Russia's Airspace Monopoly Was Real. Wendover's Explanation of It Was Not Nearly Complete Enough.

Russia did possess extraordinary leverage over European–Asian aviation, and established European airlines benefited from restrictions that excluded competitors. But Wendover Productions makes a much bigger claim than simply describing a restrictive aviation system: it presents Russia as deliberately protecting legacy airlines and keeping budget competitors out. The documentary record reveals a more complicated system of bilateral agreements, negotiated flight quotas and payments to Aeroflot. The distinction matters because a story about political protectionism is not automatically a proven story about deliberate monopoly engineering.

The video gets the legal framework wrong by making it sound simpler than it was

Russia's exclusion from the International Air Services Transit Agreement is important, but the agreement does not give every airline from every country unrestricted access to every signatory's airspace. It grants two specified transit freedoms between participating states. More fundamentally, international scheduled flights still operate under national permissions and applicable aviation agreements. ICAO's treaty framework and the Convention's sovereignty provisions make that distinction clear.

Russia's position was therefore not an extraordinary exception to a universal right of unrestricted flight. It was an unusually valuable exercise of a power that states retain over their own airspace. That does not excuse discriminatory arrangements, but it changes the argument: the relevant question is how Russia negotiated and allocated traffic rights, not simply why it refused to sign one treaty.

The one-airline rule is real in Scandinavia, but the video generalizes it

There is unusually strong independent confirmation of the Norwegian dispute. Norway's government examined it in its 2019 aviation report, NOU 2019:22. The report says Scandinavia collectively held a limited number of Siberian overflight rights, that SAS was the only Scandinavian airline using them, and that SAS consumed a large share of the regional allocation.

It also confirms that Norway and Russia had been negotiating to secure rights for a second Scandinavian airline, specifically Norwegian. The available quota had been increased somewhat in 2016. Norwegian government's 2019 report, section 4.4.6.

This supports the video's central example. But it also exposes an important distinction: the arrangement was a negotiated Scandinavian allocation, not evidence of a universal Russian rule granting exactly one airline per European country. Wendover acknowledges exceptions but never establishes the complete country-by-country system or explains how the individual bilateral agreements differ.

The Icelandic airlines dispute was more complicated than a price dispute

Wendover's account relies heavily on the claim that Russia refused WOW Air and Icelandair permission because their low-cost business models could not absorb its charges. But a contemporaneous Russian Transport Ministry statement, published on 17 May 2018, disputed that account. It said two Icelandic airlines had been offered access to Tokyo, Beijing, Seoul, Hong Kong and Shanghai after September 2017 negotiations, but had not submitted applications.

That Russian account was not proof that access was freely available. The same statement required diplomatic designation and commercial agreements with a designated Russian airline. Interfax's report therefore exposes the missing question: were the airlines refused access, or were they offered access on conditions they considered commercially unacceptable?

Iceland's own government supplied an important part of the answer later that year. Following talks on 8 November 2018, Iceland's Foreign Ministry announced that Russia had dropped its requirement for Icelandic airlines to maintain scheduled direct flights to Russian destinations before using the Siberian corridor. Iceland explicitly said the previous conditions had been so restrictive that they had prevented its airlines from negotiating access.

The airlines would still have to negotiate overflight fees. Iceland's Foreign Ministry, 16 November 2018.

This is more revealing than the video's explanation. Russia was not simply quoting a price to prospective budget airlines; it was attaching additional commercial conditions to access. Those conditions were sufficiently restrictive that Iceland's government had to negotiate their removal. That is documented evidence of market-access leverage, but it is not proof that the sole objective was to protect incumbent airlines.

The diplomatic context also deserved better treatment. Icelandic reporting attributed possible retaliation to Iceland's participation in sanctions against Russia following the annexation of Crimea. That attribution came from sources close to the Icelandic tourism industry, not a documented Russian admission. Wendover presents the political explanation without adequately separating suspicion from established fact.

The $100 figure needs a date, a source and a definition

The video's estimate that Siberian overflight fees could add up to $100 to a passenger's round-trip ticket is plausible in scale, but its presentation is inadequate. It gives no calculation, airline, route, passenger allocation method or year against which readers can test the number.

