Boeing's Missing 797: Airbus Built the Aircraft That Boeing Promised
Wendover Productions made a confident prediction about the future of aviation: Boeing would fill the gap between its 737 and 787 with a revolutionary new aircraft, the 797. The video even forecast commercial service around 2025.
That prediction failed. By November 2024, Airbus was already operating the A321XLR across the Atlantic, while Boeing had no 797 in production, no announced launch customer, and no confirmed entry-into-service date.
The problem is not simply that an aircraft programme was delayed. The video misunderstood how the competition for the middle of the aviation market would unfold.
Iberia Launches the New A321XLR Worldwide+2
The 797 was a proposal, not a product
The video repeatedly presents Boeing's 797 as an almost certain aircraft. Its own wording is revealing:
“We've all but confirmed that the Boeing 797 will be a brand new plane.”
That was an exaggeration. The aircraft was officially being studied as Boeing's New Midsize Airplane (NMA); 797 was an unofficial designation. In August 2018, Air Lease Corporation president John Plueger told investors that the NMA had not been launched and that nobody could order or preorder it. Air Lease was deeply involved in discussions with Boeing, making this particularly informative evidence.
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The distinction matters. Boeing's own spokesman, Paul Bergman, told the press in May 2019 that the company was still evaluating the business case and deciding whether to offer the aircraft. Even a launch decision was conditional on a positive market response.
Federal Way Mirror
The 2025 target was not invented by Wendover. Aviation Week reported in January 2020 that Boeing's proposed 225-seat and 275-seat versions had provisionally targeted 2025 entry into service. But Boeing had been approaching a board approval decision when the second 737 MAX crash and subsequent grounding derailed its plans.
New CEO Dave Calhoun subsequently sent the project back to the drawing board, describing a fresh design process. Reuters reported that the existing $15–20 billion proposal had effectively been shelved in its current form.
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By July 2026, Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg had started work on a new aircraft design but said the company needed to restore its finances and establish the necessary technology before committing. He expected that preparation to take another couple of years.
WSJ
I don't fault Wendover for predicting an aircraft that Boeing was genuinely considering. I fault the presentation for converting a conditional business proposal into an almost-confirmed future product.
Airbus did not sit still
The video dismisses Airbus's previous A310 experience and describes the A321neo Long Range as a temporary solution until Boeing releases its supposedly superior aircraft.
That assessment aged badly.
Airbus developed the A321LR with a range of 4,000 nautical miles and capacity for up to 240 passengers. Aer Lingus received its first aircraft in July 2019 and deployed it on transatlantic routes to the eastern United States.
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Then came the A321XLR.
With a range of 4,700 nautical miles, typical two-class seating for 180–220 passengers and maximum capacity of 244, it offered substantially greater range than the earlier A321LR. More than 90% commonality with the A321neo also gave airlines an established aircraft family into which they could integrate the new model.
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The commercial decisions were particularly revealing:
- American Airlines agreed to acquire 50 A321XLRs in June 2019.
Airbus
- United Airlines ordered 50 in December 2019. Its executive vice president described the aircraft as an ideal one-for-one replacement for older aircraft operating on important intercontinental routes.
Airbus
On November 14, 2024, Iberia operated the first commercial transatlantic A321XLR service, flying Madrid–Boston.
Iberia Launches the New A321XLR Worldwide
This is precisely the kind of development the video treated as temporary.
However, I would not claim Airbus has captured the entire market. The proposed Boeing NMA was a larger twin-aisle aircraft, with 225-seat and 275-seat versions. The A321XLR is smaller and does not fulfil every mission that a larger aircraft could serve.
The distinction remains visible in the numbers. A July 2026 aircraft-market assessment recorded more than 500 A321XLR net commercial orders, but only 43 deliveries and 39 active aircraft. Meanwhile, Delta's 2025 annual filing still listed 92 Boeing 757s in its fleet.
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Airbus found a commercially attractive solution to a substantial part of the problem. It did not eliminate every potential use for a larger aircraft.
