evolving International Monetary System — International Monetary Fund, November 2020. Documents historical periods in which several currencies shared international reserve functions.
3. The Stealth Erosion of Dollar Dominance — IMF Working Paper 22/58, March 24, 2022. Establishes that central bank diversification into smaller currencies was already measurable before the video appeared.
4. The International Role of the U.S. Dollar — 2025 Edition — Federal Reserve, July 18, 2025. Provides historical reserve-share data and measures of international currency usage.
5. External Sector Report: Global Imbalances in a Shifting World — International Monetary Fund, July 2025. Documents the coexistence of sterling and the dollar, emerging financial vulnerabilities, alternative payment infrastructure and the possibility of gradual monetary reconfiguration.
6. The International Monetary Role of the Euro, 2026 — European Central Bank, June 2026. Provides additional context on the euro's reserve-currency position and the revised IMF reserve data.
7. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, Q2 2026 — IMF Data, September 30, 2026. Supplies the latest reserve-share figures and explains the dollar's quarterly decline and increased euro holdings.
8. OTC Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2025 — Bank for International Settlements, September 30, 2025. Establishes the dollar's continued dominance in actual foreign-exchange trading.
9. Millemarin Investments Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions — Supreme Court of Fiji, April 28, 2023. Documents the international legal assistance, Fijian legislation and domestic judicial authority behind the Amadea seizure.
10. Civil Forfeiture Complaint Filed Against the Amadea — US Department of Justice, October 2023. Establishes the American government's allegations concerning dollar-denominated maintenance payments and the mutual legal assistance process.
11. United States v. The M/Y Amadea — US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, June 1, 2026. Records the ownership dispute, evidentiary hearing and appellate affirmation of the finding that the claimants were straw owners.
12. The U.S. Seized a Russian Yacht. Now Taxpayers Are Footing the Bill — The Washington Post, December 19, 2024. Uses government records obtained through litigation to document approximately $30 million in yacht-maintenance expenses.
13. Audit of the Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund, FY2025 — US Department of Justice Office of Inspector General, February 2026. Records the Amadea's $187 million sale and the status of its proceeds while the appeal remained pending.
14. Improving the Analytical Usefulness of the IMF's COFER Data — International Monetary Fund, November 26, 2025. Explains the reserve-data revisions and their effect on historical currency-share comparisons.