Europe’s Airline “Culling Season” Is a Real Risk, Not a Proven Calendar Rule
Wendover’s 2019 video has a defensible premise and an overconfident conclusion. European airlines face a severe seasonal cash-flow squeeze after summer, but the episode does not establish that September and October constitute a predictable bankruptcy season, or that the same financial mechanism explains every airline collapse.
I accept the seasonal risk. I reject the calendar certainty.
1. The seasonal problem is real, but the evidence is more complicated
The strongest independent evidence actually supports part of Wendover’s argument. In a 2019 analysis, International Air Transport Association (IATA) chief economist Brian Pearce wrote:
“Cash flow problems typically become unsustainable in the seasonally weak period of October to February.”
Pearce also identified several additional pressures behind European airline failures. Jet fuel had increased from approximately $60 to $95 per barrel over two years, the US dollar had strengthened 10% against the euro, passenger traffic growth had slowed, and ticket yields had turned negative across major European markets.
This is important because it confirms that Wendover did not invent the seasonal explanation. An independent industry economist was identifying the same vulnerability.
But IATA described a five-month period, not a September–October bankruptcy season. It also identified rising costs, currency movements, weakening demand and falling fares as contributing factors.
The distinction matters. Seasonal weakness can expose an airline's financial problems without being the underlying reason that the airline became insolvent.
Source: IATA's analysis of European airline profitability and failures.
2. The $160 billion profit figure hides an extremely unequal industry
Wendover opens with more than $160 billion in combined global airline profits over five years, creating an apparent contradiction between industry prosperity and individual airline failures.
But industry-wide profitability is a poor measure of the financial health of an individual airline.
IATA's European analysis found that more than half of European airline profits were generated by just four major groups: IAG, Air France-KLM, Lufthansa Group and Ryanair.
Europe had 195 airlines offering scheduled passenger services, compared with 98 in North America. It took 28 European airlines to provide 80% of available seats, compared with just seven in North America.
The median European airline was performing considerably worse than the headline industry figures suggested.
This is the missing economic context. Europe's largest carriers could generate extraordinary profits while smaller competitors struggled with limited scale, expensive operations and intense competition.
The industry's prosperity was not shared equally.
Wendover acknowledges that weaker airlines were surviving during favorable conditions, but never properly establishes how concentrated those profits were. The $160 billion figure therefore creates a misleading impression of general financial strength.
Source: IATA's analysis of Europe's fragmented airline market.
3. Nine airline collapses are not a statistical demonstration
The video identifies nine prominent European airline failures and observes that eight stopped flying in September or October.
That is an interesting pattern. It is not a comprehensive statistical analysis.
Wendover acknowledges that the list is not definitive, but provides no complete comparison of airline failures, surviving airlines, monthly insolvencies or the number of carriers exposed to the same seasonal conditions.
There is a significant difference between identifying a cluster and demonstrating that the cluster represents a recurring statistical phenomenon.
A European Commission-commissioned study published in 2026 provides a broader comparison. Its research team, using Cirium data and additional investigation, identified 54 airline bankruptcies across its 2014–2023 sample.
The annual totals peaked at ten bankruptcies in both 2018 and 2019. However, the published analysis provides annual counts rather than a month-by-month breakdown.
It therefore confirms a substantial wave of airline failures, but cannot establish Wendover's September–October pattern.
Other significant failures also occurred outside those months:
- Air Berlin filed for bankruptcy on August 15, 2017.
- Germania declared bankruptcy on February 4, 2019.
- Flybmi ceased operations on February 16, 2019.
- WOW Air ceased operations on March 28, 2019.
These are not obscure examples. They are documented failures within the same period.
The problem is not that Wendover selected interesting airlines. It is that the selected cases cannot establish the frequency or predictability of the phenomenon.
The video makes a particularly ambitious prediction:
“Each year, without fail, another big name too will topple in September or October.”
That is a much stronger statement than the evidence presented. It requires a defined population, consistent definitions of bankruptcy and operational closure, and a sufficiently long historical record.