The more important discovery is that Boeing was not competing against an empty market. Airbus was developing an alternative while Boeing was still trying to establish whether its own business case justified a clean-sheet aircraft.
A gap in an aircraft chart is not a business case
The video's central market argument rests heavily on aircraft size and maximum range.
It compares the maximum all-economy capacities of the 737 MAX 10 and 787-8, identifies a gap, and concludes that airlines need an aircraft carrying roughly 230–280 passengers.
That is a useful starting point, not proof of commercial demand.
The video does not establish how many routes could consistently fill such an aircraft, what passengers would pay, what operating costs would be acceptable, or how many airlines would actually purchase it.
Nor does it adequately compare the financial advantages of introducing a completely new aircraft against extending an existing family.
The A321XLR's commonality with the A321neo is particularly important. Airlines can introduce longer-range capability without adopting an entirely new aircraft family. The video identifies the aircraft's smaller size as a disadvantage but does not seriously examine the operational value of that commonality.
Its assertion that United, Delta and American all wanted a larger, longer-range aircraft also needs qualification. United and American ultimately ordered A321XLRs, while Delta's subsequent fleet commitments followed a different path, including A321neos and 737 MAX 10s.
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These are not identical purchasing decisions.
A 757 replacement is not one universal requirement. Airlines have different passenger volumes, route lengths, fleet structures and operating strategies.
The video also overlooks an important distinction: the NMA concept expanded beyond replacing the 757 to include a potential successor to the 767. That made its proposed market broader than the narrow transatlantic problem used to introduce the story.
Aviation Week
Boeing's challenge was not simply to build an aircraft that fitted between two existing models. It had to justify a very expensive development programme against an evolving market and an increasingly capable Airbus competitor.
A blank space between two aircraft specifications does not automatically justify billions of dollars in investment.
Electric aviation is another prediction presented as an inevitability
The video finishes by suggesting electric aircraft could dominate short-haul transportation because they would eliminate fuel expenses and compete with buses and trains on price.
The technical obstacles are acknowledged, but the economic conclusion arrives without a serious cost model.
Airbus's own 2017 statement was more cautious than the video's presentation. It said passenger aircraft below 100 seats could use hybrid propulsion by 2030. Its more specific roadmap anticipated a 50–100-seat hybrid-electric aircraft capable of flying 1,000 kilometres by 2035. These were technology ambitions, not confirmed commercial release dates.
Airbus
Airbus's E-Fan X programme illustrates the difference. It was a hybrid-electric technology demonstrator developed with Rolls-Royce, not a production commuter aircraft. Airbus and Rolls-Royce jointly ended the project in April 2020.
Airbus
Independent research also challenges the video's economic assumptions.
A May 2024 study by Nicolò Avogadro and Renato Redondi, published in Transportation Research Part D, compared the operating costs of first-generation electric aircraft with conventional equivalents.
Its findings were inconvenient for the video's argument:
- First-generation electric aircraft had higher operating costs than comparable conventional aircraft.
- Smaller, 19-seat electric aircraft could become economically attractive as purchase, maintenance and battery replacement costs improved.
- Larger regional electric aircraft were more promising in the medium term, with further technological development.
In other words, removing conventional fuel does not automatically make an aircraft cheaper to operate.
ScienceDirect
The regulatory and infrastructure problems are equally significant.
A May 2026 US Government Accountability Office report found that the FAA had not issued type certification for a manned electric aircraft as of March 2026. Only 47 US airports had identified electric-aircraft charging stations in their plans as of December 2025. Airports also faced uncertain installation costs, electricity availability and demand.
GAO Files
These are not minor details. An airline cannot build a profitable network around aircraft that cannot yet obtain the necessary certification or reliably use its intended airport infrastructure.
The Edinburgh–London comparison between British Airways and Flybe does not resolve these questions. A six-minute difference between a jet and a turboprop on one route demonstrates that cruise speed is not everything. It does not establish that electric aircraft can offer competitive fares, operate profitably or replace conventional regional services.