There is a revealing historical connection: Aviation Week reported in November 2011 that removing Russia's overflight royalty could save as much as $100 per passenger on a Europe–Asia round-trip ticket, citing industry analysts. That was an estimate of the potential fare reduction from removing the fee, not a published measurement of the charge on every 2018 ticket. Aviation Week, 16 November 2011.

The payment system had also undergone significant negotiations. Under the EU–Russia agreement, compulsory commercial agreements between European airlines and Russian carriers were to end by 1 January 2014, with remaining charges required to be cost-related, transparent and non-discriminatory, and paid to public authorities. The arrangement was tied to the wider negotiations surrounding Russia's WTO accession. European Commission's agreement.

That does not mean Russia stopped collecting money. Russian officials disputed whether the royalties would disappear entirely, and Interfax reported in May 2018 that payments continued, with most going to Aeroflot and part to Rosaviatsia. The same report gave an unofficial annual estimate of 30–40 billion rubles. Interfax, 17 May 2018.

There is another distinction Wendover misses: the European Union's settlement did not automatically govern Iceland's separate bilateral aviation arrangements. The old Aeroflot royalty system, reformed EU charges and the commercial terms facing Icelandic airlines cannot simply be treated as one identical fee.

The money was real. The commercial leverage was real. But a single $100 figure cannot explain a payment system whose recipients, legal arrangements and conditions changed over time.

The low-cost airlines were not being held back by Russia alone

The video treats Norwegian Air as a ready-made competitor that could have brought cheaper fares to Asia if Russia had granted access. Norwegian's own financial disclosures complicate that picture. Its 2018 annual report describes the peak of its long-haul expansion, expensive operational disruption from Rolls-Royce engine problems, grounded Boeing 787s and the need to lease replacement aircraft. The company subsequently shifted its strategy from growth to profitability and reduced planned investment. Norwegian's 2018 annual report.

Norway's subsequent government review recorded Norwegian's 2018 earnings before tax at a loss of NOK 2.5 billion. It also documented the airline's difficulty maintaining revenue per seat against operating costs. Russia's restrictions were a genuine obstacle, but the video never establishes that removing them would have produced a profitable Asian network or materially cheaper tickets.

WOW Air provides an even sharper reality check. Its Reykjavik–Delhi service actually launched on 6 December 2018, but the airline announced a major restructuring one week later. It planned to reduce its fleet from 20 aircraft to 11, return its Airbus A330 widebodies and lay off 111 employees; its published results showed a $33.6 million loss for the first nine months of 2018. Business Standard subsequently reported that WOW intended to withdraw from Delhi shortly after launching the route.

WOW Air's restructuring announcement and Business Standard's report.

This was not evidence that Russia had defeated a financially healthy competitor. WOW was already fighting for its survival. And, as Wendover itself notes, the Reykjavik–Delhi route could avoid Russian airspace with approximately 45 minutes of additional flying time.

The decisive omission is the absence of actual consumer-price evidence. The video supplies no route-by-route fare comparisons, no measurement of the premium caused by Russian restrictions, no market-share analysis and no estimate of how much a new budget airline would have reduced ticket prices. It moves from a genuine barrier to competition to a sweeping prediction about expensive flights without establishing the economic link.

The final problem: a real restriction becomes an unproven accusation of intent

Russia's restrictions did favour established airlines in particular markets. The Scandinavian case is documented, the Icelandic negotiations demonstrate restrictive conditions, and historical payments to Aeroflot were substantial.

But Wendover never establishes that protecting legacy airlines was the consistent purpose behind the system. It does not examine the individual bilateral agreements, demonstrate a coordinated policy of excluding budget competitors, or establish that the same explanation applies to every country.

The distinction is important. A government can negotiate restrictive aviation rights, demand commercial concessions and exploit its geographical position without every restriction being designed specifically to preserve an incumbent airline's market share.

The evidence supports a serious criticism of Russian aviation policy. It does not support treating every denied application, commercial fee or negotiating condition as proof of a deliberate European-wide airline protection scheme.