None is supplied.
Sources: European Commission-commissioned airline bankruptcy study and Reuters' chronology of European airline collapses.
4. Ryanair's profit graph does not establish the cash-flow position of failing airlines
Wendover uses Ryanair's quarterly gross-profit figures to demonstrate how strongly airline earnings fluctuate throughout the year.
The seasonal pattern is credible. Ryanair's own 2019 SEC filing confirms that it typically records higher revenues and income during the first half of its financial year.
But gross profit and cash flow are not interchangeable.
Ryanair's filing explains that revenue from flight seats is recognized when the service is provided. Tickets sold for flights that have not yet taken place are recorded as unearned revenue.
At March 31, 2019, Ryanair reported approximately €1.962 billion in unearned revenue. It also held approximately €3.16 billion in cash and liquid resources.
These figures matter because the video uses an earnings graph to explain a cash-flow crisis.
The graph demonstrates seasonal financial performance. It does not establish when the failed airlines received their cash, what debts were becoming due, how much liquidity they retained, or whether they had sufficient advance bookings to survive the winter.
Ryanair was a particularly strong operator with substantial financial resources. Its quarterly performance cannot simply be treated as the financial template for an airline approaching insolvency.
The missing evidence is the actual financial position of the failed companies.
5. The airlines did not all fail for the same reason
Seasonality was a genuine pressure, but individual collapses involved different financial decisions, ownership arrangements and operational failures.
Cobalt Air provides a particularly revealing example.
Its Chinese investor, AVIC Joy Air, held 49% of the company. By October 2018, the airline had reportedly received approximately €100 million in investment, while the Cypriot transport ministry's permanent secretary cited accumulated losses of approximately €30 million annually.
Two aircraft had been grounded after leasing payments were missed. According to contemporaneous reporting by the Cyprus Mail, investors provided an emergency injection of up to €10 million, but the airline reportedly needed another €30 million to survive the winter.
The investors eventually stopped providing money.
This was indeed a seasonal cash problem, but it was also a story about chronic losses, aircraft leasing, management decisions and an investor's willingness to continue financing the business.
Source: Cyprus Mail, October 19, 2018.
Thomas Cook presents a different problem.
A 2019 submission by the Institute of Directors to Parliament identified approximately £3 billion owed to lenders and suppliers. It described the immediate cause of insolvency as rapidly deteriorating cash flow, partly resulting from high indebtedness and the failure to secure a viable restructuring with major creditors.
The submission also raised questions about the company's acquisition-led expansion between 2007 and 2011 and its ability to manage the resulting debt.
Importantly, the Institute acknowledged that the ultimate causes still required proper investigation.
This was not simply an airline encountering a quiet winter. It was a heavily indebted corporate group unable to secure the restructuring needed to survive.
Source: Institute of Directors' written evidence to Parliament.
These examples do not disprove seasonal vulnerability. They demonstrate why seasonal cash flow should be treated as a contributing pressure rather than a universal explanation for airline failure.
6. Europe does not have one bankruptcy system
Wendover contrasts European insolvency procedures with American Chapter 11, arguing that European airlines generally have little opportunity to restructure once bankrupt.
There is some truth to the comparison, particularly in the UK, but the continental generalization is too broad.
The UK Department for Transport's 2019 Airline Insolvency Review describes operating an airline during administration as rare in Britain, though not unheard of. More typically, British airline insolvencies result in immediate cessation of operations.
However, the same report documents a major European counterexample: Air Berlin.
Air Berlin filed for insolvency on August 15, 2017, after its main shareholder, Etihad Airways, withdrew financial support following years of losses.
The German government provided a €150 million bridging loan through KfW, a state-owned financial institution, allowing the airline to continue operating while assets were sold and its business was wound down.
Its aircraft continued flying until October 27, 2017. Some operations and employees were transferred to other carriers, and the company completed an orderly exit from the market in January 2018.
Germany's insolvency framework allowed a debtor-in-possession approach that enabled the airline's directors to continue managing operations during administration.
This creates another problem for Wendover's timing argument.