The video moves from a plausible technical advantage to an enormous commercial conclusion without demonstrating the economics in between.
The verdict
Wendover's explanation of the Boeing 757's importance remains a useful account of how aircraft economics shape airline networks.
But its forecasts were considerably less reliable.
The Boeing 797 never became an approved aircraft programme. Airbus developed the A321LR and A321XLR into real commercial products, winning substantial airline orders. The larger middle-market opportunity remains more complicated than either a simple Boeing victory or a complete Airbus takeover.
Electric aviation offers genuine possibilities, but the gap between experimental technology and profitable commercial service remains substantial.
My objection is not that Wendover made predictions. Predictions are useful. My objection is that the video repeatedly presented possibilities as near-certainties without showing readers the commercial evidence necessary to distinguish an exciting engineering concept from a viable airline product.
The future of aviation is not decided by which aircraft looks best on a specification sheet. It is decided by which aircraft airlines can afford to buy, fill, operate and maintain profitably.
That was the economic argument the video set out to explain. It should have applied the same discipline to its own predictions.
References
- Original video — Wendover Productions, What's Actually the Plane of the Future. Watch original video. The source of the 797 and electric-aircraft predictions; it also discloses a Squarespace sponsorship, with no established connection between the sponsor and the aviation claims.
- Air Lease Corporation, Q2 2018 Earnings Call Transcript — SEC, August 9, 2018. Read SEC transcript. Documents the NMA's unlaunched status and the lessor's simultaneous discussions with Boeing and Airbus about the A321XLR as a 757 replacement.
- Boeing says decision on new airplane will come this year — Federal Way Mirror, May 29, 2019. Read report. Contains Boeing spokesman Paul Bergman's statement that the company was still deciding whether to offer the NMA.
- Boeing Heads Back to Drawing Board on NMA — Aviation Week, January 25, 2020. Read Aviation Week. Establishes the proposed aircraft's configurations, provisional 2025 target and the circumstances surrounding Boeing's programme rethink.
- Boeing's new CEO orders rethink on key jetliner project — Reuters, January 23, 2020. Read Reuters report. Reports the $15–20 billion proposal being shelved in its existing form and Boeing's decision to reassess the market.
- Boeing Needs to Shore Up Finances Before Launching New Airplane Design, CEO Says — The Wall Street Journal, 2026. Read WSJ. Records Kelly Ortberg's explanation of why Boeing was not yet ready to commit to a new aircraft programme.
- A321LR and A321XLR development — Airbus, 2018–2019. A321LR specifications · Aer Lingus delivery · American Airlines XLR order · United Airlines XLR order. Establishes the aircraft capabilities, commercial development and airline commitments.
- Iberia Launches the New A321XLR Worldwide — Iberia, November 13, 2024. Read Iberia announcement. Documents the first commercial transatlantic A321XLR service between Madrid and Boston.
- American Airlines aircraft financing prospectus — SEC, July 27, 2026. Read SEC filing. Provides July 2026 A321XLR order, delivery and active-fleet figures based on industry fleet data.
- Delta Air Lines 2025 Form 10-K — SEC, 2026. Read annual filing. Establishes Delta's remaining 757 fleet and its different aircraft purchasing commitments.
- Electrifying the Sky — Airbus, May 2017; E-Fan X programme update — Airbus, April 2020. Read Airbus technology roadmap · Read E-Fan X history. Distinguishes Airbus's original hybrid-electric research ambitions from actual demonstrator development and cancellation.
- Demystifying electric aircraft's role in aviation decarbonization: Are first-generation electric aircraft cost-effective? — Nicolò Avogadro and Renato Redondi, Transportation Research Part D, May 2024. Read academic study. Provides an operating-cost model comparing first-generation electric aircraft with conventional regional aircraft.
- Electric Aircraft: FAA Is Evaluating Designs for Certification and Considering Long-Term Regulatory Approaches — US Government Accountability Office, May 27, 2026. Read GAO report. Documents the certification, charging infrastructure and deployment barriers facing electric aviation in the United States.