The bilateral agreements tell a different story

The European system was not governed by one universal Russian rule. A 2007 UK parliamentary review of the EU–Russia aviation negotiations explains that Russia refused to negotiate overflight rights with the European Community as a bloc. Individual member states had to negotiate their own bilateral arrangements.

The agreement also preserved existing leased overflight frequencies while introducing new rights and a temporary equalisation mechanism to prevent competitive distortions between European airlines. These details matter: historical allocations, national bargaining and grandfathered commercial rights helped determine which airlines could compete. UK House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, 2007.

The distinction between the old royalty system and its replacement was also disputed inside Russia. In September 2013, Deputy Transport Minister Valery Okulov said royalties would not be fully cancelled after 2014, despite earlier expectations that Aeroflot's contractual payments would end. The Moscow Times, 4 September 2013.

That is precisely the sort of institutional detail an investigative explanation should establish before declaring how much money Russia was making and who benefited.

Closing verdict

Russia's geographical position gave it an extraordinary commercial advantage. Its restrictive bilateral arrangements disadvantaged competing airlines, its Scandinavian allocation favoured SAS, and its Icelandic negotiations demonstrate that access could come with conditions designed to serve Russian commercial interests.

But Wendover turns those documented facts into a broader accusation it never adequately proves.

It generalises a regional allocation system into a European-wide monopoly, treats different generations of overflight payments as one straightforward charge, overlooks competing official accounts of denied access, and presents a speculative consumer-price consequence as an established economic outcome.

Russia controlled an exceptionally valuable shortcut. Wendover demonstrates that control, but does not establish that protecting legacy airlines was its overriding purpose or that removing restrictions would have made Asian flights substantially cheaper.

That is the difference between identifying a powerful gatekeeper and proving a deliberate monopoly. The video does the first. It has not earned the second.

References

1. The Most Valuable Airspace in the World — Wendover Productions, 29 May 2018. Original work under review.

2. International Air Services Transit Agreement — United Nations Treaty Series, 1944. Establishes the two specific transit freedoms granted between contracting states.

3. Agreed Principles of the Modernisation of the Transsiberian Routes — European Commission, 2007. Documents the termination of compulsory commercial agreements and the replacement fee requirements.

4. Aviation Agreements: Fifteenth Report — UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 2 April 2007. Explains bilateral negotiations, grandfathered frequencies and the equalisation mechanism.

5. NOU 2019:22 — Norwegian Aviation in Change — Norwegian Ministry of Transport, 2019. Independently confirms SAS's privileged position in Scandinavia and the negotiations to secure rights for Norwegian.

6. Russia Won't Let Icelandic Airlines Fly to China, Japan and South Korea — The Reykjavík Grapevine, 16 May 2018. Reports the original Icelandic allegations, including the Russian service requirement and quoted overflight charges.

7. Russian Transport Ministry Disputes Attempts to Block Icelandic Airlines — Interfax, 17 May 2018. Provides Russia's competing account of the negotiations, proposed permissions and commercial conditions.

8. Icelandic Airlines Can Now Negotiate the Siberian Route — Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 November 2018. Confirms that Russia removed a restrictive prerequisite for Icelandic airlines and that fee negotiations remained necessary.

9. End of Siberian Overflight Royalty Could Cut European Airfares to Asia — Aviation Week, 16 November 2011. Traces the $100 round-trip passenger estimate to an earlier industry forecast.

10. Overflight Fees to Remain After 2014 — The Moscow Times, 4 September 2013. Records the Russian Deputy Transport Minister's position that the royalty system would not be fully eliminated.

11. Norwegian Air Shuttle Annual Report 2018 — Norwegian Air Shuttle, 2019. Documents long-haul operational problems, engine disruptions and the company's shift towards profitability.

12. WOW Air: Restructuring and Going Back to Its Roots — WOW Air, 13 December 2018. Provides the airline's own account of its financial difficulties, fleet reductions and workforce cuts.

13. WOW Air Begins Reykjavik–Delhi Services — Aviation Week, 7 December 2018. Confirms that the proposed Delhi service actually launched.

14. Cheapest India–US Flight to End as WOW Air Set to Exit Delhi Route — Business Standard, 13 December 2018. Documents the planned withdrawal of WOW's Delhi service shortly after launch.