Air Berlin can be classified as an August bankruptcy or an October flight shutdown, depending on which event is being counted.
Those are two different dates describing two different stages of the same failure.
A comparison between Europe and America cannot responsibly ignore the differences between European national insolvency regimes.
Source: UK Department for Transport, Airline Insolvency Review, March 2019.
7. Thomas Cook's collapse left a substantial public bill
Wendover describes the Thomas Cook repatriation as a lucrative opportunity for charter operators and an expensive exercise for the British government.
The subsequent National Audit Office investigation provides the figures missing from that account.
The estimated taxpayer bill was at least £156 million:
- £83 million for repatriation.
- At least £73 million in other government costs, including redundancy payments and liquidation expenses.
- Approximately 9,000 UK employees lost their jobs.
Between September 23 and October 7, the government and Civil Aviation Authority organized 746 repatriation flights from 54 airports.
Approximately 94% of passengers were returned on their original scheduled date.
The operation was an extraordinary logistical achievement, but describing the charter operators' earnings as a lucrative payday is not the same as demonstrating their actual profits. The video supplies no operator-level contract prices or margins.
The independently documented financial consequence is the public bill and the enormous burden placed on passengers, employees and taxpayers.
Verdict
Wendover identifies a genuine weakness in European aviation: seasonal demand, concentrated profitability, rising operating costs and fragile airlines can combine to produce serious financial problems after summer.
But it turns that explanation into something much more certain than the evidence permits.
The video does not establish a statistically reliable September–October bankruptcy cycle. Its Ryanair profit graph does not demonstrate the liquidity position of failed airlines. Its selected examples conceal substantial differences in corporate debt, investor support, operational failures and national insolvency procedures.
The distinction is consequential. A seasonal downturn can expose a badly managed or undercapitalized airline, but it does not explain why that airline was vulnerable in the first place.
The airline industry's autumn crisis is a credible economic pattern. The annual September–October execution season is a much stronger claim, and Wendover has not proved it.
References
- Why So Many Airlines are Going Bankrupt — Wendover Productions, October 8, 2019. Original video and primary source for the claims examined; the transcript discloses Shopify sponsorship, with no established connection between the sponsor and aviation.
- The State of the Airline Industry in Europe — International Air Transport Association, 2019. Provides independent confirmation of seasonal cash-flow pressure, fuel and currency exposure, and the concentration of industry profits among major airline groups.
- Evaluation Support Study for the Revision of the Guidelines on State Aid to Airports and Airlines — European Commission, prepared by Lear, DIW Berlin and EY, 2026. Provides a broader airline bankruptcy dataset covering 2014–2023, with annual counts but no monthly breakdown; the report notes that its findings represent the authors' views.
- Factbox: European Airline Collapses Since 2017 — Reuters, January 14, 2020. Establishes the filing and operational dates of several prominent failures, including Air Berlin, Germania, Flybmi and WOW Air.
- Ryanair Holdings plc 2019 Form 20-F — US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2019. Documents Ryanair's seasonal earnings, treatment of unearned ticket revenue, and substantial cash and liquid resources.
- Airline Insolvency Review — Final Report — UK Department for Transport, March 2019. Explains UK insolvency practice and documents Air Berlin's continued operations during German insolvency proceedings.
- Cobalt's Chinese Backers Decided 'Enough Was Enough' — Cyprus Mail, October 19, 2018. Reports Cobalt's investor funding, accumulated losses, aircraft lease arrears and the additional capital reportedly needed to survive winter.
- Written Evidence on the Collapse of Thomas Cook — Institute of Directors, 2019. Provides an early assessment of Thomas Cook's debt, failed creditor restructuring and financial vulnerability; it explicitly acknowledges that the ultimate causes required further investigation.
- Investigation into Government's Response to the Collapse of Thomas Cook — National Audit Office, March 19, 2020. Establishes the taxpayer cost, repatriation scale, passenger outcomes and employment consequences of the collapse.
Clarify the article’s central verdict earlierSeparate airlines from Thomas Cook